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ABSTRACT

Descriptive Inhumanism: Description and Decolonial Aesthetics
by
Marcos Gonsalez

Advisor: Kandice Chuh
This dissertation research examines, how can the act of describing, as a mode of writing,
documenting, and representing minoritized bodies, be geared towards an anti-racist, multispecies, and decolonial aesthetic praxis? Paying close attention to modes of writing categorized
under the rubric of description, such as ekphrasis, reportage in documentary film, travel writing,
and ethnographic description, as this dissertation contends, are integral to understanding how we
perceive and apprehend racialized people living out the legacies of coloniality. Through an
analysis of 20th century Anglophone literature on the Americas and contemporary queer Latina/o
literature, film, and art, this research looks closely at oft-overlooked styles and modes of writing
like description, bound as description has been to an objective and empirical social scientific
mode, and seeks to animate description with imaginative political potential to contribute to our
understanding of literary studies, writing practice, and decolonial thinking.
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Introduction

A modern is in Mexico. Fleeing his beloved Europe to the Americas in the 1920’s, D.H.
Lawrence writes a book of travel essays titled, Mornings in Mexico. In it, he observes, he
documents, and he describes his travels through the U.S. Southwest and Mexico. There he finds
Pueblo dancers in the desert, trees full of parrots, and a stubborn mestizo mozo (male servant)
named, Rosalino. Out of all the subjects/objects Lawrence speaks of in the essays, Rosalino
proves the most troublesome to his European sensibilities, to his European all-knowingness.
Lawrence describes the mozo derisively, as if he were in a relationship with him that he would
much rather not be in, describing him as animals and things: “Monday morning, the same black,
reptilian gloom, and a sense of hatred;” “But his heart was an obsidian knife;” “Exactly like a
parrot;” “he sweeps the whole of the patio, gathers up the leaves and refuse, fills the pannierbasket, hitches it up on to his shoulders and holds it by a band across his forehead, and thus, a
beast of burden, goes out to deposit the garbage at the side of one of the little roads leading out
of the city.” Lawrence may write degradingly of the mozo, of his indifferent and moody
existence, but the mozo does not budge for Lawrence. There is an epistemological impasse.
Lawrence’s effort at describing is an attempt to know the mozo, to exude control and mastery
and aggression over who he is, what his story will be. The mastery in description Lawrence holds
to does not work to reveal the inner workings of Rosalino. Rather, the descriptive apparatus
Lawrence tries to deploy is short-circuited by Rosalino’s material excess. What is this stumbling,
this impasse, to Lawrence’s thought that Rosalino represents via description? What could he not
describe that Rosalino represented? In what ways is describing a means of knowing,
categorizing, and perceiving via coloniality? In what ways can describing be against it?
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Descriptive Inhumanism analyzes the ways in which description operates to, on the one
hand, legitimize the colonial gaze in moments of epistemological crisis as is the case with
modernist writers like D.H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley traveling through Mexico; and, on the
other, work against the descriptive coloniality that seeks to classify, know, and apprehend
racialized subjects according to Eurocentric worldviews as it unfolds in contemporary queer
Latinx literature and cultural production. Working through scholarship on description from
anthropology, art history, decolonial theory, literary criticism, and the nonhuman turn taken up
by critical race scholars, I argue that fostering a critical sensibility for analyzing description can
tap into anti-racist, nonheteronormative, and decolonial aesthetic praxis. In a time when antimigrant violence and policies are on the rise, and global environmental destruction and
extractivism creates populations of precarity who are moving across the Global South, our
models for representing coloniality and colonization’s enduring impact on minoritized bodies are
inadequate for intersectional, hemispheric, and multi-species analyses. Beginning with modernist
literatures’ fascination with ethnographic description, and culminating in Latinx poetics and
aesthetics, I analyze how thinking description through this literary genealogy allows for a more
capacious analytic and creative language for figuring out how else to represent minoritized
bodies and communities outside of colonial epistemologies and worldviews, away from a future
that leaves no room for other ways of being and thinking of ourselves as human in the world.
This project, as I identify, is inhumanist, where it enters a hermeneutic practice that is embodied
and relational, queer and of color, human and nonhuman, entangled in the world rather than
distinct from it, which helps challenge the colonial epistemic projects of Western humanism.
Interest in description has been around for a long time. Homeric description instantiates it
as a literary style, and then follows its popularization in the tradition of blazon poetry made
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popular by Petrarch and Elizabethan poets. In the eighteenth century, description becomes
closely aligned with the rise of empiricist science, and becomes a means of taxonomizing and
classifying the world according to European epistemologies. For decades now, anthropologists
and social scientists have contended with description’s ties to empire, attending to the politics of
ethnographic description and the ways in which it caters to Western perspectives. Take for
instance the preface to the diaries of anthropologist Bronisław Malinowski, who published a
discipline-defining monograph Argonauts of the Western Pacific in 1922. His diaries document
his days conducting research in Papua New Guinea, which is the research he will use to publish
his magnus opus Argonauts of the Western Pacific, and the preface debates his reputation in light
of the diaries being published. In the diaries Malinowski writes of affairs he is having, doubts
over his marriage, calls the natives the n word, and finds his ethnographic subjects stubborn and
unwilling to cooperate. In parenthesis, Clifford Geertz, writing on Malinowski’s diary and
Firth’s preface to it, comments how Firth “sounds as though he desperately wishes he were
someplace else doing almost anything else.”1 In one of the most revealing instances of the
diaries, Malinowski, upon the first days in the Trobriand Islands, the initial impressions of a
people and their lives coursing through him, writes: "Feeling of ownership: It is I who will
describe them or create them."2
Malinowski’s diary entry is telling for how it knows just how powerful the descriptive
apparatus can be. The observations of a culture and a people reside in the ethnographer’s hand.
Yet Malinowski’s “or” in his pronouncement is an ambivalent one. What distinction is the “or”

1

Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988), 75.
2
Bronislaw Malinowski, A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1967), 140.
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trying to create between describing and creating? Is he suggesting description is an objective
empiricist method while creation is creative and subject to the whim of the writer? It is uncertain
what he is getting at but this dilemma over description and creation is nothing new for
anthropology. Emerging from the linguistic turn pervasive in the humanities and social sciences,
Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, the field-changing anthology
published in 1986 and edited by James Clifford and George E. Marcus, takes seriously the how
of how ethnographers write, describe, interpret, and represent the cultures they study.3 Recent
anthologies analyzing how ethnographers’ write culture, and how they can write ethnography,
continue the thinking done in Writing Culture.4 Clifford Geertz, in his 1973 collection of essays
The Interpretation of Cultures, posits what he calls “thick description,” a process of paying
attention keen to context, to the detail of the sociopolitical, the geohistorical, when observing and
interpreting cultures. “Anthropological interpretation,” for Geertz, is about, “tracing the curve of
a social discourse; fixing it into an inspectable form.” As an exercise in scholarly interpretation,
Geertz is sound in his packaging of interpretation as a form that is inspectable, given that the
arch of scholarly writing leans towards the clear, the definitive, the coherent. However, in
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Essays within the anthology like Vincent Crapanzo’s, “Hermes’ Dilemma: The Masking of
Subversion in Ethnographic Description” and James Clifford’s “On Ethnography Allegory” are
critical in their assessment of the how of how ethnography is written. Description, as their essay
foci attest, is to be taken seriously for how it projects truth, fact, and identity essence.
4
For more on style, writing, and method within anthropological field work and ethnography, see
the genre-defying anthology Crumpled Paper Boat: Experiments in Ethnographic Writing, ed.
Anand Pandian and Stuart McLean (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Writing Culture and
the Life of Anthropology, ed. Orin Starn (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), is a collection
of essays reflecting on the impact Writing Culture has had on ethnographic writing and research,
and provides avenues for imagining what research methods and ethnographic writing can look
like. Also Michael M.J. Fischer’s, Anthropology in the Meantime: Experimental Ethnography,
Theory, and Method for the Twenty-First Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2018) which
speaks to the post-Writing Culture in ethnographic work and the possibilities for experimental
research.
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creating this “inspectable form” what complexities, what nuance, what narratives, what
differences must be evacuated? What must be reduced in order to make generalizable? These
questions are not lost on Geertz who writes in the same essay that “coherence [in ethnography]
cannot be the major test of validity for cultural description,” and yet, “cultural systems must have
a minimal degree of coherence, else we would not call them systems.”5
In his essay in Writing Culture, “Hermes’ Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in
Ethnographic Description,” anthropologist Vincent Crapanzo analyzes three ethnographic
descriptions—George Catlin, Goethe, and Clifford Geertz—and the ways in which those
descriptions are imbued with rhetoric, figurative language, and other elements of literary style.
Style, for Crapanzo, is a defining component of the descriptive apparatus, of what it can do and
make do on the page. In his essay, he argues, description is a mode of ordering, making sense of
chaos, fighting back against the ephemeral, a means of convincing a reader with the end goal of
this descriptive work to project a sense of accuracy (therefore, veracity) over the peoples and
cultures the ethnographer is observing. Description in this way becomes a rhetorical tool through
which intentions, meaning, and interpretations are mediated, and with the intended result of
veracity and accuracy. Description sediments the binaries between knower/known,
observer/observed, and order/chaos.
Walter Mignolo confronts the power of the descriptive Crapanzo takes on in his essay
vis-à-vis Kant’s philosophy, and, in particular, the assertions Kant makes in his lectures on
geography. “Kant operates under the assumptions that knowledge is objective without
parenthesis and that the knower (or observer) can establish objectively that there is a

5

Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 17.
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correspondence between the description (in words or in cartography) and the world described,”6
states Mignolo, making clear the Western philosophical’s tradition dependence upon the
descriptive apparatus to legitimize epistemic coloniality. Kant cannot rationalize his philosophy
on objectivity and knowledge without the description, or lack thereof, of subaltern subjects and
locales, describing as displaying authority over knowledge, a describing of other geographies
other than Europe that is bound to a disembodied universality. Again, Malinowski’s diary entry
echoes, “Feeling of ownership: It is I who will describe them or create them.” Kant, too, enacts
Malinowski’s diary entry, as Mignolo provocatively makes clear.
Description, the act of describing, then, is bound to ethnographic research and analysis,
bound to philosophic traditions and colonial modes of knowing. Description is the data of field
research, and description is the evidence of philosophy. The concern over how to write
ethnographies is still pervasive within anthropology, and this unresolvedness is generative for
thinking through the ethics, politics, and the representational discourse inherent in how bodies,
communities, and cultures are rendered.
Description as a mode has also been of critical interest for literary criticism and critical
hermeneutics for some time now, with scholars interrogating the use of description within
literature and the possibilities for descriptive methods of analysis. György Lukács in his 1939
essay, “Narrate or Describe?” is critical of description. Undertaking a Marxist critique of the
work of Zola, he links the dehumanization of capitalism to description, where the automation and
assembly-lining of human life is like description in that description’s function is one of
generating static, immobile, and inert scenes. Lukács identifies description throughout the essay

Walter Mignolo The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options
(Durham: Duke University Press. 2011), 191.
6
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as producing still lives, “superfluous,” doing little more than “emphasiz[ing]the picturesque and
superficial aspects,” and, in the boldest indictment, it creates a “dreary existence without a rich
inner life, without the vitality of continuous development.” For Lukács, description is a form of
decadence, feminized and passive, a wasteful indulgence in details, whereas narration captures
the inner life of people, providing a connection between the past and the present to articulate the
development. Naomi Schor asked in her 1987 monograph: “Is the detail feminine?”7 The detail,
as Schor explains, is perceived as ornamental, superfluous, useless, feminine and effeminized
since neoclassical times. Description is detraction from the coherence and unity of works, a
digression from a main narrative, notions which, since the seventeenth and nineteenth century,
have structured our understandings of description.8 This is in stark contrast to the empirical and
scientific lens adopted by the social sciences and ethnography where description is deemed
masculine, classifying, taxonomizing, and ordering as it does, a style of writing and method
imbricated in colonial projects. In a 2009 special issue of Representations, “How We Read
Now,” Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus present what they call surface readings, a mode of
reading keen to description, considering “what texts do say, rather than what they don’t or
can’t.”9 Literary scholars are well versed in hermeneutics of suspicion, a demand for unveiling

7

Naomi Schor in Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine (New York: Routledge, 1987),
mounts a compelling case against the devaluing of the detail in Western art and criticism. For
her, the detail, through neoclassical thinkers, becomes associated with the feminine. However,
her analyses contains a blindspot in overlooking the details (housed under the umbrella of
description as it is) connection to the descriptive apparatus employed by Western science and
empiricism.
8
Michel Beaujour, “Some Paradoxes of Description” Yale French Studies 61 (1981): 27-59;
Hamon, Philippe, “Rhetorical Status of the Descriptive” Yale French Studies 61 (1981): 1-26
9
Heather Love, “Close but not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn” New Literary
History, vol. 41 no. 2 (2010): 383.
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and demystification, formally inaugurated by Frederic Jameson.10 Symptomatic reading, as it
came to be called, looked to the text for repressed meanings, and anything on the surface of a
text, visible, available, or present, was deemed unworthy of critical investigation. Through this
analytic purview, description, being immediate and on the surface of a text, details and detailing
what is, was overlooked. Merely descriptive.
Following Marcus and Best’s response to Jameson’s symptomatic reading, Heather Love
has extensively written on surface readings and the descriptive.11 Focusing on the close-reading
of literary studies, foundational as it is to literary pedagogy and credentializing critics, Love
questions the symptomatic ways of reading associated with close-reading, where the critic,
“gives up his role of interpreting divine messages to take up a position as a humble analyst and
observer.”12 What description as a method of analysis allows, as opposed to a depth
interpretation, or Geertz’s thick description and Jameson’s symptomatic reading, is a different
vantage point investigating what the text is and is like, identifying, “not what texts and their
signifying practices can be interpreted to mean but what they can be deciphered to do.”13 What
lies on the surface of the text, not buried within or beyond it, is of value.
For Love, in a time of ever-increasing university defunding and departmental
consolidation, surface reading proffers a method of invigorating our analytic toolbelt and modes
of scholarly study. While Love does admit there is no such thing as “‘pure’ description,” and

10

Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1982).
11
Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus. 2009. “Surface Reading: An Introduction.” Representations,
vol. 108, no. 1: 1–21.
12
Love, “Close but not Deep.” 381
13
Sylvia Wynter, "Rethinking 'Aesthetics': Notes Towards a Deciphering Practice" in Ex-Iles:
Essays on Caribbean Cinema, ed. Cham Mbye (Trenton: African World Press Inc, 1992).
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“every description entails an interpretation of some kind,” surface reading cleaves too easily a
boundary between interpretation and description. More importantly, queer of color critique has
taken to task ethnographic description and the observational methods of social science for the
pseudo-objectivity it purports to practice and the banishing of particularity it demands, where,
for those like Roderick Ferguson, contending with the descriptions of the “drive-by sociologist”
is to “expose the restrictions of universality, the exploitations of capital, and the deceptions of
national culture.”14 Surface reading, as an analytic method, as a potential way of undertaking
scholarly study, requires more room for thinking human social differences within descriptive
work.
Other critics, particularly in art history, have argued the importance of interpretative
description.15 Art historian Jaś Elsner incentivizes interpretive description, writing, “Without
interpretative description there would be no art history.” He provocatively argues the importance
of description as interpretative, as analytical and evaluative, by positing that there is no original
work of art, or pure essence of an object to study. His analysis derives from art history’s
longstanding theorizing on the descriptive tradition known as ekphrasis, the verbal representation
of visual representation. Ekphrasis is a confrontation with Otherness, difference of medium,

14

Roderick Ferguson in his seminal book, Aberrations In Black: Toward A Queer Of Color
Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004) discusses the importance of
weaving together race and sexuality in sociological frameworks, particularly when sexual
difference informs how we understand race. For more on queer of color critique, see José
Esteban Muñoz, Disidentifications: Queers Of Color And The Performance Of Politics
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Chandan Reddy, “Home, Houses, and
Nonidentity: ‘Paris is Burning,’” in Burning Down the House: Recycling Domesticity, ed.
Rosemary Marangoly George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); Cathy Cohen, “Punks,
Bulldaggers, and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics?” Gay and Lesbian
Quarterly 3 (1997): 437– 65.
15
For more on art history’s take on description, see Jaś Elsner. “Art History as Ekphrasis” Art
History, no. 1 (2010): 12-27; T. J. Clark, ‘‘Poussin’s Sacrament of Marriage: An Interpretation,’’
New Literary History vol. 45, no. 2 (2014): 221-252.
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genre, and style, and, ultimately, an overcoming of it.16 The function of ekphrasis, ideally and
impossibly, is to bring an object into language as it is, rendering what is not present into
presence, image into text. This process is always an act of translation, and, like all translations, is
an approximation, a nearness which can never be the original. The writing becomes something
all its own.
Ekphrasis, and its role as a disciplinary principle in art history, reveals descriptions
slipperiness and openness. Ekphrasis reveals how description is always an imitation, a copy of a
copy ad infinitum, where any approach to study an object is one informed by prior framing:
photographs are taken from particular vantage points, with certain lighting and angling which
impose upon our senses; prior scholarship on an object informs the positioning taken on it.
Repetition without an original, in Derrida’s sense, repetition as “movement of non-truth: the
presence of what is gets lost, disperses itself, multiplies itself through mimemes, icons,
phantasms, simulacra, etc.”17 This is to say, that description is not just mere representation, a
realism neutral and subjectless, but rather all description is interpretative, evaluative, and
engaged in meaning making, in crafting some representations, some realities, some truths over
others. The real, and the truth we ascribe to some total and irrefutable real, à la Barthe, is one
where “we choose a certain inference and not certain others; realism is, at its very inception,
subject to the responsibility of a choice.”18 As deconstructionists like Barthes and Derrida
demonstrate, a deconstructionist approach avowing the undecidability of meaning, description is
always and ever a framing; description is always and ever an interpretation; description is always

16

W.J.T. Mitchell. Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994), 156.
17
Jacques Derrida, Disseminations. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 168.
18
Roland Barthes, Critical Essays. Trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1972).
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and ever about how the world is framed according to particular rubrics, logics, and ideology. The
act of describing, then, whether literary or critical, is always and ever “a parallel work of art.”
What becomes evident is that the approach to description, and its conceptual limits and
possibilities, by the numerous disciplines and artistic practices, varies. Description means and
does different analytic purposes in its specific contexts. Each, however, grapples with the
concern over the interpretive capabilities of description: of what is true or authentic to the object
being described, and what aspects of a description are the creative agency or expression of the
describer. From these concerns we can estimate that any describer must ask themselves: Is this
an accurate description of the object or scene? Am I imposing my own aesthetic judgements,
evaluations, or interpretations on the object therefore evacuating objectivity? For disciplinary
knowledges belonging to anthropology, literary study, or art criticism, the dilemma is one of
empiricism, objectivity, and how to construct knowledge production devoid of bias. For works of
art or artistic genres like travel writing, a poem, or an autobiographical dissertation, description
is there to authenticate or verify some degree of realism, to give the impression of immersion
that the describer was there and now the reader can be there too. My concern in Descriptive
Inhumanism is not whether the descriptions I will be analyzing are empirically accurate or
objective enough, or effectively delivers some sense of realism or immersion. Rather, my
attention is what discursive grids arise from these debates over description, finding their
epistemic and disciplinary unresolvedness generative in configuring a queer, antiracist, and
minoritarian creative and analytic modes of writing about racialized and minoritized peoples.
The unsettled concerns over description are what compel this study forward, and, as I will
continue to point out, are what gives it its vibrant potential as a decolonial aesthetic and analytic
practice.

12

Description as Inhumanism
The descriptive postulation I am advancing is informed by the recent theorizations on the
nonhuman. Therefore, it begins with the human, or perhaps with the end of the human. Man, as
documented by Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things, is the rational, integral, sovereign, and
self-aware subject. Foucault, with a prose like prophesy, announces “man is an invention of
recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.”19 Aimé Césaire, before Foucault, in Discourse on
Colonialism, opens his essay, importantly, by casting the gaze of the periphery on that of the
center, “European civilization...is incapable of solving the two major problems to which its
existence has given rise: the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem; that Europe is
unable to justify itself either before the bar of ‘reason’ or before the bar of ‘conscious.’”20
Keywords here are “reason” and “conscious,” terms Césaire is adamantly aware of in how these
words have constructed the humanity of Western civilization above that of all others, a humanity,
despite whose “reason and “conscious” fails “to justify itself,” nevertheless has instantiated and
legitimated itself according to this very failed humanity/human/humanism. Informed by
Césaire’s work, writers and theorists like Fanon, Wynter, and Glissant have painstakingly
considered how thinking together colonialism and race can provide a powerful critique of
Western humanism’s “Man.” Their work has helped to undermine the epistemological and
ontological equivalence between “man” and “human,” that, as Zakiyyah Iman Jackson aptly

Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York:
Vintage Books, 1994), 387.
20
Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 31.
19
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notes, summing up the contributions of Wynter, Fanon, and Césaire, “they maintain that the
figure ‘man’ is not synonymous with ‘the human,’ but rather is a technology of slavery and
colonialism that imposes its authority over ‘the universal’ through a racialized deployment of
force.”21 Man as the Enlightenment subject, Man as the standard of being properly human, Man
as a certain racialized way of being and knowing the human. Western humanism’s “Man”
determines the norms upon which we come to judge, discipline, know, and are in the world, a
means of executing violence, exploitation, discrimination, and oppression through a normatively
figured human rendered as universal. The idea of the universal human and universally shared
humanity stages itself as a becoming fully human, a progress measurable and quantifiable
because the human becomes a fixed point. The metrics of the human according to Western
humanism, I argue, are inadequate for accounting for, representing, and liberating racialized
human lives being that those metrics are tied to aspirational normativity, racial uplift, and
identity essentialisms.
Thinking of racialized materiality and matter, as opposed to ready-made identity models,
opens up pathways to understanding how descriptive inhumanism can forge alternative pathways
away from the constraints of liberal human subjectivity. Donna Haraway, and her notable essay
“A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology and Socialist Feminism in the Late TwentiethCentury,” has incisively set itself on the task of challenging the taken-for-grantedness of the
Enlightenment subject, exposing this human to their entanglements and dependencies in the
larger world which Man is supposed to be distinct from, transcendent to, and master of.22

Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, “Animal: New Directions in the Theorization of Race and
Posthumanism” Feminist Studies. vol. 39.3 (2013), 670.
22
New materialist scholarship’s primary tenet is the vitality of nonhuman matter. I, too, identify
nonhuman matter as agents and agenting the world, where thinking the nonhuman and human
entanglements can get us to a different way of being, knowing, and sensing. I, however, do not
21
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“Matter,” Judith Butler writes in her provocative work Bodies That Matter, is “a process of
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we
call matter.”23 Butler’s analysis is limited, as Karen Barad notes, because it “fails to analyze how
matter comes to matter.”24 To attend to Butler’s oversight Barad introduces her concept of “intraaction,” “a phenomenon is a specific intra-action of an ‘object’ and the ‘measuring agencies’; the
object and the measuring agencies emerge from, rather than precede, the intra-action that
produces them.”25 Intra-action over that of interaction, Barad argues, in order to attend to how
“the move toward performative alternatives to representationalism shifts the focus from
questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality (e.g., do they mirror nature or
culture?) to matter of practices, doings, and actions.”26 Barad’s study opens up a means of
pinpointing the limitations in the universal human as horizon for social justice struggles and
minoritarian liberation, providing a method and a process for thinking the material and discursive
together against the grain of a universal humanist schema that demands discrete, individualized,
and separate components interacting with one another.
Special issues like GLQ’s “Queer Inhumanisms,” TSQ’s “Tranimalities,” and Social
Text’s “Interspecies” have anthologized necessary contributions to how we theorize the human
and nonhuman, stressing, rather than willfully overstepping, the importance of not evacuating the

ascribe to a depoliticizied and undifferentiated, universalized idea of human. Not all humans are
constituted the same, not all humans experience being human similarly. For notable studies of
agency, vitality, and nonhuman matter see Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of
Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010) and Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe
Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2007).
23
Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 9.
24
Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 192.
25
Ibid., 128.
26
Ibid., 135.
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human from socially constituted axes like race, gender, ability, and nation which configure both
the human and the nonhuman.27 Robert Reid-Pharr takes to task in his provocative book
Archives of Flesh scholars who are ensconced within posthumanist inquiry like Cary Wolfe for
their “inability to understand how in the absence of any consideration of the protocols of race
and gender in the articulation of humanism [Wolfe] might achieve the fundamental ‘unsettling’
that he desires.”28 Reid-Pharr importantly notes how we are all bound to the Western traditions
which bind us, these traditions determining the “specific discursive protocols and institutional
procedures by which examination and discussion of human being has been delimited.” The
effort, then, is to admit how “the human has always been a thoroughly exclusionary concept in
race and species terms,” and a critical retheorizing of the human needs to be understood as “not
an expansionist one (expanding the definition of the human to allow a few racialized groups or
preferred ape species in) but rather a reconstructive one (reimagining humans, animals, and
nature outside of systems of domination.”29 It is important to reiterate how extensionist projects
are Westernized liberal humanist projects. Both operate according to a logic of abstraction, no
parameters concrete or identified for meting out what kinds of bodies and what ways of being
human will be rewarded with rights, and that the core of its power, the power of being commonsense along lines of species belonging thereby a force of domination that does not feel like
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domination, lies in the ability to pigeonhole minoritarian difference into aspiring for a human
never meant to be achieved.
The nonhuman is an important framework for what I am identifying as descriptive
inhumanism. The nonhuman as a category allows for a reconfiguration of what it means to be
human, and how else to represent minoritized and racialized humans within a nonhuman idiom.
My attention throughout Descriptive Inhumanism will be to how language activates the
nonhuman possibility, how language can make matter other ways of thinking and being.

Doing Descriptive Inhumanism
My critical attention on description is in many ways a focus on form and to formalist
inquiry. Renewed interest in formalism has been undertaken by literary scholars and theorists.30
In the foreword to an anthology staking out the claim for a revitalized formalism, there is a
necessary distancing from the New Critics of the 50s and 60s who “did not neglect history, but
that [they] privileged certain types over others, positioned history as background, and, in so
doing, encouraged its own apolitical tendencies.”31 The antidote to this ahistorical and
depoliticized formalism, as the editors of the collection insist, is, “reading form as ideologically
charged, as anything but ‘innocent,’” and that “a text’s formal features, its aesthetics, in close
30
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conjunction with cultural context, convey a politically and historically significant literary
experience that is both intentional and affective.”32
Following in such a theoretical vein, Marxist literary scholar Anna Kornbluh posits her
notion of “political formalism” which is “to designate the order of forms, the order made by
forms and the forms made by order, and to designate as well the theory thereof, theory most
often performed by art.”33 Her monograph examines the Victorian novel and how analyzing the
literary realism of those novels, with a particular attention on homes and shelter, elaborates a
kind of social modeling, where the constraints and constructs of form express the sociality
contained within. Her thesis extends to make claims about literary criticism itself, as she notes,
being that literary analysis has been framed by a “politics of demolition,” that is, literary study
dominated by poststructuralist hermeneutics which celebrates formlessness, unmaking, and
deconstructing what exists. Her wager is that by valuing forms and formalist analytics we can see
how to build, organize, and compose literary study and political possibilities which literature
helps us do. The scope of the political formalism is constructed around a set of conceptual limits
informed by a strict adherence to Marxist theory detached from any reckoning with Victorian
Britain’s economic dependence upon imperialism and coloniality. The explanation for the
omission is explained in an endnote: “my study is aimed at how novels deliberate and conjure the
fundamental unit of the socius—the minimal bonds and infrastructures of social relationality
necessary for human existence—and is not therefore aimed at empire, which I take to be wholly
maximal distortion of connectivity for the sake of violently racialized value accumulation.”34
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The hearth, shelter, and the family are the organizing structures of her Marxist formalist critique,
and Kornbluh understands these to be elementary structures of social reality, so when her,
“arguments grapple with what are fundamental to such relations and what are epiphenomenal
contingencies, I consider that such questions are questions about empire, even if they do not take
the recognizable shape of questions about cultural bias and racialization.” Empire is a give-in,
Kornbluh suggests, where it is always already contained within the Marxist apparatus at play,
needing no overt or explicitly stated attention given. Concerns of class, labor, and domesticity
are the way in which empire is revealed and mediated.
Kornbluh’s formulation is promising, and as much as I share the commitment to thinking
through how forms help us to organize, to construct, and to create rather than demolish, I want to
extend further formalism with a notion of the political, an inquiry upon form and what form does
that attends to coloniality and decolonial aesthetics. My interest, then, in thinking through the
descriptive in formalist terms is not to adhere to the tenets of a new movement or formalism,
particularly since such calls to newness tend to reinstate in a different form the very thing they
sought to distance themselves from or depart. Nor I am arguing for the need to value for the sake
of valuing description because it has been underexamined. My proposition is that an analytic
focus on tracing the formal qualities of description activates a way to see how form becomes a
strategy through which to articulate the socio-political, to stage encounters with the messy
materiality of racialized life. Having outlined the various disciplinary debates around description,
and what it is supposed to do, gives us workable parameters in which to identify description as
description: nonnarrative, objective, relatively static, detail-oriented, superfluous, and empiricist.
My claim is that these relatively agreed upon formal qualities of description are not fixed and
non-negotiable but are rather contingent, dynamic, and conditioned by the particular text, writer,
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and context of its use. Prescriptions of what description is are meant to be contested, malleable,
and subject to revision within the given framework of descriptive inhumanism. This playing
around with form, this keen attention to form, operationalizes the force and vitality located in the
descriptive work I am proposing. Whether I am analyzing the flat affect of a voice-over narrator
describing a deceased human body in the desert, or a poem’s close attention to detailing human
bodies as more than human, the paying close attention to description as a formalist concern
inaugurates various ways in which to measure what descriptive inhumanism does via form, and
how it can continue doing so for queer, anti-racist, and decolonial means.
The descriptive inhumanist work I will be following through this dissertation are
instances and brief emergences, and do not encompass the entirety of the texts in question. Each
share similarities with the other instantiations but are each discrete and unique in their
deployment. These various iterations of descriptive inhumansim are constructed according to
generalized qualities and features of what description is as a mode, and how they manipulate the
mode of description for various means and ends. Positing this project as a formalist concern is to
look at how the form of descriptive inhumanism manifests across texts and genres, and how
those distinct manifestations are intercalated to produce aesthetic tactics and strategies
classifiable as descriptive inhumanism. This typology of description serves as a kind of how-to
manual, a guide for identifying, articulating, and functionalizing descriptive inhumanist work.
Tending to the descriptive as a formalist concern returns us to issues over
representational politics heralded as transcended. Issues, which, having informed cultural
critique during the last decades of the twentieth century, ought to be returned to because
description provides aesthetic pathways incentivizing the how of how we represent reality for
minoritized bodies and communities, and, more importantly, how we make meaning of that
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reality that aims to rethink ontologies, epistemologies, and perceptions. Form lets us look at the
constructedness of categories, at the rules and laws governing what has come to make sense, and
what ought to make sense. Description, I contend, is the process by which we identify, detail, a
and represent the world, so assessing how description is always and ever an act of inscription, of
creating meaning, interpretation, contextualization, and sociality, is critical for the kinds of
aesthetic praxis that are anti-racist, nonheteronormative, and decolonial, challenging, in Aníbal
Quijano’s formulation, “the colonial matrix of power.”35
What I am calling descriptive inhumanism is a mode of doing form, an aesthetic practice
which works against the grain of Eurocentric mastery in knowing the world, a means of staging
raced and minoritized humans in contradistinction to depoliticized and ahistorical renderings
which serve settler coloniality’s ever-destructive protocols and procedures. My emphasis is that
descriptive inhumanist work should be a struggling. The struggling over how else to perceive,
how else to know, how else to create through a descriptive mode. When colonial projects and
fantasies for so long have been dependent on describing, and legitimating that description with
Western rationality, science, and epistemology, the descriptive as a site of struggling against
coloniality bears promise for, as José Muñoz postulates, “vacat[ing] the here and now for a then
and there.”36 A future, a tomorrow, a not-yet-here where we can render and apprehend
coloniality, on the one hand, creating it as something that can be articulated, can be critiqued, can
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be challenged. And, on the other, we can create other modalities for being and knowing, creating
vitalized languages, intimacies, and worlds which seek something else altogether.
Each chapter analyzes a different set of texts and their order is important for the analytic
through-line developed in the research. Chapter one examines the modernist travel writing of
D.H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley, looking closely at the ways in which they use ethnographic
description to describe the bodies and behaviors of mestizo and indigenous Mexican people as
“stone-like” and “reptilian.” This nonhuman descriptive idiom both writers deploy, I argue,
articulates the illegibility of indigenous lifeworlds and thought to Western settler colonial
rationality, and, by doing so, outlines aesthetic strategies for critiquing and imagining against it.
Mapping a line of inquiry from the modernist travel writing of Lawrence and Huxley to
contemporary queer Latinx poets Maya Chinchilla and William Archila, a line which importantly
traces how the aesthetic and stylistic function of description has changed across literary period
and genre, chapter two analyzes the inhumanist descriptive idiom present in the work of these
poets. The poetry of Chinchilla and Archila documents migration and movement between and
across hemispheric, national, city, and neighborhood spaces, blurring the lines between human
and terrain, corporeal sovereignty and becoming with human and nonhuman others. Their work
activates an inhumanist aesthetic praxis that helps us think better about writing on and
representing minoritized people in a world mired in capitalist exploitation and environmental
destruction. Chapter three undertakes an analysis of queer Chicana writer Gloria Anzaldúa’s
autobiographical dissertation Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro, which, as I coin, performs a
queer inhumanist decolonial autobiography: a mode of writing the self that is open-ended,
descriptive as opposed to narrational, relational and contingent upon animate and inanimate
beings, critiquing and imagining against a rational, coherent, and liberal humanist subjectivity.
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Whereas in chapter two I look at poetic practice, Anzaldúa’s genre-bending work of
theory/memoir elaborates a way in which to write the self in a queer, nonhuman, and decolonial
way. Concluding the theoretical through-line, chapter four looks closely at three texts about
migrants journeying across the U.S.-Mexico border: a documentary film, The Real Death Valley,
an ethnography, The Land of Open Graves, and an exhibition, State of Exception/Estado de
Excepción. In The Real Death Valley, I examine the role of descriptive reportage in a
documentary film about migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border desert. The bare and staccato
descriptive language this documentary deploys, I argue, inaugurates what I am calling ekphrastic
hyperrealism, effectively breaches the fourth-wall of filmic time, producing an effect which
demands the viewer to respond and to take heed of the material realities of migrant peoples
coming from the Global South. Through a language attentive to the environmental pressures on
the Latinx migrant crossing the desert, for instance, or a focus on what happens to a deceased
human body when overexposed to the weather, the documentary’s descriptive aesthetic presents
a powerful way in which to ethically attune our senses and perceptions to the ever-enduring
impacts of coloniality across the Americas. I then turn to anthropologist Jason De León’s
ethnography about the desert and the migrants who traverse, and die, in it, examining the
descriptive apparatus he deploys which provides an unsettling and discomfiting confrontation
with migrant life and the nonhuman. My analysis of De León’s descriptive work is followed by
an exhibition curated and informed by his work and his Undocumented Migration Project, which
I visited in New York City in the Spring of 2017. I look at how the exhibition puts on display
objects and items and how these nonhuman objects signal racialized migrant life and experience.
Bringing into conversation travel writing, poetry, an autobiographical dissertation,
documentary film, ethnography, and an exhibition, and suturing them together through an
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interdisciplinary theoretical framework, has proven essential for the inquiry into the politics of
description and representation. These various texts and genres gathered here perform a necessary
confrontation with the logics, epistemes, and aesthetic orders of coloniality, and a way in which
to imagine innovative and socio-politically informed styles of aesthetic practice that delink from
such orders. Focusing on description and the nonhuman, and the how of how we represent
racialized peoples through thinking descriptive inhumanism, allows the differences between
literary time periods, genres, and disciplines to coalesce. My hope is that these unusual
intimacies will elucidate a mode of analytic writing and critical practice which is attuned to the
potentialities of the porous, of what was not and what was not imaginable but is, stubbornly
insistent on being and knowing differently.
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Chapter One
The Mozo, The Drummer, and Two Modernists:
The Nonhuman Descriptive in D.H. Lawrence’s Mornings in Mexico and Aldous Huxley’s
Beyond the Mexique Bay

Fed up with the Edwardian morality and industrialism of his native Britain, D.H.
Lawrence decides he needs a fresh start away in the Americas. An epistolary exchange with
literary patron, Mabel Dodge Luhan, eventually convinces Lawrence to set out for Taos, New
Mexico in 1922. There he comes face to face with the Pueblo which develops into essays like
“Dance of the Sprouting Corn,” and “Hopi Snake Dance.” From Taos he travels to Oaxaca,
Mexico City, and other places across Mexico. Journeying through the U.S. Southwest and
Mexico culminates in a novel, The Plumed Serpent, a book of travel writing, Mornings in
Mexico, several short stories, and poems. However, as critics and biographers of Lawrence note,
this period is resoundingly identified as a literary failure for Lawrence. In Metaphor and
Meaning in D.H. Lawrence’s Later Novel, John B. Humma calls The Plumed Serpent,
“Lawrence’s most ambitious failure.”1 Drewey Wayne Gunn in his book American and British
Writers in Mexico, 1556-1973 writes “Worse, such a belief in the self-contained destiny of each
people brought Lawrence to a position essentially one with fascism.”2 In the introduction to the
2009 Wordsworth Classics edition of the novel, Cedric Watts notes how, “There is an intimate
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relationship between the Fascist doctrines espoused in The Plumed Serpent and the disappointing
quality of much of this novel.”3 Lawrence’s brush with fascism is what produces an
overwhelming denouncement of his work produced in the Americas. Lawrence’s output from
Mexico and the U.S. Southwest are also deeply fetishistic and primitivist in their views of the
indigenous and mestizo populations of Mexico and the U.S. Southwest.
Aldous Huxley, another white British modernist contemporary of Lawrence, also wrote
on his travel experiences through Mexico and Central America in 1934, Beyond the Mexique
Bay. Similar to the reception of Lawrence’s travel writing in the Americas, scholarship on
Huxley’s travel writing in the region are limited. “The author’s customary style and flippant
comments will make many Latin Americans angry,” a reviewer in 1936 wrote, and “in some
cases he refutes the statements of historians and encyclopedists and comes to his own
conclusions.”4 “It is thought-provoking and pleasant to follow Mr. Aldous Huxley in his winter
tour of Central America and Mexico” another review in 1936 comments, speaking to the
gentlemanly travel writing positionality comforting to Western white audiences. In a 1933 New
York Times review of the book, the critic anticipates the reason behind such neglect of this text,
“They [the Mexican and Central American peoples] won’t appreciate his remarks about their
cleanliness, their slowness, their failure to jump right up and hustle about doing things he wanted
done, their architecture or their native arts.”5 The critic immediately follows by citing how,
“Neither, probably, would Mr. Huxley feel too delighted if they sent a posse of Central
Americans over to walk through his house, examine his belongings, comment on his appearance
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and morals, discuss his family life and generally publicize their findings.” The review is telling
for how it situates Huxley’s travel writing within the anthropological and ethnographic, putting
the mirror on Huxley’s method and Eurocentric relativism used within the book.
Like Lawrence’s travel writing in Mexico and the U.S. Southwest, one can only surmise
the critical neglect of Huxley’s travel writings deriving from the colonial gaze and racist
depictions of various groups of indigenous and mestizo peoples he encounters in Mexico and
Central America. The various reviews of Beyond the Mexique Bay written in the 30s illustrate
this depiction of the people he visited, the tensions around (or lack thereof) of that depiction, and
they reveal his own standpoint as a white British gentleman undertaking some light ethnographic
travel writing. The most sustained scholarly engagement with this text is by Carey Snyder, who
analyzes both Lawrence’s travel essays and Huxley’s book, examining how they satirize the
language and methods of ethnology to critique the modes of ethnographic spectatorship and
observation.6 Carey identifies how the two writer’s travel projects differ in ideological approach,
“Lawrence as a primitivist longing to reconnect with lost origins, Huxley as a satirist wishing to
expose primitivism as a utopian fantasy.”7 Their respective differences in analytic approach
speaks to the interests they have with the indigenous populations of Mesoamerica, yet both share
the ethnographic sentiment of their time that indigenous ways of life and knowing are
disappearing and need to be documented. Both writers depict peoples of indigenous descent in
the Americas as indolent, lacking proper reason, and merely mimicking in a crude form the
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European and Western civilizational modernity. This attitude will fundamentally shape the travel
writing both create.
Travel writing for early 20th century Euro-American writers proves an integral mode to
conceptualizing an understanding of self and culture as modern, as modernist. The racialized and
exotic Other of the white Euro-American aesthetic imaginary, the Other who is mandated to be
both present and absent as the source for modernist innovation, is now amply known and
researched.8 The connections between the aesthetic innovations notable of literary modernism
such as abstraction, montage, and fragmentation are ones directly informed by white writers’
engagement with racialized peoples and cultures. One can only be modernist contra the
primitive, one can only be timely contra those who are backwards. Traveling to, the experience
of being somewhere else as the white male European or American, is distinctly different from
this well-known and cited facet of 20th century literature and poetics.9 There is no visiting the art
gallery or museum within London or Paris, or reading books on far-off lands within an armchair
comfortably situated in New York or Berlin. Travel literature is about being there, being with the
Other in their home, the being in displacement, where the insider becomes the outsider, the
knower in a realm of the unknown. This displacement of privileged position of knower and
insider grounds the affective and epistemic uncertainties facing Lawrence and Huxley in their
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traveling across Mexico and Central America. Travel writing stages this disorientation overtly,
and is woven into the seams of the text.
Lawrence and Huxley’s travel writing in Mexico and Central America, as I will argue, is
generative for the insights it gives into descriptive inhumanism. They present two contrary
approaches to the places and people they document in their travel writings. That is, approaches
which differ in writing style, tone, and ideological purpose. Their work converges, however, in
the aesthetic strategies and writing modalities which coalesce around a nonhuman descriptive
idiom. Lawrence’s descriptive work is imagistic, sensual, and tinged by a syntactical brashness.
Huxley’s, on the other hand, features a metonymic ekphrasis, using photography, memory, and
the nonhuman to render the indigenous peoples he cannot make heads or tails of. This descriptive
idiom is utilized to apprehend the indigenous peoples they encounter. Description becomes a
rhetorical and aesthetic method to try to decipher the racialized embodiment and countenances
they cannot make sense of or define in Western epistemes. What ends up happening, as I
propose, is that this descriptive idiom exceeds the writers’ own intentions for why they use it.
Instead, it highlights how indigenous and mestizo bodies and minds evade white supremacist
settler colonial knowing, evading it while ensconced within the text, techniques, and perspective
of the majoritarian position. The descriptive idiom Lawrence and Huxley deploy is informed by
the ethnographic and primitivist discourses they were participating in and which was prevalent of
their time. Putting to use a Muñozian disidentifcatory practice allows for a reconfiguring of this
colonial gaze, contending with the colonial gaze for what it is but also allowing for another kind
of anti-racist and decolonial aesthetic to emerge.10 Careful analytic attention to the descriptive
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writing and work these two writers’ employ will outline decolonial aesthetic strategies and
modes.

Lawrence and the Transmogrifying Mozo
Lawrence’s novel of Mexico is the most frequently commented upon work from
Lawrence’s output in Mexico and the U.S. Southwest. In Lawrence’s The Plumed Serpent Kate
Leslie, a forty-year-old Irish widower, arrives in Mexico and is immediately initiated into the
cult of Quetzalcoatl. Lawrence’s cult, and his protagonist’s experience in the cult, is undoubtedly
informed by the artistic and political interests of the time in Mexican indigenismo, the national
agenda of claiming an indigenous aesthetic past for the sake of Mexican modernity. The main
character of this novel in many ways embodies Lawrence’s desire to flee Europe in pursuit of a
humanity untouched by modernity, where she becomes the medium through which Lawrence
espouses his ideas on post-Revolutionary Mexico, indigeneity, and modernity. As Sheila Marie
Contreras notes, “his own assumptions about the degraded status of Indians were reinforced in
Mexico as was his fetishistic urge to capture something of their past greatness to serve his own
artistic purposes” (61).11 The pre-Conquest past is precisely what Lawrence utilizes to comment
upon the ilks of modernity, and its supposed influence on indigenous descendant peoples. The
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novel’s imagined understanding of Mexican politics, indigeneity, and culture ultimately shape
the essays Lawrence will come to write.
Though not as studied as his novels, scholars have taken up investigations into
Lawrence's travel writing.12 Before heading to the Americas, Lawrence traveled to Italy and
Sardinia, writing up travel essays and a book on the experience, as well as venturing to Ceylon
(today Sri Lanka) and Australia. I take as central Mornings in Mexico and I do wager that there is
a distinction between his travel experiences in Europe and Asia and those he undertook in North
America. This distinction lies with Lawrence’s investment in primitivism, in Mexico recovering
for Lawrence a form of humanity Europe, as he believes, has lost touch with. The indigenous and
mestizo peoples of Mexico in Lawrence’s vision, “served as a mirror that reflected not the values
and assumptions of the West but, rather, a set of chimerical values and assumptions based on
romantic and illusory expectations of what the indigenous Mexican should be.”13 Mexico, the
U.S. Southwest, and the Americas in general, were to be site of spiritual and aesthetic
rejuvenation for Lawrence, and the people there were to execute this utopic vision. In the end of
his journeys in the Americas, Lawrence is dismayed by the condition of the indigenous and
mestizo populations: they are too touched by settler colonial modernity, no longer the primordial
and unimpacted indigenous populations of Western fantasy. Moreover, unlike Lawrence’s travel
writing in Italy, the colonial history and present of Mexico invigorates Lawrence’s imaginary,
shaping the way in which he experiences Mexico and the U.S. Southwest.
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“The Mozo,” one of the essays in Mornings in Mexico, Lawrence takes as his muse his
male houseworker, Rosalino. The essay details Lawrence’s relationship to Rosalino, Rosalino’s
moods, his resistance to work according to Lawrence’s standards. The essay is chock-full of
Lawrence trying to explain Rosalino’s indigenous difference and Lawrence’s own whiteness. His
writing in this essay demonstrates his own conflict with being a European modern, his condition
as a product of Western modernity plays out in the contempt he displays towards Rosalino, and
Lawrence sets out to describe Rosalino in detail in order to apprehend him. Lawrence’s primary
mode of description is constructing him as an object, as rock or animal, giving an attention to the
inscrutable and obdurate indigenous body. For instance, Lawrence opens his short travel sketch
in this way, “Rosalino really goes with the house, though he has been in service here only two
months.” The mozo produces, as Lawrence puts it, “a glance of pure, reptilian hate from his
black eyes.” The indigenous Mexican women give birth to children who are “stone knives,” with
“their black eyes like flints, and their stiff little bodies as taut and as keen as knives of obsidian.”
These descriptions relating to stone and obsidian are influenced by his research on
Mesoamerican antiquity, a primitivist impulse supported by early 20th century archaeology and
ethnography, particularly focused on Aztec blood rituals and sacrifice.14
Lawrence also animalizes he and his fellow white men throughout the essays by
identifying them as, “white monkeys.” Scholar Eunyoung Oh analyzing “The Mozo” writes of
Lawrence’s conflicted sense of self in the face of the indigenous Other in this way: “[Lawrence]
wants to distance himself from white monkeys by emotionally identifying himself with
Mexicans. He ridicules, from the native Mexican’s point of view, a Western social system (the
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“curious tricks” of white monkeys) in relation to white men’s conception of time, distance, and
money.”15 As much as Lawrence cites the tricksterish ways of white coloniality, he, as Oh aptly
notes, does feel superior to Rosalino. Tellingly, this superiority is most demonstrable in the
authority Lawrence feels over his projections over how Rosalino feels towards the white man,
effectively speaking on his behalf.
The action of the essay is centered on Rosalino’s sudden and inexplicable gloominess.
Lawrence is shocked at how Rosalino can so suddenly go from (appearing) happy to brooding.
Rosalino goes so far as to refuse to work and Lawrence threatens him by saying he will find
another Mozo. Describing Rosalino’s sudden shift in attitude leads Lawrence to make
conclusions of what this moodiness means.
And now, the reaction. The flint knife. He had been happy, therefore we were
scheming to take another advantage of him. We had some devilish white-monkey
trick up our sleeve; we wanted to get at his soul, no doubt, and do it the white
monkey’s damage. We wanted to get at his heart, did we? But his heart was an
obsidian knife.
He hated us, and gave off a black steam of hate, that filled the patio and made one
feel sick. He did not come to the kitchen, he did not carry the water. Leave him
alone.16

Rosalino, in the face of the white colonial gaze, is able to obstruct the meaning Lawrence
demands from him. Lawrence faces an epistemic rupture in his ways of seeing and apprehending
through Rosalino’s embodied affect. Lawrence’s motif of describing Rosalino and indigenous
Mexico as an inanimate object, human bodies that are stone-like in countenance and demeanor,
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is used against him. Inanimacy through a nonhuman descriptive idiom becomes the way to repel
the intentions of coloniality. Lawrence’s own descriptive style doubles back as a means through
which Rosalino’s inanimacy, his stone-like obduracy, can animate something resisting and
resilient to Lawrence. More specifically, Rosalino’s inanimacy impedes on Lawrence’s efforts to
make Rosalino mean a certain kind of humanity, an idealized humanity free from modernity, free
from coloniality, which Rosalino does not allow.
Animacy and inanimacy is a primary theoretical concern taken up in the work of Mel Y.
Chen. For Chen, keying into animacy enables an interrogation into the parameters of the human
and what constitutes humanness, particularly attentive to the differentials within the human such
as nationality, race, gender, sexuality, ability, and animality. “Animacy activates new theoretical
formations that trouble and undo stubborn binary systems of difference,” to quote from Chen,
“including dynamism/stasis, life/death, subject/object, speech/nonspeech, human/animal, natural
body/cyborg.”17 Working through such binarisms for Chen paves the way for alternative kinds of
intimacies, intimacies that can create more affinities and kinship across differences. These
boundary breaking intimacies maneuver around the rigid binaries that keep us from being able to
theorize difference politically, affectively, and materially.
Chen’s theoretical undertaking on animacy provides the framework in which to theorize
Rosalino in Lawrence’s essay against the grain of his very own colonial project. Inanimacy, a
staple descriptor of passive, insensate, and inorganic things, is a usefully generative ontological
and epistemological positioning for Rosalino. Lawrence's writing on the mozo demonstrates how
inanimacy, as a concept, is shaped by racialized and indigenous excess, operationalizing against
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the very epistemic capturing Lawrence is trying to do through his vivid and nonhuman
descriptions. Inanimacy is not acted upon but enacts: demonstrably forcing Lawrence’s authorial
and colonial gaze to be troubled. Lawrence seeks to name, to identify, to categorize according to
a Western schema yet he cannot because the inanimacy of the mozo’s affect, comportment, and
mind halts him in his tracks. Inanimacy brings to bear Lawrence’s doubt in his own Westernized
mode of writing and thinking. Rosalino’s being stone-like through Lawrence’s authorial
positioning is precisely why and how Rosalino can evade Lawrence, can elude his demand to
know the very being of Rosalino, and can mirror that back to Lawrence.
Lawrence dates Rosalino’s stone-like tricksterism as pre-modern, as pre-dating European
conquest and colonialism. “The Mozo” is concluded by Lawrence admitting the futility of
knowing the ontology and epistemology of Rosalino: “Not to be caught! It must have been the
prevailing motive of Indian-Mexico life since long before Montezuma marched his prisoners to
sacrifice.”18 Lawrence’s reference to Montezuma, surely influenced by the modernist vogue to
glorify a primal and pre-modern past, identifies an onto-epistemic indigeneity as the means
through which to combat the Western colonial gaze. This, then, supposes that modernity, that is,
the entrance of European thought and civilization discourse into the Americas, is not the
condition of possibility for ways of being and knowing the world. There can be thought and
being in distinction to a Western humanist project. Lawrence needs for the thought and being of
indigenous Mexico to look and be a certain way in order for his theoretical groundings to make
sense. In the end, Lawrence discovers he and his apparatus for knowing the world is no
universal. Through Rosalino’s inanimate body he reaches the limits of Western thought, the
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point at which Western thought no longer even makes sense as the mode in which to render
indigenous lifeworlds and knowledges in the Americas.
Rosalino appears again in Mornings in Mexico in the essay, “Corasmin and the Parrots.”
Working through his own understandings of Aztec mythology, evolution, and species difference,
Lawrence, in this essay, writes of a morning in Mexico observing two parrots and the dog
inhabiting his rented home named Corasmin. The essay outlines Lawrence’s rather imaginative
recounting of evolutionary progress informed by a primitivist sensibility, a chaotic and slapdash
account of animals gaining intelligence, animals dominating, animals dying out. In his
sensational recounting, Lawrence taxonomizes Western people, indigenous peoples, and
nonhuman animals, “And he [Rosalino] can imitate me, even more than life-like. As the parrot
can him.” Imitation, for Lawrence, is the means through which species, and racialized bodies, are
able to be higher up on the evolutionary chain, a means through which to taxonomize species and
racial difference. Unlike his positioning in “The Mozo,” Western man becomes the model
through which nonhuman animals and racialized humans aspire, the marker of evolutionary
progress. In this sense, Rosalino parrots Westerners and Western culture much like how
Lawrence describes Rosalino learning to write and read in Spanish, “And of what he had written
he understood a small, small amount, parrot-wise, from the top of his head. Actually, it meant
just words, sound, noise, to him: noise called Castellano, Castilian. Exactly like a parrot” (66).
An unusual move for Lawrence to depict Rosalino in this way given his critical stance on
Western modernity. Nonetheless, it is illustrative of Lawrence’s dependence upon Western
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modernity and notions of rationality to configure his vision of indigenous Mexico, to “capture
something of their past greatness to serve his own artistic purposes.”19
Lawrence vacillates between the primitivist impulse to idealize indigenous bodies as an
ideal form on which all men should project, and the indigenous body a stand-in for a primitive
body, Earth connected, sensuous, animate, anti-modern, vital. Yet, as Lawrence comes to find
out, particularly as it unfolds in the essays on Rosalino, indigenous Mexico becomes an impasse
of inanimacy on Lawrence’s theorizing upon the human, where bodies are “stone-like,” postures
a “reptilian gloom,” a heart an “obsidian knife,” and “Rosalino”—as if a centerpiece, a fixture
for a room—“really goes with the house.” The qualities of coldness, hardness, and inanimateness
that Lawrence observes in Rosalino impedes upon the process of constructing the ideal human
Lawrence is in search of. This confrontation between Lawrence and Rosalino addresses how the
nonhuman descriptive idiom poses a tension to Lawrence’s figuration of proper and improper
humanness. He deploys the nonhuman descriptive idiom to render legible, to rationalize, to put
in place the indigenous excess, but is instead trumped by that very writing procedure, exposed by
it. Lawrence’s friend and contemporary, Aldous Huxley, will face a similar challenge in his
travels through indigenous Mexico and Central America.

Aldous Huxley, Nonhuman Ekphrasis, and the Drummer
Aldous Huxley is well-known for his dystopian novel published in 1932, Brave New
World. Anxieties over modernity and the impact it will have on the individual as a person, like
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those exhibited by Lawrence in his writings, play out in this novel where English tourists go on
holiday in a Savage Reservation in New Mexico. From there, they return with a British boy born
and raised on the reservation, John, and he becomes a source of exotic curiosity for the
motherland and, ultimately, he grows tired of the far-too modernized world. We see early on in
the novel references to indigenous peoples from Samoa and the Trobriand Islands in Papua New
Guinea, indexing an engagement with anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski’s 1922 Argonauts
of the Western Pacific and Margaret Meade’s 1928 Coming of Age in Samoa. Both texts are
staples of early ethnography, and both will prove pivotal for the later disciplinary debates which
will ensue in anthropology over the representing of subaltern peoples, the desire for primitivism,
and the constitutions of civilization and human progress.
Huxley mockingly cites indigeneity and indigenous peoples ways throughout the novel in
attempts to point out the primitivist fascination with their cultures and customs early
anthropologists and other Western intellectuals partook in. By doing so, he makes a case in the
book for the degradation of the family unit, and civilization’s plummet away from the merits of
the white-European cisheteronormative family, through highlighting how Western peoples’
idealization of indigeneity’s queerness becomes a flight away from modernity, a faux-returning
to an originary humanity. The way, “the tropical sunshine lay like warm honey on the naked
bodies of the children tumbling promiscuously among the hibiscus blossoms,” or where “home
was in any one of the twenty palm-thatched houses,” or how, in the Trobriands, “nobody ever
heard of a father,” is listed in an arousing manner, a delightfully enticing perversion which
allows for familial, bodily, and sexual freedoms to emerge.20 Huxley makes it a point in the
novel to address the ridiculousness, and boredom, of white Western cultures desire to idealize
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indigenous peoples, “to live like the savage.” Nonetheless, his efforts at satirizing and mocking
Western civilization are also lined by the disavowal of indigenous peoples and epistemologies, of
using them as an argumentative prop to further his own point about the of absurdity over
modernity and the disintegration of Western civilization. We will see this attitude of disregard
toward indigenous peoples and lifeworlds unfold in the travel writing in Mexico and Central
America, as well as its transformation into affective disgust and epistemic uncertainty when he is
in direct contact with them via traveling.
Not long after the publication of his most well-known book, Huxley travels across
Mexico, Central America, and some of the Caribbean in 1933 and publishes a book of travel
writing in 1934 titled, Beyond the Mexique Bay. Many of the novels concerns over modernity
and its part in shaping the Western subject are further examined in this later nonfiction book.
Little remembered, and barely the attention of scholarly interest, Beyond the Mexique Bay was
last reissued in 1985. One can only imagine the critical neglect and lack of interest in re-issuing
the book for a contemporary reader as one predicated on Huxley’s disparaging, satirical, and
calculating ethnographic stance on the indigenous peoples he encounters. The fact it is
nonfiction, where Huxley’s involvement in the text is unavoidable and present, as opposed to
fiction, where the author and the autobiographical are afforded distance from the texts, makes
clear why this book is relegated to the dustbins of literary history. However, my interest in this
moment in Huxley’s literary output isn’t to redeem this text. Rather, similar to Lawrence’s travel
writing, my claim is that there are textual ruptures and slippages which exceed the project
Huxley envisioned. The worth in revisiting this text is for how it can elaborate a queer decolonial
aesthetic schema which the author himself did not share, and most certainly did not intend to
propose to readers.
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Not as impassioned, brash, or imagistic as Lawrence’s prose style, Huxley’s writing is
more tempered, level-headed, and precise in his wording. He is the English gentleman of fine
society personified, while Lawrence is the renegade outcast. Huxley has similar kinds of
encounters with indigenous peoples in his account of traveling in Mexico and Central America as
Lawrence does such as visiting the markets where they exchange goods, the Mayan ruins, and
the staged bull fights. However, Huxley’s standpoint is as distant observer, markedly cool and
leveled in tone, noticeably detached, and not as immersed or intimate with the locals as
Lawrence tends to present himself, as is most with his attention on Rosalino.
Huxley does have an encounter similar to Lawrence’s with Rosalino. An encounter which
disrupts the well-maintained observational distance Huxley deploys throughout the book. He is
in the town of Ciudad Vieja, Guatemala, and visiting one of the Christian churches there. In front
of the church, an indigenous man is playing the drums and a penny whistle for an unspecified
religious ritual. Huxley remarks how both the whistle and the tune he is singing is an
“importation” from Europe, and the music resembles an “old London street song.” Huxley is
jarred by how the man repeats the song for hours on end. The supposed resemblance of European
forms he sees in the instrument and tune, and the seemingly repetitious nature he ascribes to the
hours long performance, is a way in which Huxley can give credence to the ethnographic
imperative of the time to lament the loss of authentic indigenous life and customs in favor of
merely derivative and mimetic Europeanisms. But this argumentative posturing he takes up is
troubled when Huxley enters into close physical proximity to the performer. Much like
Lawrence’s relation to Rosalino, this being close, this faraway yet close intimacy, startles
Huxley. I quote the passage at length.

40

Lifting his chin a little, he blew, for perhaps the eight-hundredth time that
morning, the first notes of “Who’ll buy, who’ll buy.” Above the barrel of his
whistle his eyes stared fixedly into space, black like boot-buttons and no less
perfectly inexpressive. I found myself suddenly rather disquietingly reminded of a
photograph I had once seen of a giant tortoise eating a snake. The serpent hung,
like so much living spaghetti, from those toothless and scissor-like jaws, and the
tortoise’s eyes were gazing with a bright unwinking fixity into the Ewigkeit. Two
round black nothings focused upon nothing. Automatically the mouth continued
its labors. Bite, bite, bite; the wildly struggling body was slowly masticated. The
eyes continued to stare into vacancy. Everything was totally irrelevant to
everything else. It was the same here at the church door in Ciudad Vieja. Nothing
gazed at nothing. The drum beat; the thin squeaking of the melody drooped to its
conclusion; then, for the eight hundred and first time, began again. And still,
above the penny whistle, those black buttons beamed with the same impenetrably
meaningless brightness. I was glad to see the last of them.21

What Huxley vividly recounts in this passage is the memory of a photograph. He performs an
unusual double ekphrastic transposition: 1) recalling in his mind’s eye a photograph of a tortoise
eating a snake 2) proceeding to describe the image in a way as if what he is inspecting is moving
images of those animals and not a still image 3) and all the while superimposing those images on
his immediate proximity to the drummer so as to qualify the image of him he is trying to render
to the reader. This doubled ekphrastic moment is Huxley’s efforts to use literary techniques and
writing to render apprehensible the indigenous Other. He is trying to make sense of what he
cannot make sense of like the motives of the performer, what the music signifies, what the whole
thing is all about. It is not for him and so he must use associational metaphors, metonymy,
personification, and ekphrasis to corral the embodied excess the drummer represents.
The nonhuman apparatus utilized to apprehend the drummer here is similar to the one
used by Lawrence on Rosalino. It is a defensive tactic set out to consolidate the indigenous body
within Western settler colonial epistemes. Yet what ends up slipping through in this double
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ekphrastic practice is a queer desire and intimacy activated vis-à-vis the nonhuman metonymic.
The drummer metonymically becomes the tortoise, animal-like, an unyielding, monstrous, and
inscrutable blankness which Huxley cannot decipher or understand. Riddled with the anxiety of
not knowing and being in epistemic shock, one can only presume here Huxley is the snake,
“hung, like so much living spaghetti, from those toothless and scissor-like jaws, and the
tortoise’s eyes were gazing with a bright unwinking fixity.” What becomes evident is how the
tortoise represents a nothingness, a place of no intelligible meaning or available interpretative
framework in which apprehend the world, and the snake is at the mercy of this nothingness, at
risk of being in a place of not knowing and not commanding the discourse. The rational, distant,
and disembodied posturing of the narrating Huxley is temporarily disrupted. Huxley becomes
fully bodied, the physical proximity to the drummer instigating this corporealizing, feeling his
white, British, and man flesh manifest through the substitutive function of the snake being
devoured. The prose style in the passage reflects this unbecoming. In words, in the associational
and descriptive and metonymical strategies used, a different relational grid is presented which
destabilizes the hierarchies Huxley avowedly abided by. His horror in this becoming flesh, this
devouring instantiated by ekphrasis, is the horror of giving in to the pleasure of being with the
other, with giving up the ruse of Western universality and all-knowingness. This is a momentary
pleasure, however. The concluding sentence in the above excerpted passage jarringly curtails the
ekphrastic overflow undertaken by Huxley in this moment. He returns to the disciplined
boundaries he profits from and feels most comfortable in.
Prior to this instance of ekphrastic mediation, Huxley asks his ladino companion what the
music signifies and is meant to do, only to be met with the response of shrugged shoulders and a,
“‘Quien sabe?’ And that was the end of our ethnological researches—that would be the end, if
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one had to depend on the ladinos, of all ethnological researches in Guatemala.”22 Huxley marks
here how ladinos, an ethnic category to designate mestizo peoples in Guatemala who no longer
have affiliation with indigenous customs and communities, are actively invested in overlooking
the indigenous presence in Guatemala. Elsewhere throughout the book he notes this positioning
the ladinos have towards the indigenous communities and people because they are a source of
shame for the ladinos, a marker of their proximity to uncivilized non-Europeanness and
nonwhiteness. The outside European and United States researcher is understood to be the arbiter
of indigenous preservation and authenticity, celebrating a nostalgized and sentimental rendering
of indigenous peoples. These two forces posed in epistemic tension with one another merely
work to underline how indigenous peoples are not figured in their own representational
discourses, not understood to be the proper agents mapping out how they want to be perceived.
The photographic is more than just ekphrastic rendering of a visual image in order to
articulate the inner life of the drummer. Photographs themselves play an important role in the
ethnographic and epistemological legitimacy of Beyond the Mexique Bay. As the book jacket
advertises in the 1934 first-edition published in London, the book contains thirty black and white
plates. The advertising of the plates is certainly an enticement to buy the book for a white,
British, and Western readership, the promise of putting on display the indigenous Other and the
tropicalized lands they inhabit which many have never been to. But the plates also serve as kind
of truth-claim by Huxley, a way of visually attesting to the fact he has been there for himself,
giving credibility to the assumptions and claims he makes within the text. Taken by Huxley
himself, the photographs are mainly comprised of the ancient Maya ruins and stelae, Christian
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churches and close-up shots of emblems and building detailing, and various shots of the
indigenous peoples he comes across throughout Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico.
My wager is these photographs taken by Huxley of the indigenous and mestizo
populations for a dominant Western white audience can do what Tina M. Campt calls “listening
to images:” “the practice of looking beyond what we see and attuning our sense to the other
affective frequencies through which photographs register.”23 Campt attends to what photographs
taken of black subjects through dominant frameworks and institutions can do to foster a
“quotidian practice of refusal” which is “defined less by opposition or ‘resistance,’ and more by
a refusal of the very premises that have reduced the lived experience of blackness to pathology
and irreconcilability in the logic of white supremacy.”24 The black feminist method outlined by
Campt is one that prioritizes the haptic, and the sensory, experience of photographs and images,
an analytic connection to the image which examines the event of the photo, the conditions
surrounding its moment of instantiation. This method takes into account the seen and unseen, the
center and the periphery, the past and present, of what constitutes the image. The act of being
with the photo becomes an interpretive event in and of itself.
Huxley’s photographs of indigenous peoples and peoples of indigenous descent in
Mexico and Central America require this practice of refusal Campt offers. If not, we cannot
“imagine beyond current fact and to envision that which is not, but must be,”25 and we cannot
reframe the photographs outside the textual, visual, and epistemic parameters set up by the book.
We must read them against the grain of the text itself but must do so situated and contextualized
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within the book. Contra and counter to, simultaneously, the photographic capturing done by
Huxley.
After the ekphrastic scene with the drummer in Ciudad Vieja, while traveling in
Chichicastenango, a cultural center for the Kʼicheʼ Maya people, Huxley presents a plate of a
drummer encountered in this town. The photograph is a low-angle shot, overlooking from the
side a set of steps leading up to a building with neoclassical columns, where an indigenous man
sits with a drum resting atop his knees. The man’s face comes at the viewer from a distance but it
is notable that his expression is flat, and indifferent, as his head is slightly cocked to the left
looking back at the camera and the photographing body of Huxley. The building the man is
resting on is unspecified but the columns allude to the Greek inspired structures constructed by
president of Guatemala from 1898 to 1920, Manuel José Estrada Cabrera, who sought to
“modernize” Guatemala through implanting European architectural styles and disavowing the
Maya and Mesoamerican styles already present. Though the photograph is of the seated man
with his drum, the caption of the plate is, “The Drum,” suggesting to the reader that the central
point of visual interest is to be the instrument. The previous plate is of two drummer men and
titled, “The Drummer,” so perhaps this explains why Huxley does not prioritize the human
before the drum in the captioning. In “The Drummer,” one man has the drum slung over his
back, while another follows behind with what appears to be in his hand a drumming stick in
which to hit the instrument, and there are men and women in front and back of them. As Huxley
details in the pages preceding this plate, the two drummers are part of a processional walk
through the town in honor of a saint.
That being said, it is unclear if the photograph of the drummer seated in “The Drum” is
before or after the procession. It is unclear which drummer he even is. Huxley offers no
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sequencing of these images, and offers no specifics of the photographic human subjects he is
documenting. Most of the people and the groups documented are not identified by personal name
or even indigenous group or nation of belonging. As is most of the book, he moves between
town and road and country with little textual guidance or background information. Each place
and person is dislocated from historical or social contextualizing, merely presented as a
generalized and generalizable population of indigenous peoples in the Americas. His thoughts
and observations are loosely linked, moving from idea to idea with no thematic connective tissue
beyond the fact he is traveling across Central America and Mexico. It is unclear his exact
motivation for how or why he selected the specific sites and locations he has chosen. This, in
turn, allows for a totalizing control over the specific narrative Huxley is positing about how the
primitivist and anti-modern fantasies placed upon the indigenous people from the West are faulty
and misguided.
But the plate of the seated drummer staring back at the photographer that is Huxley
disturbs this totalizing colonial capturing Huxley deploys throughout the book and as the
ideological premise of the book. The drummer’s gaze is unsettling because his staring back is
noticeable. But the gaze is not noticeable because he is merely staring back at the photographer,
as if just gazing on the colonial reinstates agency and autonomy over one’s image. Rather, the
low-angle shot, the distance from the photographer, and the grainy quality of the printed plate
compound to produce an opacity which undermines the photographic imperative to document, to
prove, and to provide knowledge through the visual. It is undeniable that the drummer is gazing
back but the lack of visual clarity, the not being able to see well enough, performs akin to what
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José Quiroga terms, “open masking.”26 The photographic is intended to capture the body and
identity of the subject in order to document, to represent, to know them but the low-angle shot
and poor printed resolution troubles this opening up of the subaltern to a Western readership. The
drummer in his distance looks ominous and unforthcoming, much like Lawrence’s mozo, his
still-life and two-dimensional gaze not giving up what he is thinking of or about as Huxley
photographs him. The photograph leaves us with more questions than answers.

Conclusion
Huxley and Lawrence both utilized aesthetic strategies and modes of writing in their
travel writing to respond to the various indigenous peoples and communities they encountered in
the Americas. Description and ekphrasis as mediated through a nonhuman idiom serves as an
important tool through which they try to apprehend these indigenous Others but, as I examined,
these attempts exceeded their own desires and expectations. Queer decolonial possibilities
emerged through this slippage enabling a reading practice which underscored the impossibility of
epistemic knowing and disciplining of indigenous bodies, lifeworlds, and knowledge. This
exceeding by these two white British men is a failing in many ways, too, a failing to live up to
the very tradition of post-Enlightenment rationality they depended upon to define the people and
places they were visiting. Their failing, however, is also an opening for further inquiry on how
these aesthetic strategies and modes of writing gravitating around description can be deployed on
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behalf of queer, anti-racist, decolonial, and a nonhuman poetics. While Huxley and Lawrence
were using description to apprehend the Other for their own epistemic and rhetorical projects, the
next two chapters will pivot to how Latinx poets, writers, and artists like Maya Chinchilla, Laura
Aguilar, and Gloria Anzaldúa utilize description to conceive of racialized peoples otherwise.
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Chapter Two:
The Art of Descriptive Inhumanism

Saidiya Hartman opens up her monograph, Scenes of Subjection, with the refusal to
describe. “I have chosen not to reproduce Douglass’s account of the beating of Aunt Hester,”
Hartman explicates, referencing her choice to not give her reader the famous account of Aunt
Hester’s beating in Frederick Douglass’s 1845 Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, “in
order to call attention to the ease with which such scenes are usually reiterated, the casualness
with which they are circulated, and the consequences of the routine display of the slave’s
ravaged body.”1 Hartman’s theoretical framework within the book hinges upon the refusal to
reproduce the spectacle of black suffering, and instead towards how one participates in these
spectacles, how these spectacles activate white audiences and spectatorship. Hartman addresses
the allure of description in producing a particular kind of pleasure and sympathy, one where the
scene of subjection “immure[s] us to pain by virtue of their familiarity—the oft-repeated or
restored character of these accounts and our distance from them are signaled by the theatrical
language usually resorted to in describing these instances—and especially because they reinforce
the spectacular character of black suffering.”2 In this regard, description functions as a
pleasurable repetition. The description of black suffering becomes a mode through which that
suffering becomes fungible, functioning to sensationalize and sentimentalize the everyday “terror
of the mundane and quotidian” that is slavery.
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Fred Moten grapples with the move by Hartman to not reproduce the scene of Aunt
Hester’s scream. He marks how Hartman offers in “the space she leaves for the ongoing
(re)production of that performance in all its guises and for a critical awareness of how each of
those guises is always already present in and disruptive of the supposed originarity of that primal
scene.”3 Hartman’s refusal, as Moten makes clear, is a choice which still makes viable other
modes of inquiring over the scream, reproduction, and the description of it. “What are the
politics of this unavoidably reproducible and reproductive performance?” he asks, where his
critical interest in the scene is one over performativity and the sonic, lingering in the “terribly
beautiful music” of Aunt Hester’s beating. Moten’s leaning into the aurality of Douglass’s
description of Aunt Hester’s beating is to try to see if the scene of subjection can be retooled, if
the object and commodity that is Hester’s scream can enact something else beyond what
Hartman understands to be just the reinforcement of black suffering.
What Hartman and Moten’s divergent approaches to reproducing the scene of subjection
helps to enumerate is a politics of description. Their refusal, or their amplification, of the scene
of subjection, the refusal to describe or describing of Aunt Hester’s scream, articulates
description’s capacity to serve differing functions. What becomes evident in their differing
approaches is that description can be used as an aesthetic strategy. One can choose to suppress
description, to negate it, in order to effect a particular intention. Or, on the other hand, one can
choose to amplify it, to recreate and create anew that description for particular ends. Description
is a mode through which inquiry and contestation needs to happen over what it can do and, more
importantly, how it can do.
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In the “A Note on Method” conclusionary section of the introduction of Scenes of
Subjection, Hartman elaborates her relation to the historical archive of slavery. She understands
it as a process of interrogating those sources and materials often written by the oppressor, and a
necessary act of writing against the totalizing, implacably factual, and definitive accounts which
hold as historical truth. She explains her method in this way: “My attempt to read against the
grain is perhaps best understood as a combination of foraging and disfiguration—raiding for
fragments upon which other narratives can be spun and misshaping and deforming the testimony
through selective quotation and the amplification of issues germane to this study.”4 Literary
analysis, and one that is historicist and archival, as Hartman makes well enough clear, is an act of
curation: we forage, we disfigure, we spin, we select, and we amplify according to our own
interpretive goals. She further adds that the work at hand is “reconstruction and fabulation.”
Methodologically, Hartman corrects here the long-held notion of literary study being objective
and miraculously conceived by the armchair literary critic. Instead, she importantly posits how
dominant and commonsensical historical narratives, periodizations, and archival materials are
ones which are done through particular lenses and political agendas. Her intention is to provide
an analytic that is contrary to the dominant narratives and the archival materials she is using but
one that “nonetheless remain[s] entangled with the politics of domination.”5
She expands upon the curational aspects of literary study and historicizing with her
notion of critical fabulation espoused in such later essays as “Venus in Two Acts” and in her
book, Wayward Lives, Beautiful Experiments: Intimate Histories of Social Upheaval. In these
works, Hartman takes what she can from various archives—a case file, a newspaper article, a
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diary, a police report—and constructs accounts of Black girlhood and womanhood against the
disciplinary goals that the slave owner, the sociologist, the philanthropist, the police, and other
forces from the late nineteenth century into the twentieth had in mind. “The beauty of the black
ordinary,” as Hartman writes on the intentions behind her project, a note, in many ways, on her
speculative method, “the beauty that resides in and animates the determination to live free, the
beauty that propels the experiments in living otherwise.” She continues: “Beauty is not a luxury;
rather it is a way of creating possibility in the space of the enclosure, a radical art of subsistence,
an embrace of our terribleness, a transfiguration of the given. It is a will to adorn, a proclivity for
the baroque, and the love of too much.” Her fabulative method is one which works with and
against existing archives, with and against existing accounts of Black girlhood to imagine
otherwise, to find moments of beautiful resistance and possibility.
This method of critical fabulation is by no means purely an imaginative or fictive
endeavor, castigated to the realm of the merely creative, but one that is of research and
intellectual inquiry:
By playing with and rearranging the basic elements of the story, by re-presenting
the sequence of events in divergent stories and from contested points of view, I
have attempted to jeopardize the status of the event, to displace the received or
authorized account, and to imagine what might have happened or might have been
said or might have been done. By throwing into crisis “what happened when” and
by exploiting the “transparency of sources” as fictions of history, I wanted to
make visible the production of disposable lives (in the Atlantic slave trade and, as
well, in the discipline of history), to describe “the resistance of the object,” if only
by first imagining it, and to listen for the mutters and oaths and cries of the
commodity. By flattening the levels of narrative discourse and confusing narrator
and speakers, I hoped to illuminate the contested character of history, narrative,
event, and act, to topple the hierarchy of discourse, and to engulf authorized
speech in the clash of voices. The outcome of this method is a “recombinant
narrative,” which “loops the strands” of incommensurate accounts and which
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weaves present, past, and future, in retelling the girl’s story and in narrating the
time of slavery as our present.6
Hartman offers up here a powerful postulation on scholarly method, and a pathway to doing
scholarship otherwise. There is an important transformation in the line of thinking between her
earlier Scenes of Subjection and this later body of work. She is not just presenting scholarship
that is “entangled within the politics of domination” but is critically imagining the lives and
scenes of what living within the structures of domination and power entails. It is about that
power, but also about the ordinary ways of living and resisting. She presents to us a way of
thinking of the work of the scholar as not the abiding to a given limit of historical narrative and
continuity, nor one of archival stability and delimitation, nor one which has been pre-determined
by the disciplinary norms and protocols put in place. Her method is not about archival recovery,
or filling in the historical record, nor the trying to tell a full story of becoming fully human
within liberal humanist constructs. “Narrative restraint, the refusal to fill in the gaps and provide
closure, is a requirement of this method,” Hartman explains, “ as is the imperative to respect
black noise—the shrieks, the moans, the nonsense, and the opacity, which are always in excess
of legibility and of the law and which hint at and embody aspirations that are wildly utopian,
derelict to capitalism, and antithetical to its attend discourse of Man.” The allure for finality,
completeness, and narrative within scholarly methods is tempting, as Hartman elucidates,
because such methodological posturing has been de rigueur for the scholar to demonstrate
mastery over knowledge, to position oneself as the expert. But, more so, this allure for narrativity
and closure is one which helps to reinforce the dominant discourses and narratives demand to
maintain its authority, its pervasiveness, and legibility. Therefore, scholars, like Hartman,
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working with archival materials about Black women and girls living during and within the
afterlives of slavery, are figured to be doing scholarship which merely “fills in the gaps” or “tells
the full story.” Locating the work in this way continues to authorize the methodological
procedures of the dominant structures at hand.
Instead, Hartman proposes a way of researching against narrative time, against the
legibility and rigor narrative purports to offer, and, ultimately, against narrativity itself. Her
critical mission is one of putting into tension the taken-for-granted assumptions of historical
knowledge and archival surety for an imaginative hermeneutic practice. One that is attuned and
responsive to the open-ended, the fragmented and inconclusive, the ordinary and common, the
merely ornamental and descriptive scenes of racialized living. Through this methodological
approach, a bric-a-bric assemblage of incommensurate and discordant knowledges, Black
girlhood and womanhood can emerge. Not as the definitive or a complete narrative, history, or
account but instead one of many, a possible many, one which allows for more possibilities for
analyzing the past, present, and potential futures.
Hartman situates her methodological approach as also a confrontation with
representation, and the politics over representing human lives. Hartman foregrounds this
dilemma over representation in an inquiry, “Cargo, inert masses, and things don’t lend
themselves to representation, at least not easily?” Though Hartman doesn’t position her work
explicitly in the realm of the nonhuman as I do, we can see how her thinking of enslaved peoples
and the transatlantic slave trade is already there. The human lives turned into cargo, into masses
of flesh. The task at hand for her is, “The necessity of trying to represent what we cannot, rather
than leading to pessimism or despair must be embraced as the impossibility that conditions our
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knowledge of the past and animates our desire for a liberated future.”7 For Hartman, the matter at
hand is representing and not representation, the verb rather than the noun. Representation,
according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is, “the fact or process of standing for, or in the
place of, a person, group, institution, etc., esp. with the right or authority to speak or act on
behalf of these.”8 In order to stand in for a group, the representative must be exemplary, must be
able to define and delimit what constitutes the object. Hartman’s use of the verb form, the effort
in “trying to represent,” illustrates the urgency of the trying, of the not quite getting it right of
bringing forward the experiences of black girls and women. The impossibility of never having or
knowing the right representation, if at all even possible, is the point of scholarly generativity,
rather than an impasse to shy away from.
Hartman’s approach to method and representing as an effort in trying opens a pathway
for my own inquiry. Whereas Hartman’s critical emphasis is the relation between archive and
historicity, and those relations to method and representation, my critical aim is directed towards a
different set of concerns primarily oriented around the aesthetic. How does the work of
aestheticizing the colonial conditions framing racialized peoples through a nonhuman idiom
attune our ways of knowing and perceiving differently? How might an attention to how we do
method and ways of representing racialized peoples configure other modes of aestheticizing that
do not prescribe to liberal humanist tenets? Description, as a mode of writing and analysis, can
aestheticize in particular ways which tap into a queer, anti-racist, and decolonial sensibility. My
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wager is that this aestheticization stages the confrontation with the our own conceptual limits, as
well as possibilities, for representing racialized peoples and colonial conditions otherwise.
The inhumanist descriptive apparatus I am outlining in this monograph is about what
other modes of representing and, more importantly, imagining, racialized peoples through
thinking nonhuman materiality and matter can emerge when we forego the legible and dominate
frameworks of intelligibility. How might, for instance, paying attention to the intimacies of
gendered food production and consumption, bodily sweat, and transnational migration activate
modes of situating and analyzing subaltern subjects? Or how might the description of a
transformation of a tree in the desert into La Virgen de Guadelupe speak to modes of sensing and
perceiving against the grain of settler coloniality? My proposition is that tracing the porous
entanglements operating in description across various writers, artists, and genres, challenges
various paradigms constituting liberal humanist notions like human/nonhuman,
individual/ecology, and self/other. The aim is to assert how description poses
incommensurabilities and at-odds thinking across the various iterations description takes. An
attention to description can activate both a critical and creative hermeneutic practice which
challenges dominant frameworks of intelligibility and commonsense. Zeroing in on the formal
features of description, of what description does within a nonhuman idiom about racialized
peoples, enables a way in which to counter the liberal humanist understandings of what it means
to be human, and how we may be human otherwise.
Moreover, this proposition is staked out on the fact that this is a particular emphasis of
analysis, examining a particular kind of descriptive work, and compiling of a particular set of
texts and theoretical tools in which to do this work. All literary study undertakes this selectivity,
all literary study is shaped by the critic. Foregrounding this relation to the study at hand points to
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the work of demystification around analytic method and protocol in hopes of bringing to light the
creative, associative, and extemporaneous dimensions of literary study.
In this chapter, I will analyze the ways in which various Latinx writers and artists deploy
a form of descriptive inhumanism, that is, they utilize aesthetic strategies that turn descriptive
work into elusive and allusive poetics that works against the paradigms and logics of coloniality.
Their approaches are deeply materialist, and, as I argue, work to defamiliarize our ways of
knowing bodies: bodies as essentialist representations, as identity and essence, bodies as bound
to exhausted frameworks of posing social justice struggles. Unlike the post-Enlightenment
subject prominent within humanist inquiry, the inhumanist descriptive approach I am working
through, akin to recent scholarship centering the relationship between race, sexuality, and
materiality,9 is deeply materialist: embodied and relational, within human and nonhuman
circuits, of the world and not distinct from it, against the Cartesian split of mind/body, producing
critical modes of description/inscription/interpretation which challenges the colonial epistemic
projects of Western humanism. Their inhumanist poetics articulate the materiality of bodies, their
vulnerabilities in relation, in networks of colonial history, geopolitics, and knowledge. Here
these writers and artists take up the key concept-term posited by Quijano, the colonial matrix of
power, and Mignolo’s formulation informed by Quijano, modernity/coloniality/decoloniality, as
a sites of investigation in their aesthetic-praxis. These concepts inform the analytics of this
chapter.
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Grease, Bones, and Borders
“It always starts here,” begins Salvadoran American poet William Archila’s poem, “This
is for Henry,” where here is, “over the chain-linked fence.” Archila was born in Santa Ana, El
Salvador, immigrated to the United States in 1980, and is still working today. The following
lines and stanzas of his poem, “This is for Henry” document the narrator’s reminiscences with a
man named Henry, reminisces of bodies moving across national borders like the U.S.-Mexico
border, across cities like Los Angeles, across neighborhoods. Bodies working in restaurants,
bodies of men whistling at women, bodies after work “munching on bread, Italian sausages, /
swigging on a bottle of wine.” It is the ordinary of running from police or immigration, and to be
caught by them.
Sometimes, it’s you kneeling
at the corner of the liquor store, handcuffed,
baton blow
to your back, flopping
to the ground, a grunt
of flesh and bone,
your golden tooth shining10

Archila’s effect is a simplicity. The descriptive is action, the doing of the poem is the descriptive.
Giving the setting “at the corner of the liquor store,” and “handcuffed,” where, unexpectedly,
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unknowingly, an indentation on the proceeding lines brings about a “baton blow.” The noun of
“baton” meeting the verb of “blow” camped out within their own line. The consonantal doubling,
b following b, the lips in contact, against one another, an impact of body uttering the poem.
These two words in one line followed by the “to your back,” the enjambment a figurative result
of violence, a comma splitting it from the “flopping” that is to be done when this violence is
realized. Line follows line describing the body and the weapon against the body and the physics
of the body in space, a stanza describing a violence slowed down, suspended and demanding of
attention, contemplation. A violence described in lines unlike the gratuitous displays of violence
normalized in movies, in shows, on the internet, in popular culture, visually described hastily and
uncritically and decontextualized, and unlike violence overlooked and ignored all across
mainstream media. Slowed down as it is, described sparsely, described in enjambment, described
typographically, violence in Archila’s lines and stanza is a reckoning with the materiality of
racialized life, grappling with the body and the violence done against the body temporally,
textually, and politically otherwise. The stanza’s final line an ambiguous offering, a suggestion
open-ended: Is this a “tooth shining” through a mouth open and wide from pain? A “tooth
shining” through a mouth open in resistance, a smirk a laugh a perverse bodily signaling? A
“tooth shining” in terms as of yet imaginable?
The narrator is describing events that happened with Henry fifteen years ago. The
narrator is in a different point in their life, driving through east L.A., and no longer working in a
restaurant but as a teacher. While driving through east L.A., fifteen years later, the narrator’s
memory of Henry is sparked by, “the boys leaning / against the wall, rising above trash / cans,
beer bottles, / baggy pants and black / shades, long white shirts.”11 Or, when teaching, the
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narrator sees Henry, “in the dark eyes / of students, you appear, / your white shirt, shiny shoes, /
your back slouched / at the board, cracking the English grammar.”12 The descriptive in these
passages hails the past via the everydayness of the present. Henry, that man whose fate the
narrator does not know, Henry, that man who tugs on the memory though he has been nothing
more than absence for fifteen years, is materialized through the material of the everyday. The
past incarnated in the material of the present. Even though fifteen years have passed, Archila’s
opening line (“it always starts here”), and concluding line (“and it all starts again”), suggest a
recurrence, a cyclicality, to the events portrayed in the poem. Henry is everywhere, in every day,
because the conditions of people like Henry, those migrating across continents, nations, cities,
neighborhoods, are still happening, have happened and will again. Archila captures this
continued happening in the descriptive apparatus and, in particular, the description enacted via
the material. It is these details, the bare yet masterfully orchestrated description Archila employs,
which sparks the migration of memories, those memories of transnational migration,
supranational memories of living out coloniality in the Americas, a condition of being beyond
time, beyond space, existing in objects, in flesh, in their material impact.
In the introduction to Archila’s second poetry collection, poet Orlando Ricardo Mene
notes on Archila’s poetic style in his poems, “While these descriptions are no doubt unflattering,
even grotesque, they are precise, tonally restrained, their purpose not to shock us gratuitously but
to elicit our sympathy because of the poet’s fealty to the truth.”13 The descriptions in question are
in a poem titled, “Grease,” a poem centering on a woman named Lety and her roadside food
stand in El Salvador. Describing a moment in Lety’s day where her “fat jiggles under her arms, /
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her apron, smudged yellow ruffles and pineapples / for pockets, crumpled like a fallen flag,”14 as
she prepares food to sell, or, when a man named Licho enters from the brushwood because of the
scent her food stand makes, how she’s “thankful for the toasted smell seeped in his clothes, for
the fuel in his belly, lard that oozes out of his pores, grease protecting him from the cold” when
he departs from her view, from the security and safety she provides.15 Archila’s poetics is one of
descriptive precision in the material. A precision of description focusing on the body and the
relations between bodies, a precision documenting subtly, allusively, suggestively, the
Salvadoran Civil War and its aftermaths, the enduring violence effecting/affecting those of
Salvadoran descent. This instantiates a hyperreality through description, a more than the real yet
starkly real, where the detail, the minor, the unnoticeable, the taken for granted, is incentivized.
This magnification he demands we look at the abject like, as the title of the poem suggests,
grease: the process of how the body produces grease, how Lety knows her laboring with food is
critical for the production of grease which is her form of care, a body to body connection
happening via secretions. His noting of “the calloused bottoms of her feet throbbing” telling us
something about a woman’s life, about having to work despite losing loved ones or losing home,
despite a war happening while adding water to a dish or kneading dough.
I want to stay a little while longer over Mene’s comments in Archila’s introductions on
the “unflattering” and “grotesque” descriptive work in Archila’s poem. What Mene seems to be
suggesting is that the descriptive work utilized by Archila is not in league with the production of
the beautiful, or what we constitute as the beautiful. The “jiggles” of the arm fat, the “lard” that
seeps from pores, “the calloused bottoms” of feet, are what bodies do and how bodies are. These
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are how bodies labor, how bodies feel pain, how bodies digest, and how bodies produce sweat,
grease, and bodily fluids. Natural, and ordinary, these are the everyday living for human bodies
with excess weight, who cook on the side of the road, who digest and use such digestion to keep
warm, to keep alive. Though not normatively beautiful, in Mene’s understanding, this attention
to how everyday bodies are, nevertheless, generates a sympathy that is aligned with the
dedication to present the truth. But what affective response might be possible beyond the
production of sympathy, or even empathy? How else might truth operate beyond these affective
modes? My claim is that Archila’s descriptive work—too tapped in to the real as it is, too
documentary in detailing how bodies are, what bodies do, and how bodies relate to one another
through labor, food, digestion, and the bodily fluids produced from those three—animates a field
of relations which highlight the intimacies of power, coloniality, and everyday existence in the
Americas. This becomes possible through thinking in a nonhuman idiom. Being able to
conceptualize the intimacies of gendered human labor, digestion, and bodily fluids as a means of
care for other human bodies is a figuration which amends the stultifying dead-end of affective
responses like sympathy and empathy, which does little to situate or explicate the conditions
framing the lives of racialized subaltern peoples. Rather, what occurs with an inhumanist
descriptive apparatus like Archila’s, attentive to the “unflattering” and “grotesque,” to the
“grease” and “lard,” is the instantiating of an aesthetic strategy attuned to the socio-political, a
sensibility geared for paying attention to the conditions of coloniality framing human and
nonhuman lives.
The social, historical, and political dimensions of life that is El Salvador, those who
remain and those in exile in places like the United States, the playing out of the long duress of
coloniality across the Americas, is presence for Archila in thinking racialized materiality and the
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nonhuman idiom. More specifically, the abject: the grease, the fat, the calloused feet. Those
things of human life which index how we live, how the world lives through us, though we would
rather look away, not know, dissociate ourselves from nature, relationality, the world at large.
The abject of matter, and describing it, in Archila’s formulation, is a form of networking: putting
like and unlike circuits into connection, the real and the unreal, the perceivable and
imperceivable, the singular and the plural, the transparent and the opaque. Describing the abject,
matter of factly and simply, indexes without the full story. Bits and pieces of citation citing the
ordinary grotesque. Through the minor that is the seemingly superfluous detail, the all too human
nonhuman stuff composing our lives, Archila forges an inhumanist aesthetic. Inaugurating a
method of reading and a means of engaging with words that calls into questions the limits of the
human, all the while providing possibilities for more expansive, more interconnected, analyses
for how we can describe human difference and the world which situates and conditions them.
This descriptive inhumanist work is also found in the writing of Guatemalan American
poet, Maya Chinchilla. Her poem “24th and Mission Border Transmission,” takes as its setting
24th and Mission in San Francisco, the women who enters bars and are called indecent, and from
there Chinchilla telescopes out to tackle the femicide of migrant women crossing the Americas.
The poem is structured in three parts: the opening in the local (a street and a neighborhood in San
Francisco), moving to the national (the U.S.-Mexico border), and then to the hemispheric
(beyond the U.S.-Mexico border into Mexico, Central America, the Americas). This structure
allows for the poem to confront issues about violence towards women and femicide with an
avowed focus on the feminine and feminized body, and what adorns that body and how that body
moves.
Poor women aren’t allowed liberation
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Or maybe they find freedom in tight jeans and
A stretchy v-neck that shows every bump every movement
Dripping ornaments dangle teasing
gold hoops lasso your eyes
You will see me!
Ay! He says, why do you women wear a dark bra under a white shirt.16

The poem presents an attention to the feminized body, and, more particularly, to the
racialized feminized body. The “gold hoops” and the “stretchy v-neck” and the “tight jeans”
signaling the everyday outfits of a Latinx femme walking down barrio streets. These
accoutrements, these items and objects composing a particular iteration of racialized femininity,
trigger the cisheterosexism of the men on the street who stare, who catcall, who threaten violence
because a woman is not composed in a decent way, not in her place. The nonhuman objects
which serve as descriptors are what racialize the human body.
From the overly adorned feminine body walking down a street in San Francisco, the
poem branches out in geographic scope. It moves to the level of the national, to the ideologically
loaded drama that is the U.S.-Mexico border, and does so through the threat of violence towards
women. Midway through the poem, a stanza functions as the pivoting point for the larger scope,
the lines conceiving of a porousness between and amongst different kinds of humans and
geographies:
It’s dangerous to be a woman; even first world.
That is why I am connected to my hermanas on the border.
I know what it is to fear to have body of mujer
16

Maya Chinchilla, The Cha Cha Files: A Chapina Poética (San Francisco: Kórima Press,
2014), 49.

65

Be careful I hear they are killing women over there
My 1st world status means nothing?17
Borders travel, politics migrate, and geographic distances fold in on one another through an
attention to the body, and the connections of bodies across their socio-political differences. What
unifies, although differentially experienced, is the threat of violence, and the ability to mobilize
against that violence. Borders between bodies, between geographies, become more porous in the
poem but they do not lose their specificity. Instead, the poem purposefully opts to maintain their
distinctiveness, drawing attention to the differences between 1st world and 3rd women, the
tensions diasporic and 1st and 2nd generation people feel towards this binary.
This common unification through a shared relation to gendered violence can only happen,
as the poem elaborates, through a materialization, a mattering that is a transformation. “The
Border / the line that is not a bridge, not a line, it’s a ditch a hole an open wound, / like the Berlin
Wall the great wall of China, apartheid wall, imaginary / walls / not just one wall, but several,
cement, iron gate, barbed wire / men with guns protecting who again?” The border becomes
visceral and material.18 The border transforms from a metaphorical, from an abstraction, to a
materialized idea, an idea which takes shape in a human and nonhuman form that bespeaks the
realities and violences of it. It is “a ditch” where bodies may be thrown in mass, it is “an open
wound” that is far too frequently literal. It is actual and physical walls “like the Berlin wall the
great wall of China” made from “cement, iron gate, barbed wire.” It is the human turned
nonhuman composing the terrain of borderlands like the “Body parts, cut nipples, / legs
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disconnected from hips” which is what becomes of the bodies of women who cross the
Americas, bodies vulnerable to unparalleled violence, the violence of migrant men and desert,
the violence of border agents and rivers.
Her brown eyes, her smile never seen
her laugh not heard anew
The last her mother saw of her was bone.
She didn’t get to say good-bye.
Bone. No flesh to be ogled wounded.
What she most wants to hug her daughter again.19

All those things that make a human body—the eyes, the smile, the laugh—reduced to bone. Bone
scattered across the earth, bones becoming one with the desert, national borderlands housing the
human turned nonhuman. Bone. The inanimate, the untalking, the unable to express in words, in
language, in meaning. What happens in the absence of flesh? In the speaking subject? The
materiality signaling the human, the migrant, the woman, the subject living out coloniality?
When all that is left is bone? What do bones describe to us?
Lingering on the line: “No flesh to be ogled wounded.” Pausing between the “ogled” and
the “wounded,” pausing on that blank white space dividing. Pausing at the fact no punctuation
separates them, verb following verb, the noun that is flesh unable to receive their doing. No flesh
to be looked upon, no flesh which can be injured, the human body in negative. This negation,
this doing of the negated, the two verbs together in their immediacy. Describing to the reader
what can no longer be done to flesh, a description of nothing, really, because those verbs can do
nothing in the absence of the noun, of flesh. Can bones be wounded? Can bones be ogled over?
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Certainly. And bones do describe though they do not speak, do not represent themselves in
language, in narrative, in linearity and coherence, in exhausted frameworks of uplift and
respectability. Bones describe if allowed, like, for instance, the bones of a woman, the bones of a
woman battered, the bones of a woman found in the desert because she dared to traverse a
continent, dared to defy hundreds upon hundreds of years of colonization.
The poem’s three-part structure concludes by expanding to think in hemispheric terms.
“Ni una más” is a refrain throughout the final stanzas of the poem, a saying which refers to the
feminist movement across Latin America against femicide and gender-based violence. The turn
to the hemispheric, and the invocation of the “Ni una más” chant, in the final stanzas proposes a
way of thinking solidarity and activism across socio-political differences, across differences
constituting what it means to be a woman and femme in the Americas. But what is critical to
note is that poem can do this, structuring itself and framing its various spatial and geographic
scales, through an attention to the nonhuman, and to the human and nonhuman
transmogrifications. The golden hoops and v-necks and borders and cement and bones as they
are found in Chinchilla’s poem, like the slowed down descriptions of violence in Archila’s work,
fosters a critical attentiveness to the composing together of the factual and the fabulative, the
critical and the imaginative, assembling not a narrative but a poetics, an aesthetic, a description
of the intricacies of coloniality’s workings and decoloniality’s possibilities. Therein lies the
unruly, the unwieldy force of descriptive inhumanism.
In another poem within the collection, “Homegirl: After Cisneros,” a poem signaling in
the title and stylistically similar to Cisneros’ poem, “You Bring Out the Mexican in Me”
Chinchilla connects the description of the body to that of the thinker. “You / bring out the
homegirl in me // my inner cha-cha chola / The big hoop girl / burgundy lips and sticky gloss
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kisses” are the lines of the first stanza, the second-person voice identifying the poem as a loveletter of sorts.20 Addressing the erotics between “That gender deviant femme drama and butcha
trauma,” the erotic energy of how, “I’d give it to you / ‘cause homegirl / You bring out that /
puta-madre-más-cabrona-punk-ass-bitch that don’t need nobody”(76). Queer erotics are made
ordinary, the fuzziness of a love letter so common in cisgender and heterosexual desire, here “la
Jotería / speaking / broken / tongue harmony.”21
In the second stanza she follows with “The chingona intellectual / Who’d write the
hoochie feminist manifesto.” Chingona, a word so familiar to Mexican and Central American
folks, a word to describe women who are stubborn, are outspoken and loud and unruly, women
who go against the patriarchal norms. The paradoxical that is bringing chingona and intellectual
into the same line, the two describing and informing the other, inseparable. The second line
invokes the manifestos of all manifestos: Marx’s, Communist Manifesto. A twist, though, in that
hers is feminist, unlike Marx’s, unlike those early twentieth century European manifestos on art.
Hers is profoundly materialist unlike those earlier manifestos. And don’t forget the descriptive
word before feminist: hoochie. That lowdown word. A word to describe a woman who is
sexually promiscuous, who is provocative, who is a sexual being whether you like it or not.
Chinchilla’s poem, as well as her larger body of work, describes paradoxes. Hoochie
belongs to feminist belongs to manifesto in delightful unease. Chingona is side by side with
intellectual. Describing the unthinkable, the highbrow with the lowbrow, the intellectual with the
chingona. The philosopher, the activist, the thinker, the lover, the artist, and the one involved in
knowledge production all brought together under the identity of the chingona intellectual. The
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erotic is knowledge building, the feminist is an erotic inclination, the chingona intellectual is that
delicious paradox Chinchilla offer us. A describing of oneself as these many intersections. A
description whereby knowledge is constructed from the corporeality of the hoochie: the big hoop
girl, the chingona, the gender deviant femme, the puta-madre-más-cabrona-punk-ass-bitch that
don’t need nobody.

Of Stone and Portraiture Sculpture: Laura Aguilar and the Aesthetics of Dehumanization
Boulders in black and white. Smooth outcroppings of stone in the near distance. Flora
and fauna of the desert is sparse, few and far between. The picture presents to us the ordinariness
of the desert. The stillness of landscape, the terrain dry and rugged, a portrait of the U.S.
Southwest in its everyday configuration. Upon closer inspection, several battings of the eyes for
clarification, one can discern a distinction in one of the boulders, a difference in texture, a
difference in form. If the viewer looks with enough intention, with enough care, they can make
out the folds of flesh, the curves of the spine, the rounded-out shape of a human body.
The photograph described above, Grounded #106 (2006), is the work of Laura Aguilar, a
Chicana lesbian photographer from California who passed away in 2018 due to complications
from diabetes. Aguilar’s body of work spanned over three decades, and her photographs centered
queer, Latina, and bodies of size. Her photographs brought to the photographic fore bodies
under-represented and otherwise considered “unappealing” to photographic norms and standards.
Three Eagles Flying (1990), her most iconic triptych, sets the precedent for displaying the nude
women of color and body of size, which Grounded #106 and the series it belongs to will come to
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do and expand upon in many ways. Before her death in April 2018, her first comprehensive
retrospective, Laura Aguilar: Show and Tell, debuted at the Vincent Price Art Museum in Los
Angeles, a retrospective which helped to consolidate her place as a visual artist and
photographer.
Grounded #106 is self-portraiture since the boulder-body is that of Aguilar, as the photos
in the Grounded series all incorporate Aguilar’s body, as well as other women, in the desert and
stone landscapes. Aguilar’s series of self-portraits in the mountains and deserts of New Mexico
and California have been well-analyzed by scholars and feminists.22 “Through images that
eschew the formal qualities of studio as a white-settler aesthetic and its exotic lens,” Macarena
Gómez-Barris writes on the self-portraits, “Aguilar pushes against the colonial objectification of
Native portraiture and the national archive” (82).23 Gómez-Barris highlights the shift in visuality
Aguilar’s portraits demand, a shift contextualized in relation to the colonial histories and Native
dispossession defining the U.S. Southwest, a shift which, as she formulates elsewhere, performs
a decolonial queer eye.24 My analysis adds to this rich body of scholarship, and accounts for the
decolonial descriptive visuality it proffers.
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What would it feel like to be a rock? What would it mean to be a boulder in the desert?
To turn away from the normativized humanity the women of color is to live up to, to represent,
to identify with? To pass as nonhuman in a world where the human is supposed to be the be all
and end all of our imagining? Aguilar’s work is provocative for these questions she poses to us,
and the descriptive otherwise her work offers. Turning from the descriptive inhumanism of
Chinchilla and Aguilar’s work to Aguilar’s work is to highlight the ways in which the visual—
the portrait of the human/nonhuman—operationalizes as a descriptive apparatus. The humanrock of Aguilar’s portraits purposefully, and tactfully, mobilize an aesthetic of the nonhuman, of
inanimacy. In turn, this aesthetic shapes a decolonial sensibility, attuning us to a nonrepresentational yet profoundly political, profoundly queer, praxis and horizon. The human body
with its marked differences, its histories of coloniality and racialization and gendering, are
presented in this abstracted, inanimate, and dehumanized form. The human made inhuman.
Eunjung Kim asks succinctly, “Beyond simply being deployed as a condemnatory last
word, can ‘objectification’ as a mode of ‘dehumanization’ offer a new way to challenge the
exclusionary configurations of humanity that create otherness?” Kim’s article looks to see how
“unbecoming human” might be a means through which to activate an, “anti-ableism, antiviolence
queer ethics of proximity that reveals the workings of the boundary of the human.”25 For Kim,
dehumanization is a critical means through which to interrogate the differences between objects
and people, and how becoming object-like can orient us against the grain of a becoming fully
human. As Samera Esmeir importantly writes, “the task is not to recognize the other’s humanity,
for, like dehumanization, that task risks repeating colonial juridical logics.” These colonial
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logics, as she notes, are tied to colonial rationalities which gave themselves the power to create
humans who are dehumanized in need of humanizing by colonial law.26 Aguilar’s work, in this
idiom of a dehumanized aesthetic, a nonhuman/human visuality, challenges the impetus for an
uplifting, respectability politics infused becoming human coupled to mainstream social justice
struggles. Her work describes another framework, another postulation through which to
articulate how one is human, how one is human in the world, how one can be human otherwise.
Another humanities emerges.
What is most striking about Aguilar’s work is how easily the human can blend in as rock,
how swiftly a human can pass over into the realm of the nonhuman, how a human becomes one
with the landscape. Aguilar’s portraits are not just a becoming of object but a becoming of
landscape: terrain and geography and substance and environment. The New Mexico desert,
those sands which conquistadores have traversed, booted and armored for war, those sands
which migrants have crossed in pursuit of some modicum of the American dream, migrant
bodies living in the ruins of those conquistadores and their laws and rationalities, is Aguilar.
History in the material of her body, her body one with a landscape, a member among an
ecosystem. Anzaldúa: “I need a different mode of telling stories, one that can simultaneously
hold the different models of what I think reality is. I need a different way of organizing reality”
(43). Reality is perspectival, as Anzaldúa suggests, reality is many, many-voiced and manyexperienced. Aguilar enters into the reality of the rock, entering into its temporal and ontological
reality. The temporality of the rock is not that of the human.27 Different scales of time. Time
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weighs down differently upon its stony surface, its memory incompatible with that of the human.
Rocks have experienced the cannon fire of Cortes, have been thrown by Moctezuma and his
people to fight off the Spaniards, have been quarried and dynamited for the purpose of
governmental and corporate extraction. Stone precedes and proceeds these events, a time out of
joint from the human one. “Stone is a sympathetic companion, a source of knowledge and
narrative,” Jeffrey Jerome Cohen writes in his study on stone’s role in Western philosophy and
literature, “an invitation to an ethics of scale, the catalyst for humanist-scientist alliance, a
disruption to everything we thought we knew” (65). Aguilar’s photos extend Cohen’s theorizing
of stones by bringing into question what stones, ontologically and epistemologically, do
politically and ethically in human-nonhuman worlds. Thinking stone and the human, in Donna
Haraway’s words, “might help open passages for a praxis of care and response—responseability—in ongoing multispecies worlding on a wounded terra” (105).
Where Chinchilla and Archila’s work is a descriptive textuality, Aguilar’s work is a
descriptive visuality. Flesh becomes rock, the folds of skin become grooves, the hunching overs
become formations in the Earth. The human body describes the body of the rock, and the body of
the rock describes the human body. Disruptions to temporality, rock time and human time
combined, portraits providing a composite of human flesh and rock flesh. This backwards and
forwards on the human/nonhuman scale are anti-narrative: there is no linearity, no coherence of
form/subjectivity/identity. The viewer is unable to discern if this is a slippage into
nonhumanness, a human becoming rock, or a slipping into humanness, a rock becoming human.
What is the telos? A becoming full human? A becoming rock? A becoming otherwise? The
fantastical blooms as possibility. Fiction and nonfiction, animate and inamimate, human and
nonhuman: indistinguishable.
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Another photo. Landscape and portrait. Three levels of rock. Their beiges, umbers, and
browns. Their cracks, fractures, and fissures. A boulder at the top, form isolated and contained
within the photograph, resting on top of a rock mesa, the mesa pushing out past the boundaries of
the photographic frame. Another rock at the bottom, rounded and smooth, a crack in the middle
of its form. Give another glance, hold it, a closer scrutiny of the eye, and voilà, the viewer can
discern the bottom most rock layer is human. It is flesh, bent over, soft and malleable, unlike the
other hardened, rocky textures in Aguilar’s photograph, Grounded Untitled (2007).
The photograph, at first glance, detailing as it does rocks in the desert, is a landscape
portrait. Rock within its environment, apart from humans as the narrative goes, is the same old
story, in fact, of nature being nature distinct from the human, unimplicated and unimpacted by
human hubris. Nothing extraordinary to see in the landscape sublime. The eyes, if they are so
inclined, if trained to be so inclined, scrutinize, notice one rock is not like the others. The form of
the human appears. The human without its civilization and technology and exceptionalism. The
human naked in landscape, the zigzagging lines which once were thought to be fractures in rock
now are identifiable as stretch marks, the full exposure under the sun. Human as rock, rock as
human: the chiasmic unthinkability of this proposition. This transmogrification a bits and pieces
of some hitherto unthought story, unthought genre, unthought knowing. An extraordinarily
unextraordinary becoming.
This muddling of genre, of temporality, of material, of ontology Aguilar demonstrates, is
pleasurable. Queer theorists, and queer of color theorists, in particular, have demonstrated that
queerness is this perversion of normative boundaries, this messing with what is and what has to
be. Samuel R. Delany’s classic, Times Square Red, Times Square Blue, a book of two longform
essays, centers the politics of pleasure present, and disappearing, within 1990’s Times Square:
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“Given the mode of capitalism under which we live, life is at its most rewarding, productive, and
pleasant when large numbers of people understand, appreciate, and seek out interclass contact
and communication conducted in a mode of good will” (121). For Delany, the pleasure of
contact, and the pleasantness it affords, enable queer socialities to emerge that are contrary to
capitalist incentivizing and privatization, and queer socialities which cut across racial and class
divisions. José Esteban Muñoz theorizes queer pleasure throughout his oeuvre, integral to his
scholarship, and reminds us how critical pleasure is to any project of minoritarian mobilizing and
aesthetics.28
Aguilar’s Grounded series contributes to this queer of color theorizing in that it enacts,
via the visual arts, an aesthetic of pleasure, the pleasure of the inhuman and the nonhuman, the
pleasure of slippage and muddling. The wildness that is undefined matter, the definitional
insurgency of matter mixing. The pleasure in the uncanniness of her portraits. The vastness of
what does not have to be, the range of what is still yet possible. This queer pleasure reveals how
the descriptive can be understood as more than just a textual phenomenon. Visuality, as Aguilar
does it, forces a confrontation with detail, nuanced ways of knowing and perceiving, and the
relations between things that is historically, socially, and culturally constitutive. A descriptive
strategy not dependent upon language, upon narrative, upon ordering and classifying. Aguilar’s
description, delinked from Eurocentric epistemologies and praxis, is a mode of describing that
does not defer to depleted essentialisms of identity and community, a description of the world as
one not of exploitation, dispossession, extractivist profit, and violence. Aguilar’s is a being-with,
a becoming else, a shapeshifting knowing that tells us of unfamiliar and pleasurable worlds,
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alluring and sensuous ways of knowing, aesthetic-praxes wholly invigorating. Portraits
describing the implicated and entangled human/nonhuman relations. Descriptive landscapes
detailing how coloniality has irredeemably suppressed and snuffed out entire lifeworlds, entire
cosmological and epistemological understandings. Self-portraiture of a mestiza body in the
deserts and mountains of the Americas, signaling time and its slippages, matter and its mixings, a
different kind of knowing and sensibility.
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Chapter Three
On Queer Inhumanist Decolonial Autobiography and Gloria Anzaldúa’s Light in the
Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro

In his posthumously published autobiographical book, Familiar Stranger, Stuart Hall sets
out to not write “a memoir in any formal sense” but to articulate “the connections between ‘a
life’ and ‘ideas.’”1 Throughout his anti-memoir Hall cites the Trinidadian theorist, C.L.R. James,
and his autobiographical book on cricket, Beyond a Boundary. “This book is neither cricket
reminisces nor autobiography,” James asserts in the preface, “It poses the question What do they
know of cricket who only cricket know? To answer involves ideas as well as facts.”2 James’ book
is well-known for its ability to analyze popular culture and sports, making connections between
quotidian life and colonialism, the impacts of the center and the periphery on everyday life. For
James, like Hall, the autobiographical is the framework through which to elaborate ideas, to
elaborate on how the ideas of the theorist, the scholar, the intellectual, have come to be. Why this
reluctance to the autobiographical? What are the connections between a life and ideas in Hall’s
formulation?
In an interview with scholar David Scott, Sylvia Wynter articulates how, “the recognition
that was happening to you was totally linked to what was happening to others.”
People ask me, "Why don't you write an autobiography?" But I have never
been able to think that way. I don't know quite how to explain it. My generation, I
think, would find it impossible to emphasize the personal at the expense of the
political—even speaking to Richard Hare you would find the same thing, that his
1
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autobiography would be linked up with those political movements. The idea of
what happens to you would always remain a secondary subject, because that's
how you lived and experienced it. The circumstances have changed, and one
would experience it quite differently now.3
This answer seems in line with the thinking at the time done by other Black intellectuals
from the Caribbean like Hall, James, Glissant, and Césaire, who were working within
anticolonial movements and producing anticolonial writings. To be anticolonial, against the
colonizing efforts of Europe in colonial spaces, meant invoking a revolutionary public, a public
ready for revolutionary measures. To be unable to think the “the autobiographical” because of
this limit, this tethering the genre has to an Enlightenment liberal subjectivity set to the tune of
transcendence from the human masses and nonhuman world it derives from, is the critical thrust
of this work.
My analysis in this article is two-fold: a) to outline the insufficiencies in autobiography
for being able to account for a nonhierarchical, multi-species, and decolonial commons through
an examination of how writers and theorists navigate the tensions of the genre b) Gloria
Anzaldúa’s dissertation writing posthumously published as, Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro,
deploys what I am identifying as queer inhumanist decolonial autobiography. She proposes a
mode of writing the self that is open-ended, processual, relational and contingent upon animate
and inanimate beings, critiquing and imagining against a rational, coherent, and liberal humanist
subjectivity. Autobiography has been a popular genre for decades, and publishing continues to
see a rise in its sales.4 Michelle Obama’s recent memoir, Becoming, selling more than 10 million
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copies in the first months of release, is a testament to the readerly interest in the autobiographic,
to the interest in the intimacy and proximity to knowing about a life. The personal essay is ofttaught in composition courses and in various other iterations across disciplines. Whether
commercial publishing or the university classroom, autobiography is a pervasive mode of
expression, storytelling, and analytic base to examine one’s life and world. Taking seriously the
structures, conventions, and perceptions of the autobiographic, then, is critical to attend to in
order to assess its limitations for and possibilities of enacting a radical political critique of the
environmentally destructive settler-colonial Anthropocene. Anzaldúa’s queer inhumanist
decolonial autobiographical work in Light in the Dark outlines how we might go about doing
autobiography otherwise, one delinked from the post-Enlightenment liberal teleology it is bound
to. This article seeks to move beyond a diagnostic framework, identifying and critiquing the
limitations of autobiography, and instead towards schematizing how to enact and make such
work possible. Her recently published Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro, I argue, operates in an
inhumanist, decolonial autobiographic idiom, where the self is utilized as a form of knowledge
production which refuses to be disqualified as illegitimate because it is not objective and
impersonal, not sequestered or transcendent from the world but rather contingent and relational
to human animals and nonhuman animals, animate and inanimate beings, producing situated
embodied knowledge.
Autobiography is a genre deeply imbricated in the production of liberal subjectivity. The
genre, and those seeking legibility within it, is premised on a progressive narrative of a rational
authoring of self, the pursuit of autonomy, and political emancipation. The autobiographer
narrates a life of hardship experienced with others into a transcendent becoming that privileges
individuality and the removal from communal struggle. The autobiographic function is carried
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out sequentially, temporally moving from past to present, and executed in a plot structure which
tracks the development of being one amidst the many then progressing into prosperous selfhood.
Frequently cited in studies of autobiography as one of the first critics to trace the development of
the genre, Georges Gusdorf, in his 1956 essay, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography” notes
how “[autobiography] expresses a concern peculiar to Western man, a concern that has been of
good use in his systematic conquest of the universe and that he has communicated to men of
other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing
to a mentality that was not their own.”5 We see how early on in the study of autobiography, even
in the hands of those ensconced within the traditions of French philosophical theory, the ties
between empire, colonization, and the genre are mutually constitutive. What becomes a tenuous,
though generative, site of analysis is when the genre and its formal logics are taken up by the
colonized as a means of representation, as a means of accounting for a life and lives.
In her book The Intimacies of Four Continents, Lisa Lowe’s reading of Equiano’s
autobiography, Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the
African, Written by Himself, is critical for formulating the limits of autobiography in relationship
to nonwhite peoples. Popularized by the likes of Benjamin Franklin, the autobiography, a liberal
genre celebrating the autonomous, rational subject, as executed by Equiano, “calls attention to
the tensions and inconsistencies that arise when the genre of liberty shapes the story of a former
slave.”6 These tensions arise where the genre that is autobiography, premised on the narrating of
overcoming one’s struggles through industrious individualism, the freedom of free will and
autonomy, to transcend the limits upon the self, are a way of eliding the structural conditions
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which allowed for, and perpetuated, enslavement of African peoples. Equiano’s tale is an
exemplary enslavement narrative, fitting uneasily into the liberal genre of the narration of a self
removed from the problem of the enslaved masses. And yet, “the autobiographical genre
develops the self-authoring individual out of the transatlantic conditions, the text’s digressions,
heterogeneity, and contradictions permit us to read ‘against the grain’ of this development.”7
Navigating within the literary conventions of the widely popular autobiographic genre allows for
Equiano to disseminate to a larger audience an account of a formerly enslaved person, and to be
legible in particular ways, while meanwhile employing various strategies and tactics to subvert
the liberal limits of the genre he is working in. Lowe’s reading of Equiano elucidates the bind of
the autobiographical for a minoritized subject, the needing to work both in and against the genre
to articulate a particular story of oppression.
Similar to the concerns over Equiano’s autobiographical slave narrative, the genre form
known as testimonio, and standout here is Kʼicheʼ Guatemalan activist Rigoberta Menchú’s
testimonio, I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, produces its own particular
tensions under the umbrella of autobiography. Critics have for some time now critiqued the
limits of the testimonio, and its claims to the autobiographic because of the kind of mediation it
requires to give voice to the subaltern, its effort to represent the Global South subject for a
Global North readership.8 Testimonio, as Georg M. Gugelberger notes in the introduction to the
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edited anthology dedicated to the form, The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse and Latin
America, “seemed at first to cling steadfastly to representationality and to be outside canonized
literature—a nomadic and homeless genre with the hope for solidarity and community not only
in Latin America. It is the homelessness of an unplaceable genre between disciplines (e.g.,
literature and anthropology), on the verge of being autobiography without being autobiography,
authored without having an author.”9 Testimonio is to testify of one’s life. Testimonio brings the
life and the body of the subaltern into representation via language, through the use of narrational
and temporal frameworks legible to Western readers. The ethical concerns with testimonio is it is
an act of translating a life unrecognizable to Western audiences into a particular kind of
recognizability. Legibility which, like the popular slave autobiographies of those like Equiano
and Frederick Douglass, demands a transcendence from the masses, an overcoming of political
struggle through free will and good moral compass. This results in the exoneration of the
Western reader from confronting the structural conditions which produce precarity and violence
due to autobiography’s subsuming of them through its genric tropes, through its narrative
mediation of the individual overcoming all the oppressive odds.
Both forms of autobiography, the slave narrative and the subaltern testimonio, grapple
with this predicament of how to speak for the oppressed, the enslaved African and the indigenous
Guatemalan, when the genre conventions prohibit such a speaking for. If we take this grappling
as a generative site of tension, what, then, might a nonhierarchical, multi-species, and decolonial
commons look like? How might one write the I/we self, the human/nonhuman selves, that does
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not conform to the liberal tenets of autobiography? To do this, I propose thinking with decolonial
theory and the turn to the nonhuman done by critical race scholars.
Important decolonial thinkers like Franz Fanon, Walter Mignolo, Macarena GómezBarris, Emma Pérez, Aníbal Quijano, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Chela Sandoval, and Sylvia
Wynter, are critical for thinking anew the self and autobiography. “There is no modernity
without coloniality,” Mignolo writes in the preface to his seminal text Local Histories/Global
Designs, “and that coloniality is constitutive, and not derivative, of modernity,”10 and this
inseparability of modernity/coloniality, of modernity being instantiated by colonization,
dispossession, and enslavement, is foundational to decolonial thought, foundational to analytics
that work to understand the embeddedness of coloniality within modernity and capitalism. This
foundational decolonial analytic is important to the understanding of how the narrating and
emplotment of liberal subjectivity is tethered to modernity and coloniality, to the making of a
new world order which holds U.S./European epistemes as center and all others as peripheral.
Emma Pérez’s work highlights how thinking the decolonial is an important “theoretical tool for
uncovering the hidden voices of Chicanas that have been relegated to silences, to passivity, to
that third space where agency is enacted through third space feminism.”11 Her work illustrates
ways of reading Chicanas into history when the archive, periodizing, and geographic
demarcations would otherwise erase them. Identifying what she calls a “decolonial queer femme
method,” Macarena Gómez-Barris prioritizes, “nonnormative embodied femininity as sources of
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knowing and perceiving.”12 Her attention to decolonial perception and embodiment, through
putting in constellation indigenous and Afro-diasporic epistemologies from Latin America in
queer decolonial ways, provides a means in which to articulate submerged and emergent
perspectives in which to perceive the world against the destructive forces of extractive capital.
To alter one’s perception in a queer decolonial way is to better attend to those unperceivable or
unnoticeable events that colonial logics have stifled.
Decolonial theory is not unrelated to the thinking done by those attending to analyses of
the nonhuman. Special issues like GLQ’s “Queer Inhumanisms,” TSQ’s “Tranimalities,” and
Social Text’s “Interspecies” have anthologized necessary interruptions in how we theorize the
human and nonhuman, stressing, rather than willfully overstepping, the importance of not
evacuating the human from socially constituted axes like race, gender, ability, and nation which
configure both the human and the nonhuman. Key theorists such as Mel Y. Chen, Zakiyyah Iman
Jackson, Neel Ahuja, and Jasbir Puar draw convergences between the nonhuman and critical race
studies, queer theory, and disability studies. In the introduction to their co-edited GLQ special
issue, “Queer Inhumanisms,” Mel Y. Chen and Dana Luciano explain how by identifying the
issue as inhumanist “points to the violence that the category of the human contains within itself,”
and “its dual temporal and historical resonances, since we do not as yet foresee a form of the
inhuman that liberates itself entirely from histories and processes of dehumanization, nor one
that does not risk falling back into them.”13 Thinking the inhuman is to think the human against
the grain of the Enlightenment Man, to think the human as porous and transmaterial. This effort
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to theorize the nonhuman in such a way is to admit how “the human has always been a
thoroughly exclusionary concept in race and species terms,” and a critical retheorizing of the
human needs to be understood as “not an expansionist one (expanding the definition of the
human to allow a few racialized groups or preferred ape species in) but rather a reconstructive
one (reimagining humans, animals, and nature outside of systems of domination.”14 The
conventions of autobiography, the demand for a coherent, linear narrative, and subjective
transcendence from the masses, I contend, partakes in this system of domination critical race
scholars of the nonhuman have written on. The generic legibility of autobiography upholds
distinctions about what it means to be human, how we prove ourselves to be human through
discourses of race, sexuality, gender, ability, and species, and how we perform that humanness
legibly.
In his tract on the animal, The Animal That Therefore I Am, a text many have turned to
when posing the concerns around thinking the nonhuman, Derrida elaborates on how the
Western philosophical tradition premised itself on the severing of the philosopher from his
philosophy, the self from the ideas. This, in turn, allowed for the production of knowledge to
codify and legitimize itself as a rational, impersonal, objective, and universal undertaking
removed from the self that is the philosopher. On the work of Descartes, for instance, Derrida
notes how he, “cleared the path of autobiographilosophical narration, of self-presentation as
philosophical presentation.”15 Here he points out how Descartes turns the philosophizing self, the
discoursing Descartes, into universal truths, into knowledge. All philosophy, Derrida suggests, is
an act of autobiography. This speaks to Derrida’s overall argument he is making on how
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philosophy, and Western thought itself, has constructed its foundations off of distinctions
between the critical and the personal, animal and the human, the rational and irrational, the
object to be studied and the one doing the studying, the white European and the nonwhite Other.
He interrogates this distinction through considerations of responsibility, of how do we respond to
that which we do not know, what is a response to that Other that is the unspeaking animal,
beyond intelligibility, beyond philosophy’s reach. He situates his argument through an attention
to the philosopher as autobiographer though the undermining of this relation is paramount for
philosophical legitimacy. One can say Derrida forefronts this self, makes sure we never forget
the philosopher in the philosophy, through his highly stylized writing which came to stand in for
deconstruction. Deconstructionists performed Derrida on the page through imitation of his style.
When Descartes, Spinoza, Hegel, and all these men of Western thought who become a suffix, an
–ian, they transcend the relations which constitute them, the social and material conditions in
which they write and produce knowledge.
A mouthful of a word, certainly, Derrida coins the portmanteau: autobiographilosophy. A
chimerical concept bringing into tension genres, discourses, and Eurocentric epistemology itself.
Another portmanteau to designate an equally chimerical concept is coined by Audre Lorde:
biomythography. Lorde’s, Zami: A New Spelling of My Name, is a fictionalized memoir (or a
memoirized fiction?) where the voices of the many women who have made her who she is,
appear. “The term,” elaborates Karen Weekes, "reflects the biography of the figure who speaks
for collective experience, along with a mythologizing impulse that enlarges this quotidian figure
and inscribes it—in its both mundane and legendary aspects—into a contemporary cultural
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mythology.”16 A Black commons emerges through Lorde’s aesthetic practice that defies genre.
What Saidiya Hartman postulates as “the chorus,” the ways in which Black people have
collaborated and improvised the space of enclosure, where “the vehicle for another kind of story,
not of the great man or the tragic hero, but one in which all modalities play a part, where the
headless group incites change, where mutual aid provides the resource for collective action, not
leader and mass, where the untranslatable songs and seeming nonsense make good the promise
of revolution.”17 Lorde’s “biomythography,” and Hartman’s “chorus,” alongside earlier
discussed postulations posed by thinkers like Wynter, Hall, and James who challenged the
individualism of the autobiographic, speaks to how modes of writing become a space of
emergence for the many forms, voices, and styles which encompass Black life.
These various workings within, and against, the autobiography genre, attest to the
constraints on how the marginalized subject can write the self within these parameters, how to
write the self in relation to various kinds of human and nonhuman others. The pressures upon
autobiography these varying writers and thinkers present helps to configure a form of writing the
self that is not bound to a linear narrative of liberal subjectivity, I argue, but rather descriptive:
not sequential, cumulative, or progressively narrating a life of rational, pull-yourself-up-by-thebootstraps transcendence from the oppressed masses, of making one distinct from the
human/nonhuman world; rather a digressive, anecdotal, nonlinear mode of describing a self and
many selves in nonhierarchical, multi-species, decolonial contingency. Gloria Anzaldúa’s
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dissertation writing in Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro exemplifies this descriptive practice,
and the overall possibilities for writing the queer inhumanist decolonial autobiographic.

Transmogrifications of Self, Text, and Body: Gloria Anzaldúa’s Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo
Oscuro as Queer Inhumanist Decolonial Autobiography
In an interview with Karen Ikas, Gloria Anzaldúa makes this remark on her intentions behind
Borderlands/La Frontera.
If I had made Borderlands too inaccessible to you by putting in too many Chicano
terms, too many Spanish words, or if I had been more fragmented in the text than
I am right now, you would have been very frustrated. So there are certain
traditions in all the different genres—like autobiography, fiction, poetry, theory,
criticism—and certain standards that you have to follow…
It is like when you write a dissertation: there are certain rules you have to apply;
otherwise they won’t pass you. My whole struggle is to change the disciplines, to
change the genres, to change how people look at a poem, at theory or at children’s
books.18
This quote is revealing for the way it touches upon Anzaldúa’s authorial intent behind
Borderlands, the book which she is most known for and is often taught in classrooms. She wrote
and completed this book strategically, subverting genre conventions and tropes incrementally,
not completely, so as to maintain some kind of legibility to an audience who might get turned off
by her genre-bending work. She equates this subtly transgressive genric passing to writing a
dissertation for a committee: one must hit the appropriate marks in order to pass. Her comparison
here is telling because what she will identify as Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro, what is to
pass as her dissertation, and, as she wants it to become, a scholarly monograph, features the same
kind of genre-bending components Borderlands deploys like poetry, memoir, theory, criticism,
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and dream writing. What distinguishes the two projects, however, is that Borderlands/La
Frontera was a book that passed the rubrics of legibility, as Anzaldúa’s comment about her
desire to push genre conventions to strategic limits so as to not lose an audience, and was able to
pass as a completed book because it was not trying to be scholarly. Light in the Dark/Luz en lo
Oscuro, on the other hand, did not pass as dissertation, as scholarly, or as a completed
monograph, because the kind of tension Anzaldúa placed upon those genres were too forceful.
The project moved between genres too much, the project moved between drafts too frequently to
settle into total and absolute completion. This inability to pass Light in the Dark/Luz en lo
Oscuro appropriately as dissertation/scholarly/monograph, I contend, is a productive tension
which these writings give us. This tension speaks to the earlier postulations given by Hall, James,
and Wynter on the reluctance to produce memoir, and guides us in understanding the kind of
aesthetic practice Anzaldúa inaugurates for writing the self otherwise.
Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro: Rewriting Identity, Spirituality, Reality is in many
ways a continuation of the thinking she was doing in Borderlands/La Frontera. She more
sharply brings into light her creative process, and the kind of worldly and otherworldly
interconnectedness such a process entails. For her, writing is ontology: a mode of being with
others, animate and inanimate, human animal and nonhuman animal. Through the positing of
concepts like conocimientos and Coyolxauhqui imperative, concepts which articulate the need
for spiritual insight and a complex healing that can work with the fragmentation colonization and
social oppression have wrought, we can “revise reality by altering our consensual agreements
about what is real, what is just and fair. We can trans-shape reality by changing our perspectives
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and perceptions. By choosing a different future, we bring it into being.”19 The manuscript is
unfinished by the time of her death in 2004, and the dissertation finds itself scattered about in the
archive she leaves behind. Scholar AnaLouise Keating pieces together the disparate material and
publishes it posthumously more than a decade after her death. A manuscript which, as Keating
notes, “underwent numerous shifts in title, table of contents, and chapter organization; it exists in
numerous partial iterations—handwritten notes, outlines, chapter drafts, e-mail communication,
conversations with writing comadres, and computer files.”20 Scholars have amply reported on
Anzaldúa’s insistence to revise all of her work even after it is published.21 No writing for
Anzaldúa was ever really finished. In pieces, then, and also under revision, the dissertation is
doubly incomplete. Organized based on what Anzaldúa left behind, Keating puts it all together
into a manuscript, inevitably, constructing a text that is Anzaldúa’s, and is not. What to do, then,
with a text that is unfinished in such a way? Unfinished, too, because the form of the dissertation,
a performance of objective, rational, and depersonalized knowledge, was inhospitable to
Anzaldúa’s ways of thinking and being?
I will examine how the unfinished—the sentence, the outline, the chapter, the
dissertation—is a productive impasse for Anzaldúa in Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro, and
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this impasse helps enact what I am identifying as queer inhumanist decolonial autobiography. It
is key to note that this impasse is conditioned by the disciplinary norms of the dissertation form
which Anzaldúa could not find a way to fit into. This is not to propose an argument that the
dissertation as a genre, in particular, or scholarly writing, in general, must contain autobiography
or is the best mode through which to enact autobiography. Rather, my argument is that
Anzaldúa’s dissertation writing and critical thinking is already operating in this autobiographic
mode, using an embodied and entangled writing practice which puts pressure upon what
constitutes proper knowledge production and properly representing a self through autobiography.
I do not merely invoke those texts which she was unable to complete in her lifetime but, as many
scholars have noted, none of her work she ever found to be complete, even those that were
published. For Anzaldúa, the unfinished is a way of being and thinking, a project that one
undertakes in the very life they live. Her life and writings give us a writing praxis that is
processual, shape-shifting, and always incomplete. This unfinished impasse constituting her
work denies the conventions of the autobiographic genre, the impulse to tell a sequential, linear,
and complete story of liberal subjectivity. This also speaks to the disciplinary mechanisms in
place which govern what modes of knowledge are legitimate, and which are not.
There are many iterations of the book-length project Anzaldúa identifies as Light in the
Dark. She worked on it for well over a decade producing many outlines and drafts for the various
parts of it. There’s something to be gained, then, if we think of Anzaldúa’s dissertation, as well
as her praxis of writing, as fragmentary, as revisionary, as intercalated, as collaborative. Moving
pieces, interchangeable, variable and variably different through time. Titled, “Putting
Coyolxauhqui Together: A Creative Process,” chapter five of the dissertation is on Anzaldúa’s
writing process, and speaks well to what I am proposing as queer inhumanist decolonial
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autobiography work. Named after the Aztec goddess of the Moon, a goddess beheaded and cut
into pieces, she is utilized metaphorically for what Anzaldúa calls the Coyolxauhqui imperative:
“the struggle to reconstruct oneself and heal the sustos resulting from woundings, traumas,
racism, and other acts of violation que hechan pedazos nuestras almas, split us, scatter our
energies, and haunt us.”22 Originally intended for an edited collection, the chapter undergoes at
least seventeen drafts between the years 1998 and 2003, and changes from first-person to
second-person narration.23 Stylistically, the chapter is organized as a series of descriptions
(digressions, wanderings, chit-chat) centered around drafting. In detail, she describes the
(second? third? fourth?) beginning of the writing process.
Now it’s time to start composing the next pre-draft. Anticipation and mild dread
course through your body. You walk from desk to files to shelves, looking for
something, a lost note, to anchor your attention. A part of you wants to write and
a part of you doesn’t—there’s always a conflict as to which of you is running the
writing. The part representing internalized goals and a personal standard of
perfection has grandiose plans for your career, wants the story to be a work of art.
Your controlling authoritarian spirit wants you to apply willpower and discipline;
it wants you to produce and to be efficient about it…
Writing is like pulling miles of entrails through your mouth.24

Anzaldúa elaborates in this passage how the process of writing is an embodied practice.
Her metaphor of writing as “pulling entrails through your mouth” attests to the full
embodiedness that is the undertaking of writing, the undertaking of producing knowledge
through writing. Writing is a struggle of the body to put ideas into words on the page. She
documents what seems to be writer’s block and being unproductive, affective comportments
which register in the terms of Sianne Ngai as, “ugly feelings,” those negative emotions which do
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politically ambiguous work.25 Being unable to write, stuck in thought, and being overall
unproductive are not valued affective comportments in neoliberal capitalism which only values
the immediate, the timely, the efficient, the finished product. And yet being unproductive in such
a way is important for Anzaldúa’s writing and thinking. These material conditions of
unproductivity are her body doing the writing how it needs to be done. The self is always there
even before the writing takes place, the body’s struggle is always present in the production of
knowledge. Anzaldúa knows this kind of writing praxis, this pacing “from desk to files to
shelves,” the “next pre-draft” and the following to come, the “mild dread” which moves through
the body, is at odds with productivity that comes with completing the dissertation, producing the
scholarly monograph, and finishing the publishable book.
From the Nahuatl word, nepantla, a concept-word of Anzaldúa’s translating roughly to
“in-betweenness,” is theorized as a shifting of consciousness, an attuning of perception, where,
“Shaman-like nepantla moves from rational to visionary states, from logistics to poetics, from
focused to unfocused perception, from inner world to outer.”26 Like the Coyolxauhqui
imperative, nepantla is a concept borrowed from Mesoamerican indigenous cultures. Anzaldúa
conceptualizes the word as a means to grapple with the shape-shifting and polymorphic modes of
perception required for creativity and healing oneself from systematic oppression. The body is
more than human in her configuration. The body is the means of moving between many kinds of
worlds: poetry/theory, inner/outer selves, human/nonhuman, and the physical/spirit world. For
Anzaldúa, the body is the conduit for writing these nonhierarchical and multi-species
movements. Embodied writing, the writing self as a medium through which to attend to these
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intimacies across difference, traces these otherwise unperceivable networks that are foreclosed,
or unimaginable, within the parameters of autobiography, the dissertation, the publishable book.
Anzaldúa’s dissertation is not what most would traditionally call scholarly. The book
enacts another of her concepts which she calls, autohistoria-teoría, an assemblage of
autobiography (anecdotes, lore, supernatural experiences), myth, theory, history, dreamings,
linguistics, and spiritualism. Autohistoria-teoría is a way of storytelling which blends the
personal and the critical, individual and the plural, the human and the nonhuman, all in order to
rework existing epistemologies, ontologies, and perceptions. This concept is much alike to
Lorde’s biomythography, where both form chimerical genres that allow for more capacious ways
of understanding the writer and the networks of relation they occupy in the world. This
theoretical concept posed by Anzaldúa goes against the grain of scholarly writing, the
dissertation genre she is trying to write in, by her being unable to uphold distinctions like
subject/object, personal/critical, linear narrative/cumulative narratives, and
depersonalized/embodied knowledge production.
Tonally, the preface of the book divulges from the other pieces of the dissertation. It is
when she stages herself as most scholarly. The preface is written close to the time of her death,
as if knowing through some kind of divine foresight that the end is near and some kind of
preface, an act of prefacing one’s unassembled fragments, revisions, chapters, would be needed.
It is the closest we get to a writing distinctly dissertation-like: “Using a multidisciplinary
approach and a ‘storytelling’ format, I theorize my own and others’ struggles for representation,
identity, self-inscription, and creative expressions”; “By focusing on Chicana/mestiza (Mexicana
tejana) experience and identity in several axes—writer/artist, intellectual, scholar, teacher,
woman, Chicana, feminist, lesbian, working class—I attempt to analyze, describe, and re-create
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these identity shifts.”27 More of these kinds of scholarly stylistic flourishes occur in the eight
pages of preface. Simultaneously, however, she works against such conclusive, definitive,
declarative language: “I use various storytelling formats consistent with the experiences that I
reflect on, and I use whatever language and style correspond to the ways I do the work”; “I don’t
write from any single disciplinary position,”28 she declares to the reader. “We are connected to el
cenote via the individual and collective árbol de la vida, and our images and ensueños emerge
from that connection, from the self-in-community (inner, spiritual, nature/animals, racial/ethnic,
communities of interest, neighborhood, city, nation, planet, galaxy, and the unknown
universes).”29 Here she explicitly invokes a nonhierarchical, multi-species, and entangled
worldview. Plant and human, nonhuman animal and human animal, the physical realm and the
spirit realm, the self and the many, all coincide in the critical queer inhumanist decolonial work
she imagines for the project. She uses the language of the scholar, those oft-overlooked stylistic
conventions like the declarative statements, the stating openly the disciplinary boundaries and
methods used, and the projections of where the work will go, what will happen, and how it will
end. However, as the examples above demonstrate, she subverts these scholarly syntaxes in the
very use of them. She makes herself legible as a scholar through them though challenges that
very legibility. In the preface she is trying to fit herself into a style, a tone, a scholarly voice
which she wants to avoid and evade. Her phrase “self-in-community” is revealing for how she
wants this dissertation to conjure forth the autobiographical and a commons, the self in dialogue
with communities imagined and unimaginable, for more than just a scholarly audience, a writing
of the self that is more than the individual, more than just human, nation, planet, and universe.
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Anzaldúa is attempting something, to put it bluntly, messy. The “messy materiality of her
archive,” as scholar Suzanne Bost notes, is testament to the kind of aesthetic praxis she
develops.30 An archive containing many versions of writing, the many revisions and revisionings, the projects planned and started and abandoned and completed and then rewritten
again. Drafts of work sent out to her writing comadres and building networks of intimacy and
kinship through the unfinished. Her dissertation is many: poetry, theory, history, memoir: her
dissertation is none. This shape-shifting and polymorphous nature of the dissertation provokes a
crisis in the ability to place it within a genre, to identify it as scholarly, to categorize it in a way
which gives legibility and legitimation. How to respond to a dissertation that exceeds the
boundaries of that form? When reproducing the conventions of that form are fundamental to
accessing livable wages, health insurance, a career? What to do with a book that was never
meant to be a book?
The self as Gloria Anzaldúa, as the writer and the writing, is processual. The I is
provisional, transmogrifying, open to difference. This is why her dissertation is so hard to pin
down as a dissertation, why her book-length project is so hard to pin down as a publishable book.
Neither is this mass of writings memoir, bound as memoir is to telling a story of completeness,
becoming whole, relaying a beginning, middle, and end, a life in singular. The memoir function,
like Hall, Wynter, and James, Anzaldúa elides. These writings are otherwise, noting, “You
realize it’s the process that’s valuable and not the end product, not the new you, as that will
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change often throughout life.”31 Healing of self, of community, happens in the unceasing process
of becoming, of thinking, of writing.
Yet the demands of production/productivity linger with a severity, a bringing into precarity.
You hate having incompletes hovering over you—the all-but-dissertation doctoral
degree, the projects promised—but what you hate most is passing something off
as finished when you feel it isn’t, when it hasn’t lived up to its potential.
Disgusted with yourself, you look around your study. Every surface is covered
with folders, faxes, requests for submissions and letters of recommendation,
manuscripts sent by friends and strangers who want you to write introductions or
blurbs for the cover or take a few days out of your life to critique their fivehundred-page masterpieces. You’re angry at your own internal demands that you
should be able to do everything. You resent the pressure—your own and that of
editors, publishers, and readers—to produce.32
How heavy falls the final, “—to produce.” The em dash—breaking, severing,
interrupting, accentuating, connecting—the demands of production, finalizing, publishing a
manuscript. The em dash is a disruption on reading, on organizing thought, on linearity, on
writing. The placement of an em dash is a consideration, a deliberate and conscious effort to
think process. She could have written the sentence as, “You resent the pressure to produce.” Yet
she did not. She opted to fragment such a simplicity, to wreck the direct, to give us a syntax out
of joint. It is the digression, rather, the getting off of track though on track, instead.
The self is somewhere near or around the em dash. Displaced, at a remove, though close.
To write the self as if an em dash? Contained within the digressive is the autobiographical, in
Anzaldúa’s formulation. Her telling description of production’s demands is not exceptional. She
writes the personal that can speak for so many who live with the pressures of productivity, of
being productive in order to survive in societies structured by coloniality and capitalism.
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Anzaldúa opens chapter two, “Flights of the Imagination: Rereading/Rewriting Realities”
with a vignette. Fantastical, and spiritual, surreal and unreal, in a Monterrey cypress altered by a
storm and subsequently sawed by an arborist to repair it, in this disfigured nonhuman body,
Anzaldúa sees la Virgen. “I suddenly saw her coming out of the hollowed trunk: It was la Virgen
de Guadalupe, head tilted, arms extended, halo spread all around…From a distance, the bright
live tans and browns of the raw newly cut wood and dangling trunk fibers looked like the folds
of her robes…But once I saw la Virgen emerging from the tree, my imagination picks her out
every time I walk toward her, no matter how age, storm, or sea alters the cypress’s trunk.”33
Does La Virgen emerge from the tree, as a human body, or is she the tree, animatedly inhuman?
The description is tricky in determining if upon subsequent visits the tree is la Virgen, or if she
emerges from it. She is both human and tree in Anzaldúa’s wording. This slippage of the
imagery is a telling ambiguity for how reality is an ever-shifting, perspectival, and processual
phenomenon. Anzaldúa describes to her reader her reality. One built from a Catholic imagery
recuperated for otherworldly purposes. A Catholicism deriving from her Tejana Mexican
American background that is jiggered for other ends, other means. “I need a different way of
organizing reality,”34 Anzaldúa writes, and had she had more time to think on this sentence,
returning to it as she returned to la Virgen tree, to her writings published and unpublished, she
would have possibly edited reality into realities. For her writing, her many writings, prove to us
there is more than one, more than a, more than self.
Light in the Dark⁄Luz en lo Oscuro gives attention to the possibilities in Anzaldúa’s queer
inhumanist decolonial work. Proposing a model for how to care for different modes of being,
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thinking, and writing which go against the kinds of corporatized models of scholarly productivity
and the conventions of autobiography which prioritize particular narratives of liberal subjectivity
and individual transcendence. The chimerical genre-bending she performs in these writings, the
queer inhumanist decolonial mode in which she operates, tests the limits of the autobiographic,
the scholarly, the dissertation, and the publishable book. These challenges to form through her
praxis of unfinishing help imagine a nonhierarchical, multi-species, and decolonial commons
that is always emergent, always in process, always forming.
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Chapter Four
The Documentary Descriptive:
Racial Mattering, Ekphrastic Hyperrealism, and Object Lessons in The Real Death Valley,
The Land of Open Graves, and State of Exception/Estado de Excepción

How can bodies describe? Or, in the absences of a body, how can a nonhuman object
describe? These two questions will take center stage in this chapter analyzing the documentary
film, The Real Death Valley, a documentary showcasing the journey migrants from Central
America and Mexico undertake through the dangerous Texas brush to avoid a border checkpoint,
and the exhibition, State of Exception/Estado de Excepción, which puts on display the objects
and other kinds of data left at the U.S.-Mexico border by migrants crossing the desert. The
documentary’s narrative arch, I argue, depends upon a narrative of humanization, that is, making
recognizable the humanity of these migrants through a narrative producing sympathy, intended
to mobilize a plea to value and to guarantee the aliveness of these vulnerable bodies. The
documentary does this through centering the nonhuman, the material evidence signaling
racialized life such as unidentifiable bones in a mass gravesite, a wallet in the brush, an
abandoned pink jacket, and a binder filled with images of bodies in the desert, towards this
affective project. The evoking of sympathy becomes the operative and, most importantly, only,
mode of imagining a politics of care for racialized bodies suffering and dying through the many
national borders they traverse. Yet the documentary, in its efforts to humanize these bodies
according to the protocols of a liberal humanist schema, a schema prioritizing the rational subject
who is able to represent themselves within an affective framework of sympathy, stages the very
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failure of its project since it is unable to account for the ways in which the category of the human
has never meant to, nor can it, incorporate these bodies within its parameters. In its attempts at
consolidating undocumented bodies—more precisely, the matter signaling undocumented bodies
when the subject is unavailable to represent themselves—within this category of the universal
human, the film reinforces the very structures of power which produce unlivability for these
bodies, the very conditions which prompt the need for migration across these inhospitable
conditions. However, I will outline how the film’s use of archival evidence of racialized matter,
such as photographs of migrant bodies in a binder or the voice-over description of what happens
to migrant bodies in the desert heat, undermines the humanizing project it sets out to do. This
excess of racialized matter enables an alternative politico-aesthetic response to emerge against
the grain of a sentimentalized, ahistorical, and depoliticized understanding of racialized migrants
moving through the Americas.
Scholars of documentary film have addressed the particular ways humanitarian impulses
are mediated, and how the mediation of minoritized people and populations incite differing
responses and demands to action. Trinh T. Minh-ha is one of the earliest feminists of color to
articulate how the celebrated realism of documentary for minoritized people produces not truth,
but particular meanings.1 Meanings which are filtered through a Western, white, and patriarchal
lens, and as Minh-ha elucidates, these majoritarian framings are aesthetically executed through
camera angling like the wide angle which is considered more objective. Leshu Torchin examines
how human rights law and testimonials are staged in documentary to produce witnesses and
witnessing publics, paying close attention to the formal and aesthetic dimensions which shape
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the reception of the plights of suffering by a majoritarian viewing public.2 “Documentary, in
recording historical reality, incites a desire for the real both as knowable, and hence mastered by
our knowledge of it,” writes Elizabeth Cowie, elaborating on the ways in which the desire for the
real and authentic compels how audiences relate to the subjects contained within documentary
film.3 What these critics highlight is how documentary’s claim to realism, a claim to truth, fact,
and a showing of life as it actually is, is not automatically aligned to ethical and emancipatory
projects. Formal and aesthetic considerations of documentary composition demonstrates how
integral such considerations are for audience reception and action.
Pooja Rangan’s work on participatory documentary and the humanitarian mandate is
particularly important for analyzing The Real Death Valley and the limits of documentary
realism. Informed by Elaine Scarry and Craig Calhoun’s concept of “emergency thinking,”
where the humanitarian dictate to save lives takes precedence over questions of aesthetics or the
politics of representation, Rangan coins the term, “immediations.” She explains how
participatory documentary, a means of giving agency to marginalized peoples by allowing them
to record their lives and suffering in its most immediate form, and a way of bypassing the
problems of representing the Other documentary film has had to contend with, only works to
reify their exploitation. “The humanitarian demand for referentiality and immediacy consolidates
a particularly apolitical discourse of human rights that is grounded in abstract, essential
characteristics of humanity (e.g., ‘life itself’)” she writes, where the presentation of suffering as
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immediacy, as the requiring of action and not contemplation, erases the conditions which
produce unlivability for minoritized people, particularly those living in the Global South.
These scholars bring necessary attention to the ties between formal analysis in
documentary film and the discursive framing of minoritized life within, which is useful for my
own inquiry into The Real Death Valley. Tracing the formal and narrative features of the film, a
film which is demonstrably didactic and aiming to persuade the audience to feel sympathy
towards migrant life,4 allows for a different analytic practice against the humanitarian impulse of
immediacy and representational legibility. The film becomes valuable not for just the content it
can relay to audiences about the struggle of migration and the dangers migrants face. Paying
attention to how the documentary mobilizes rhetorical and aesthetic strategies on behalf of a
particular staging gives way to examine the ideological underpinnings such films proffer.
Undertaking careful formal analysis enables us to contend with the materiality of marginalized
bodies, of what else might slip through the known and knowable, the exhausted frameworks of
sympathy and sentimentality pervasive in films documenting the suffering and violences towards
subaltern peoples.
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Michael Renov outlines four modalities for documentary film’s attention: 1) to record, reveal,
or preserve 2) to persuade or promote 3) to analyze or interrogate 4) to express. The Real Death
Valley occupies itself with revealing the problem of migrant border crossings and is trying to
persuade an audience to feel sympathy towards these plights. “Towards a Poetics of
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The Documentary Descriptive: The Real Death Valley, Racialized Mattering, and
Ekphrastic Hyperrealism
The Real Death Valley is a documentary made possible by the joint efforts of the Weather
Channel and Telemundo, investigating why so many migrants are dying within Brooks County,
Texas. The documentary examines the many calls for help they make to 911 to save their lives,
the weather conditions they must encounter, the exhuming of undocumented bodies in mass
unmarked graves, and the transnational politics involved in mapping out how the United States
responds to the distressed needs of these people dying, or already dead, within the borderlands of
the United States. The documentary narrativizes itself by chronicling the journey of two brothers,
Sigfredo Palomo and Fernando Palomo, who flee El Salvador due to threats against their lives
from local gangs. Their journey ends with Fernando dying right in front of Sigfredo within the
Texas desert. Accompanying the brothers’ narrative is an archive of matter signaling the fleshy
traces of a humanity lived, a humanity of a particular geopolitical, racialized life: abandoned
winter coats on a dusty path; jewelry tossed, valueless and forgotten, in the brush; wallets
containing little more than dirt scorched by the rays of an unrelenting sun; photo after photo,
blurred decomposed body after blurred decomposed body, filed away in a binder; bodies in trash
bags and skulls in a mass, unmarked grave; pleas for rescue, requests to pass on last words to
loved ones; and the painstaking tears over a recorded 911 call. The tragic narrative of the Palomo
brothers, coupled with the investigative journalism centralizing objects imbued with the
liveliness of lives lived, attempts to leverage a sympathy for these people, these bodies, and, in
effect, is a humanizing gesture, a narrativizing of these ignored lives during a contentious
moment where the politics of immigration discourse are as heated as ever.
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The setting of The Real Death Valley takes place in the highly contested and symbolic
zone of the U.S.-Mexico Border. Gloria Anzaldúa writes in Borderlands/La Frontera of the
border as, “una herida abierta where the third world grates against the first and bleeds.”5 In the
2012 preface to Local Histories/Global Designs, Walter Mignolo explains his concept of border
theory in this way: "border thinking is tantamount to engaging in decoloniality; that is, in
thinking and doing decolonially. Why? Because the main thrust of border thinking is not directed
toward "improving" the disciplines, but toward "using" the disciplines beyond the disciplines
themselves, aiming and building a world without modernity/coloniality." For Mignolo, "there is
no modernity without coloniality" and border theory is the, "thinking from dichotomous concepts
rather than ordering the world in dichotomies.”6 Anzaldúa and Mignolo's postulations open up a
field of inquiry in which to think of the border as a porous, dynamic, and imaginative conceptual
place which constitutes how people experience living and moving through borders. Theorizing
like theirs against the idea of the border as a fixed and stable settler colonial boundary goes
against, “the fiction of a regulated border [that] has long sanctioned the violent conversion of
poor, working-class, and exiled peoples into persons without a place.”7
The Real Death Valley is not invested in interrogating the border as an ideologically
contested zone, or a space which contestation may emerge over what defines it and how it is
defined. The filmic apparatus takes the border as a very real space of division, a line of
demarcation between two sovereign nations where the terrain is inhospitable to human bodies.
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What the documentary is actively engaged in debating for its audience, however, is the dilemma
of the human subject: querying who qualifies as human, as well as how we come to define the
humanity of a human. It does this through marking the inhuman, those the documentary is trying
to make culpable for and responsible for what is happening such as the border patrol,
dispatchers, first-responders, and, in effect, the United States government. Contrastingly, it
works to also illustrate those who are (de)humanized, those migrant bodies in this transnational
drama. Whether it is the first responders who take hours to come to the aid of a body dying in the
desert, the bilingual, presumably Latina, 911 dispatchers who must transmit, as well as mediate,
the distressed narratives of these migrants to border patrol, or the unidentified officials dumping
migrant bodies into mass graves, the documentary meditates upon the many levels upon which
one’s humanity is tested, made, and represented. Stamped all over The Real Death Valley is the
precarious situation of contemplating the human turned nonhuman, the nonhuman becoming the
marker for a particular kind of human, and the subsequent attempts to construct a narrative of
these past, present, and future racialized bodies crossing the Americas.
This dilemma takes center stage in the phone calls distressed migrants make to 911.
Hungry, dehydrated, and near death, migrants make the phone call which they believe, as
Sigfredo notes, will save them. The first one to respond is the Sheriff’s Office of Brooks County
but as Diana Deleon, the supervisor of the dispatchers, notes, most of the emergencies are
handed over to the border patrol because they have over 200 agents available to help. However,
as border patrol emphasizes to Deleon through the phone when she calls them to ask if they will
send someone to help a dying migrant, the priority first and foremost is the manning of the
security checkpoint, the securing of national borders from unwanted peoples coming in. In turn,
this makes the few agents they send out to help take hours upon hours to rescue one person in the
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brush. This point in the film evidences well enough that the interest above all else of the border
patrol is keeping out at all costs, rather than providing any kind of care on behalf of migrants in
the desert.
Deleon points out how the prioritization of securing the checkpoint instead of
prioritization of human lives is based upon the citizenship status of the bodies near death, “We’re
dealing with human lives here, I don’t care who it is.”8 The universal category of the human, as
Deleon invokes in her concluding words, should precede over any differentials within the
category of the human like citizenship status. Her invocation is in efforts to make others,
specifically the border patrol, care for the bodies dying in the Texas brush regardless of who the
human is. This shared care for protecting human life across identity-based divisions becomes the
only imaginable foundation for achieving this plea to care for human life within the discursive
structures available. These 911 calls, and the ensuing drama between border patrol, the police,
and the Latinx dispatchers speaking to the migrants, are a mediation over what constitutes
humanness, and the insufficiency of the liberal human subject as a category for caring on behalf
of the racialized human excluded from such a category. Deleon’s rhetoric urges us to consider
how else, in what other frameworks, can we can mobilize a politics of caring distinct from this
plea to the human.
Deleon’s invocation to a shared universal humanity is compromised in its inability to
realize a politics which addresses the material and concrete conditions pushing people to migrate,
and the ever-increasing protocols and procedures which militarize the U.S.-Mexico border. The
concluding remarks in voice-over narration by the documentary’s creator, for example, extend
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further in this rhetorical vein: “As I think back on Brooks County, I am haunted by the images of
people who came here to find a better life, and ended up in a binder, or as bone and rag in a
plastic bag, and by the bodies that continue to turn up.” The film cannot resist—or, perhaps,
knows no other way—but to lean upon “the people who came here to find a better life” to
organize its affective and rhetorical mission, replying upon the age-old belief in U.S.
exceptionalism to affirm the need for migration. Yet within this rhetorical structuring posed by
the narrator, the body, the human subject, “the people who came here to find a better life,”
swiftly, within the movement of the concluding words, transmogrify into the nonhuman, into
“the bodies that continue to turn up,” bodies transforming into paper and plastic, sun scorched
and soil stained bone, their material transformations demanding to be reckoned with. The
dependence upon the pervasive “searching for a better life” rhetoric, phrasing simultaneously
geared to legitimize migrants’ rights and reach out to the most conservative of viewers on
immigration, is undermined precisely because the cruelty of agents and police representing the
United States government is what aids in the suffering and death. They are not the benevolent
and pious exceptionalist state which the framing of the “search for a better life” purports. As
Jasbir Puar’s theorizing of Israel’s militaristic tactics and strategies to eliminate Palestinian
resistance and life through processes of debilitation, the willful overlooking to care for suffering
migrant bodies in the border zones by the agencies of U.S. state power functions similarly. Puar
observes how the maiming of Palestinian peoples by Israel servers as, “a sanctioned tactic of
settler colonial rule, justified in protectionist terms and soliciting disability rights solutions that,
while absolutely crucial to aiding some individuals, unfortunately lead to further perpetuation of
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debilitation.”9 Disabling a population so as to slowly-kill and quickly displace through legalized
means, and not killing them outright, exonerates the nation-state from culpability and
international criticism of human rights violations. The corporatization of detention centers,
extended and sometimes indefinite detention, the removal of children from families and illegally
put up for adoption, and the debilitative conditions migrants experience within such as unclean
water, no blankets, or withholding medications like those to treat HIV, as well as the tactics of
border patrol working along the U.S.-Mexico border itself, are compatible with Puar’s
assessment. These measures actively work to disperse, displace, and traumatize as many family
units and transnational community networks as possible, all in efforts to curtail and deter further
efforts by migrants to try to come into the United States. Militarizing the border extends beyond
just the physical national lines of demarcation and becomes embodied and psychic traumas
moving hemispherically.
The concluding remarks in voice-over reach further, “Regardless of how we feel about
illegal immigration, is this the best we can do?” These are the final words of the documentary.
This rhetorical question, framed as lamentable and deplorable tactfully deploys the “we,” which
successfully sunders the comfortable distance between audience and documentary. The “we”
points fingers, implicates, hails its imagined audience to push aside differences, and to unite
under the banner of a shared humanity. This language effectively forces the viewer regardless of
position to forfeit any passivity or separation between themselves and the human lives turned
nonhuman. This “we” is action, this “we” is demand. The impact of this “we,” its executability,
is stifled at its inception for it depends upon the category of the universal human, the liberal
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subject it believes these bodies can access, and the affective mode of sympathy to legitimize its
efforts to bypass these divisions. To protect these lives from becoming nonhuman we must
sympathize with them because we are, at the end of the day, made of the same human matter.
The historical, social, and geopolitical axes which condition how one experiences humanity and
being human are configured as horizontal, an even plane which we are all already. This call to
action through placing the onus on the “we” is sabotaged from the get-go in that it collects,
identifies, and curates the story of “people” becoming “bodies” according to familiar logics that
wrangles the unstable qualities of racialized matter, their knotted hemispheric entanglements, the
heterogenous temporalities and spatialities they cite, into simplified narratives set to the tune of
an unachievable mission of becoming Human, being humanized, under the rubric of sympathy.
Caring carefully, complexly, and capaciously becomes inaccessible within the film’s procedures
for narrating racialized matter—no other rhetorical, narratological, and affective modes are made
operable for telling the many stories racialized matter demands of us.
The film’s “evidence” for its narrative aims, the project of sympathy it is trying to evoke,
is in the racialized nonhuman material. For instance, a brief segment is dedicated to the efforts
made at unburying bodies thrown into mass grave sites and the painstaking process of trying to
identify them. Many scenes show the objects left behind in the brush by migrants who were
unable to continue traveling with them. The opening scene of the documentary is telling for it
begins with the Justice of the Peace, Oralia Morales, in the brush retrieving a body, as she states
plainly: “It’s an unidentified female. You can see the bra area. You can see the long hair. And I
can determine that she is young. She’s been dead approximately two days. There’s maggots on
the body. The body will swell and within three days it’ll burst.”10 The description of the human
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body in the desert breaks from the normative filmic time, acting like a Barthesian punctum, “that
accident which pricks” and the “element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an
arrow, and pierces me.”11 Barthes theorizing of the punctum is in relation to photography, to
those outliers which exceed the intentions and desires of the photographer. The tonally staccato
and matter of fact description is a filmic punctum, scrambling the sentimentalized narrative of
the good migrant in search of a better life in the United States, disrupting the complacency of the
viewer and the studium therein which creates, “that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of
various interest, of inconsequential taste.”12 The matter of factness of the facts of the decaying
body from the narrator’s voice and wording is an excess, a jarringly up-close attention to the
materiality of the dead body which breaks a boundary between the viewer and the viewed object.
Scholars rightfully critical of documentary’s realism like Minh-ha and Rangan do not
anticipate how that realism can be recalibrated to a kind of hyperrealism: the zooming in through
language on the motions of the decaying body, the tone of the narrating voice, the verbs and
adjectives of the description bare and blunt. Withholding the actual body from filmic view, this
hyperrealism materializes the migrant body through an ekphrastic mode. This mobilizes an
aesthetic and rhetorical strategy I am identifying as ekphrastic hyperrealism.
Ekphrasis has long been understood to be “the verbal representation of visual
representation.”13 The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics lists it as a, “detailed
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description of an image, primarily visual.”14 However, scholars of ekphrasis counter this limited
understanding of ekphrasis as just a representation of an image, as merely serving a mimetic
function. W.J.T. Mitchell compellingly elucidates how ekphrasis is not a simple and apolitical
translation from the visual to the written, but that the ekphrastic function highlights, “the social
structure of representation as an activity and a relationship of power/knowledge/desire—
representation as something done to something, with something, by someone, for someone.”
Like any aesthetic modality, ekphrasis does and becomes something different than the medium it
was informed by. Representation, as Mitchell establishes, is not static and fixed across time,
space, and medium, but rather is an active and in-flux concept which alters according to the
conditions constituting the object. Renate Brosch identifies how prioritizing an attention to how
ekphrasis is a “cultural performance” and a “literary response to a visual image or visual images”
can “construct alternative projects for seeing, attempting to activate images in order to
denaturalize and estrange them, often in a way that is humorous and disconcerting at the same
time, producing new modes of imaginary perception.”15 He goes on to note how ekphrasis’
dynamic qualities “describes a process rather than a one-on-one relation, more specifically a
response process that can take a variety of forms and involve a variety of projections.” Emma
Kafalenos argues how ekphrasis is not description, not a representation but a re-presentation of
an object.
Ekphrasis is quotation. Like other quotations, ekphrasis transfers the quoted
material—the image—to a new context, thereby altering its effect. Like other
quotations, ekphrasis exhibits a perspectival montage in which the writer’s
perspective is superimposed on the image-maker’s perspective. And is the case
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with other quotations, the two perspectives—the image-maker’s and the
writer’s—cannot finally be separated.16
For Kafalenos, ekphrasis is more than just objective describing or simple transference. Her
theorizing calls attention to the dynamic and transformational practice that is ekphrasis, where
the relation between the visual and the textual representation are not merely mirroring one
another. This process is an inter-textual and cross-creator exchange, a transposition from one
medium to another that creates a distinctly new form. The through-line provided by these various
critics is that ekphrasis is an aesthetic modality which augurs in its own formal and rhetorical
strategies that are in dialogue with, yet distinct from, the visual domain.
Thinking of the reportage detailing the decaying body in Real Death Valley as more than
just description as formulated by those like Brosch and Kafalenos, and rather as a particular kind
of performative and enunciative ekphrastic practice in a particular socio-political matrix, is
compelling for the ways in which it allows the racialized matter to re-matter differently. Words
visualize, texture, and materialize what cannot be shown to audiences, what is not the proper
object for televisual viewing. Words spoken and captioned in this ekphrastic hyperrealism, then,
make the body viewable as language, a synesthetic reckoning which re-orients how an audience
is to contend with suffering, violence, and the death of minoritized humans. What I am calling
here ekphrastic hyperrealism scrambles documentary film’s generic imperative to make viewable
and consumable the spectacle of the suffering and subaltern body. The viewer must respond to a
factuality in words that borders on the grotesque. Language mobilized on behalf of the far too
real, the far too material reality that is the rotting human body. This ekphrastic hyperrealism is a
spectacle of sorts but one tonally sobering yet discomfiting to bear witness to because the
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attention is placed on language and mattering racialized peoples, and what language does to
perception and the imagination of the individual viewer. This, in turn, takes the onus off of the
suffering or the already dead body to represent itself in a visual domain. The viewer is inculcated
not towards immediate action, as are the normative responses to documentary film about
suffering peoples from the Global South, responses intimately tied to neoliberal humanitarian
awareness campaigns and charity which obfuscate the conditions producing unlivability to begin
with. Rather, this effect performs a displacement of viewer and object viewed, the exposed
subaltern and the impartial judger, undermining the defining paradigms constituting postEnlightenment rationality.
This moment of ekphrastic hyperrealism hails the viewer to a enact a different kind of
ethics and viewing responsibility. The absence of the visual record, the de-jure evidentiary claim
to consolidate the veracity and legitimacy of human rights violations to audiences,17 uncouples
the subaltern subject from the representational burden documentary and humanitarian films
impose. There is no audiovisual testimony here to qualify the narrative of migrant exodus,
suffering, and death.18 The ontological purity and essentialism demanded from the minoritized
subject in order to adequately represent and commodify suffering to an imagined Global North
audience is rerouted via ekphrastic hyperrealism. Audiences must grapple with the ontology of
racialized matter, and the remainder of once lively flesh from a female migrant body coming
from Latin America.
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Whether it is a description of the decaying corpse, the blurred-out photographs of migrant
bodies, or the distressed voices calling 911, the archive of evidence utilized by the film is, quite
literally, unviewable. The evidence the film depends upon to persuade its audience eludes the
representational imperatives placed upon minoritized bodies to properly represent their struggles.
The archive of unviewed yet described visual media exceeds the parameters set forth as evidence
by the documentary’s representational logic, while at the same time it is intended to corroborate
such endeavors. Turning to Derrida’s formulations on the archive proves important for
understanding this archival function in The Real Death Valley. Originally a lectured delivered in
1994, Archive Fever finds Derrida examining the oeuvre of Freud to parse out the ways in which
the archive is both a physical place and a kind of taking place, producing the event of the archive
and therefore the ways in which people engage with it. Derrida poses the contradictory
dichotomy of Freud’s psychoanalytic need to reveal and conceal, to know and to suppress
knowing:
We will wonder what he may have kept of his unconditional right to secrecy,
while at the same time burning with the desire to know, to make known, and to
archive the very thing he concealed forever. What was concealed? What did he
conceal and even beyond the intention to conceal, to lie, or to perjure?
We will always wonder what, in this mal d’archive, he may have burned. We will
always wonder, sharing with compassion in his archive fever, what may have
burned of his secret passions, of his correspondence, or of his “life.” Burned
without him, without remains and without knowledge.19
The archive is a mediation undertaken by different forces with differing ideological interests.
There is Freud curating his archive and future readings, the archivist’s cataloguing of those
materials, the institution’s allotted resources and access given to the materials, and the
researcher’s particular ways of negotiating all those facets. These variables come together on
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behalf of whatever political or ideological case is trying to be made yet the matrix of
concealing/revealing are two sides of the same coin. As Derrida puts it, the archive is “only a
notion, an impression associated with a word and for which, together with Freud, we do not have
a concept. We only have an impression, an insistent impression through the unstable feeling of a
shifting figure, of schema, or of an in-finite or indefinitely process.”20 Deploying the methods of
the deconstructionist, Derrida extrapolates the contradictory and undecidable nature of what we
call the archive, troubling any easy correlation between the archive and claims to truth or
revelatory knowledge. The archive reveals as it conceals, and conceals as it reveals.
Yet Derrida’s postulation cannot anticipate the archive which will serve as evidentiary
truth-claims but cannot be rendered to audiences like that of photographs in a binder or recorded
footage of bodies in the desert. The documentary archive used by The Real Death Valley doesn’t
reveal in the way it is intended to reveal. The archive of the human turned nonhuman is
unviewable but we are meant to still believe in the veracity of the visual logic. The archive the
film presents is visual, and meant to be engaged in that way, yet the visual is modulated through
a verbal and written representation. The archive is present through absence. The archive is a
visuality unseen but meant to be imaged in the imagination.
This archival tension poses the question of the evidentiary function: What counts as
legitimate evidence of vulnerable and suffering human life? Is the aesthetic solution to counter
state sanctioned violence the displaying of the racialized human body? David Wojnarowicz’s
photographs of his friend, Peter Hujar, a few hours after dying from AIDS-related illness, might
guide us in thinking of the aesthetics of putting death and human bodies on display. Untitled
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(1989) is a black and white photographic triptych of Peter Hujar with each of the photographs
stacked on top of one another. The first is a shot of his face. The mouth is open, cheeks gaunt
and exasperated, a sideways glance with lifeless eyes. The photograph showcases the suffering
on the face post-mortem, a still-life of life no more, where the moment of documentation is
performed afterwards. The second photograph is a close-up of his hands. The nails discolored,
the fingers loose, unflexed, untightened, at last in peace. The final shot is of his feet. Thin and
bony, somehow emaciated, as if telling us even the feet cannot escape the impact of AIDS and its
ravage. These photos mount a confrontation with suffering, sensationalism, and the spectacle
which has been a point of contention for theorists of visual media and documentary as this
chapter has elaborated. The spectacle of suffering is captured through these photographs but the
after-the-fact ordinariness of the dead body on display disrupts the normalized indifference and
numbing affect viewers have to marginalized bodies. AIDS, though unnamed and unidentified, is
unavoidable in these photographs, its politics inescapable. Wojnarowicz presents AIDS to be
viewed, to be contemplated, but not in the familiar modes of oversaturated images of the time,
i.e., Kaposi Sarcoma lesions, a hospital backdrop, etc. The close-up shots of the feet and hands,
the close photographic attention given to the banality of human skin, nails, and hair, re-orient the
viewer away from the pervasive AIDS visual lexicon. These photos hail the viewer to pause and
to contemplate over those of affective responses like action and immediacy. Wojnarowicz
presents a necessary aesthetic slowing down, a turn away from sensationalism and the
spectacular of the queer dead body, fomenting a powerful relation of contemplation and pause
over the visual image. One can also think, too, of how Mamie Till elected to put on display in the
casket her son Emmett Till’s face in order to address the ongoing violence of white supremacy
against Black bodies in the United States.
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These cases are instances of encounter with the visual of the dead human body in a
curated way. They both elicit from the viewer an attention and attunement to the social, political,
and historical specificities surrounding the death of the body on display. They are not Rangan’s
concept of immediations wherein the suffering or death of the subaltern body is made
consumable by and palatable to humanitarianist profit and industry. Hujar, Till, or the ekphrastic
descriptions of unidentified migrant bodies are bodies which have already suffered and we are
seeing the results of that suffering in its ultimate form. The politics between visually displaying
Peter Hujar moments after succumbing to AIDS-related death photographed by David
Wojnarowicz, two prominent white queer artists of their time, and Emmett Till or the bodies of
unidentified racialized peoples in various stages of corporeal decomposition, are not equivalents
or even comparable to one another. It is important to maintain distinctions particularly because
varying audiences and publics respond to these images differently, to differing political and
social ends. But what each case asks of us is, In what ways are our current aesthetic, rhetorical,
and ideological strategies inadequate for presenting racialized life and matter outside of an
abstracted universal humanity? What other modalities can be deployed to address the socially,
politically, and historically constituted specificities conditioning precarious life? Ekphrastic
hyperrealism of unidentified bodies in the desert, Wojnarowicz’s photographs of the late Peter
Hujar, and Mamie Till’s choice to show the face of her son Emmett Till, all enact a powerful and
incisive confrontation with the structures producing their respective suffering, violence, and
death.
Attending to the filmic instants in The Real Death Valley through close attention to
formal and aesthetic analysis is to take stock of how a documentary film with merely didactic
and humanitarian interests can be evaluated for how it stages the suffering body, and how
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moments in its own staging it creates a subversive excess to critique the U.S. as a settler colonial
state set upon willful neglect, debilitation, and distributive violence. The testimony by the
surviving Palomo brother, the 911 calls, the objects in the desert signaling human life, and the
description of the decomposing body—this nonhuman and human archive constructing a story of
racialized migrant experience—sum up materially the unachievable task of becoming the liberal
human subject holding together Western thought and civilization. Sigfredo Palomo’s concluding
words in the documentary offer one more critical example for positing alternative modes and
strategies for conceptualizing racialized life and matter: “The people who don’t take into account
the humanity of those of us who struggle to come here should first understand the reasons why
we come.” The querying of the human subject, and the humanity of a given human, is presented
here by Palomo as relating to a particular set of conditions, context, and narrative background.
As he notes and knows all too well, the “humanity” of migrant bodies, that is, the worthiness of a
human life to be protected, cared for, and to be considered valuable enough to be saved, depends
upon narrative: humanizing is narrativizing. Slightly reworked: to have narrative is to be human.
What, then, for bodies without narrative? What does a wallet, tears, necklaces, jackets, nausea,
bones, blurred photos of decomposing bodies, unmarked graves, an incomplete autopsy report,
an inaccessible online border patrol record, tell us about certain kinds of lives? What happens
when racialized life comes to matter only in an ekphrastic description after death? In the
inanimate that is letters, words, and language uttered in a matter-of-fact way in the audiovisual
presentation of a documentary film? Sigfredo leads us to the answer when he remarks the
humanity of people like him should be made based on “understand[ing] the reasons they come.”
These “reasons” are the referencing of a specified human, a human because of their “reasons” are
never able to achieve this human subject (read: rational, white, citizen, heterosexual, man,
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ablebodied). These “reasons” beckon past the inadequacies inherent in demarcating what is and
what is not “migrant,” “Salvadoran,” “undocumented” and “human.” These “reasons” are all the
inorganic and organic, animate and inanimate, human and nonhuman matter present in The Real
Death Valley hemmed in to tell one story, the only story it can imagine telling: the story of dying
over and over and over again in order to become never yet quite human.

Backpacks, Wallets, and Other Object Lessons
In the Spring of 2017, State of Exception/Estado de Excepción, an exhibition housed at
the Parsons School of Design at the New School in New York City, put on display objects like
backpacks, wallets, and water bottles left behind in the desert by migrants. The exhibition ran
from February 3 to April 16, and the New School website hosting the exhibited noted how the
exhibit, “presents traces of the human experience—objects left behind in the desert by
undocumented migrants on their journey into the U.S. and other forms of data.”21 The gallery
space for State of Exception/Estado de Excepción contained special-effects video installations,
found-items like backpacks, clothing, and notebooks on display in cases and on the walls, audio
testimony by migrants, photography, and other object installations. The materials for the
exhibition have been collected by University of Michigan anthropologist Jason De León, whose
Undocumented Migration Project has been working to highlight the migrant experience through
archival construction, testimonies, and other forms of data collection. The objects are there to
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speak for and represent the absent migrant, the migrant which cannot lay claim to the object, to
the story behind the object or the narrative behind the displacement of it. These are objects
without owners because no one knows the whereabouts of the migrants who owned them. These
are stories which can never be told.
In lieu of the human, in lieu of the representative figure to lay claim to the object, to lay
claim to story and narrative, what do we do? What are the analytic pathways for inquiring into
the human and nonhuman entanglements, for the grids of relation, power, and coloniality
operating within and around these objects? Similar to The Real Death Valley, State of
Exception/Estado de Excepción stages the tension over the lack of narrative, over the inability to
present a cohesive story of humanity. Their political stakes are forthright: human lives are at risk,
human lives are dying. There is a humanitarian urgency woven into the fabric of their political
aims. But as I have demonstrated with my analysis of The Real Death Valley, we must be able to
discern how questions of humanitarian urgency either overshadow or foreclose analyses which
articulate the conditions which produce global precarity and migration in the first place.
Recalling Rangan’s poignant critique of participatory documentary, we must refuse the mandate
to rely on abstracted and essentialist notions of what it means to be human which help to gloss
over the very real settler colonial power structures at play governing human lives. The U.S.Mexico desert is a central character in the crisis of human narrative both projects present, and it
becomes, in most cases, the culprit for death. People dehydrate, people are exhausted, and people
die due to the conditions of the desert.
The desert itself, as an ecological system, however, is not the culprit. To give agency to
the desert in this way is to substitute the socio-political conditions propelling human bodies to
migrate in the first place, and to occlude the man-made measures and procedures like borders,
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policing, and state violence which keep people barely living and dying across the Americas.
Affording agency to the desert does less to demystify the relations of power and more to mystify.
The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail is De León’s ethnography
focusing on the migrant experience through the desert, and takes seriously the role the desert
plays within this transnational affair. De León grapples with how the U.S.-Mexico desert has
been weaponized by the U.S. nation-state to violate and kill migrants through Prevention through
Deterrence. Prevention through Deterrence began in 1993 with Border Patrol agent, Sylvestre
Reyes, who launched Operation Blockade as a way to prevent migrants from crossing in urban
zones like El Paso, Texas. Pressured to stay away from crossing points close to cities, migrants
then were forced traverse the less populated areas and taking more dangerous routes through
desert regions. This operation would become a wide-spread strategy to secure and militarize the
border, and accompanied by rhetoric and language which downplays the role the U.S. Border
Patrol and human agency have in mediating migrant movement.22 What ends up happening is the
desert becomes the culprit, where “Border Patrol can draw on the agency of animals and other
nonhumans to do its dirty work while simultaneously absolving itself of any blame connected to
migrant injuries or loss of life,”23 so desert operates as sole violator towards human bodies
invisibilizing the power relations and structures at play.
Citing Callon and Law’s formulation of hybrid collectif, as well as Jane Bennett’s
political ecologies around inanimate objects, De León configures the desert as a zone of

“Prevention Through Deterrence has evolved from an explicit program that once
acknowledged that the dangers posed by the desert could be strategically exploited as a weapon
in the war on immigration to a sterilized description of an enforcement paradigm that has
unfortunately (and ‘unexpectedly’) resulted in migrants ‘risking their lives,’ as noted in Jason De
León, The Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail (Oakland: University of
California Press, 2015), 36.
23
Ibid., 43.
22
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interactions and actants, human and nonhuman entanglements, largely put into relation through
global networks of precarity, migration, and militarization. I aim, then, to think how the desert is
a zone of liveliness, a time and space of interanimation, toggling between life and death, human
and nonhuman, animate and inanimate, Global North and Global South. These bifurcations
materialize and become porous through the desert, seeping into and through divisions long-held
to be distinct and different, challenging notions of what is and what must be. Through thinking
the desert, we can ask: Where does the human end, and where does the human begin? What does
the desert do to human bodies and the human-made objects like backpacks, wallets, notebooks?
How is the desert a zone of animacies where matter transmogrifies, where changes in form can
enunciate queer, anti-racist, and decolonial intimacies? What modes of inquiry does the desert
bring forth which elaborate on the conditions framing subaltern lives and experiences? In both
the documentary and the exhibit, the desert transmogrifies matter: blood and sweat are absorbed
into the dry earth; skin becomes ground; backpacks and wallets and notebooks dirty and warp
and disfigure. The desert is a landscape of transformation. These transformations in and of the
desert are ones where human lives end and become something else, and, rather than see that as
the end point of thought, the dead as the limit to analysis and imagining, I would like to think the
dead human body and the changes of form it undergoes as still able to animate a politics against
the death-giving apparatuses which labored to make life unlivable, life expendable at all costs.
De León’s desert thinking and ethnographic method in his monograph also present what I
have earlier called ekphrastic hyperrealism. He does this through a descriptive practice that does
not shy from the human body turned nonhuman matter, from the alive to the dead, the human
becoming desert. While undertaking field work in the Arizona desert with graduate students
involved in his Undocumented Migration Project, De León and his crew find a human corpse. It
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is the dead body of a migrant. One student agrees to head back to the vehicle to secure help,
while De León and the others are confronted by the horror of documentation, of what and how to
represent this dead human body.
At this point there is the realization that unpleasant work has to be done. I remind
myself that directing a research project focused on human suffering and death in
the desert means we can’t ignore certain parts of the social process because it
sickens us or breaks our hearts. This means looking at the body of this unknown
woman up close and recording as much information as possible. This means
taking photos. The decision to do this will later lead me to being questioned and
criticized by some colleagues who don’t think we should have taken pictures of
the body or used them in any publication. It makes readers and viewers
uncomfortable, which is fine because it made (and continues to make) us as
researchers uncomfortable. When this type of death starts to feel normal, that’s
when we should worry. I start taking photos of her because it feels imperative to
record what this type of death looks like up close. The objective is to document
this moment for those who are not here.24
De León chooses to present in the monograph one accompanying photograph of the dead woman
migrant. It is a photo of the back of her head, a tangle of disheveled black hair, her exposed
rotting hand, and a blanket he and the students draped over her as a sign of respect, of mourning,
a too-late shielding from the sun’s harsh rays. He will then go on to describe what the dead body
is doing, the animacy of the corpse, the lively transformations which still occur post-mortem.
Rigor mortis has set in and her fingers have started to curl. Her ankles are swollen
to the point that her sneakers seem ready to pop off at any moment. The back of
her pants are stained with excrement and are bubbling with copper-colored fluids
that were expelled from her body upon death. It is surprisingly hard to look
away…
These descriptions don’t do justice to what bodies left out in the desert actually
look like, smell like, or sound like. Nothing does. Against the quiet backdrop of
the desert you can hear the buzzing of flies busily laying eggs on her, in her.
There is a steady hissing of intestinal gases escaping from her bloated and
distended stomach. It sounds like a slow-leaking tire.25
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The real is indescribable in words, according to the describer, and the sensory cannot be relayed
effectively through language. Nothing can compare to experience, De León asserts, and in the
description, in the mimetic function of it, there is a failing, an incapacity to represent
authentically. We get physiological measurements in approximations in order to fathom the
horror: “ankles are swollen to the point that her sneakers seem ready to pop off at any moment.”
Metaphorical likenesses to render what is being experienced: “sounds like a slow-leaking tire.”
Stylistic flourishes through prepositions: “flies busily laying eggs on her, in her.” For De León,
description is a limit on the power the decomposing body may have over a viewer, unable to
provoke or evoke as much as the experiential or the realism of being there. But the descriptive
apparatus, working within the realm of language, of words composed in particular ways, can
prove equally as impactful as the being there, equally as capable of eliciting a politics on behalf
of migrant and undocumented populations. The descriptive through the nonhuman idiom is but
another form of aesthetic strategy to do political work, and to represent the violences and
suffering occurring to racialized migrant peoples.
There is another moment of encounter with the horror of the transformed body, and the
turn to the descriptive, when the sheriff and two agents arrive. They must turn the face-down
human corpse face-forward in order to place her onto the body bag. When they do so, De León
gets a look of her face, or what has become of a human face.
It is frightening and unrecognizable as human. The mouth is a gnarled purple and
black hole that obscures the rest of her features. I can’t see her eyes because the
mouth is too hard to look away from. The skin around the lips is stretched out of
shape as though it has been melted. Her nose is smashed in and pushed up. She
died face down, and the flesh on the front side of her skull has softened and
contorted to fit around the dirt and rocks beneath her. The scene is a pastiche of
metallic gray and pea green. Whatever beauty and humanity that once existed in
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her face has been replaced by a stone-colored ghoul stuck in mid-scream. It’s a
look you can never get away from.26
As in his earlier description of the other body parts, where “It is surprisingly hard to look away,”
the describer once again repeats the allure of looking, the inability to not give in to the disgust
and the horror of the human turned nonhuman, “I can’t see her eyes because the mouth is too
hard to look away from.” Unforgettable, imprinted onto memory, too: “It’s a look you can never
get away from.” It is no surprise it is the human face transmogrified into the inhuman which
evokes the strongest response from the describer given that the face is a distinctive and
discernible marker of humanness, the “means of communication, a marker of identity and
personhood, a signifier of social status, and a form of capital,”27 and that which distinguishes
human-animals most markedly from nonhuman objects and many nonhuman animals.28 Showing
the disfigured face of the dead woman through photographic representation would be too ghastly,
too implanted in the real, so description, then, becomes the only appropriate means through
which to do so. By why are worded descriptions more acceptable than photographic
representations? We return here to the role of ekphrasis, and what I have earlier identified as
ekphrastic hyperrealism. The function of ekphrastic writing is to help the imaginary to construct
a representation of a visual object. De León does this for the viewer through his writing,
transforming an eye-witness testimony into an ekphrastic procedure, rendering the morphed
human face through words rather than the visual medium that is photograph. There is a degree of

Ibid., 216.
Heather Laine Talley, Saving Face: Disfigurement and the Politics of Appearance (New York:
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removal from the real thing through the written but the ekphrastic technique and description here
funnels in the grotesque, the horror, the discomfort of the human turned nonhuman which a
photo would prompt too. Descriptions of human body parts no longer recognizably human: “The
mouth is a gnarled purple and black hole that obscures the rest of her features;” “the skin around
the lips is stretched out of shape as though it has been melted; “the flesh on the front side of her
skull has softened and contorted to fit around the dirt and rocks beneath her.” The once-human
face becomes a “scene” of “metallic gray and pea green.” What emerges in the mind’s eye will
surely vary person by person who reads the description yet what remains important here is that
the reading of those words are no easy matter. An affective response, a bodily reaction, a
confrontation with the human turned nonhuman happens in those words. We must visualize, we
must sensorialize, we must imagine the unimaginable that is the decomposing human body, the
indescribable that all that entails because of our reading. The description is another mode of
encounter with the horrors and violences of the migrant experience: the ramifications of years of
colonization, environmental extraction and destruction, cishetero machismo and femicide,
transnational trade agreements and laws which leave millions in economic precarity and no
recourse but to leave homelands.
De León’s ethnography, The Land of Open Graves, is an instance of descriptive
inhumanism and ekphrastic hyperrealism which aligns with the one depicted in The Real Death
Valley. Language in both materializes racialized matter and migrant experience for a
reader/viewer through an unsettling, discomfiting, and nonhuman idiom. And whereas The Real
Death Valley’s modality is one of the documentary, of editing and splicing together testimonies
and video footage to view at home through a screen about the desert, and De León’s monograph
is ethnographic research and narrative, State of Exception/Estado de Excepción’s curatorial
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project brings together physical objects, video footage, and photography in the gallery space to
tell a story of the desert and the migrants which traverse the desert. There is a proximity and
intimacy to the experience of visiting the gallery which the documentary does not entail. There
are objects to get near to, to smell, to inspect closely, and, sometimes, even to touch. There are
installations simulating experiences of being at the desert. We can linger and backtrack and
return again tomorrow to the space. This intimacy of proximity elicits a different relation to the
desert and to the migrant humans who traverse it. Yet like a documentary film, objects,
installations, ephemera, and other forms of presented data signaling human life found in the
desert cannot tell the story of a life. What happens is the objects in the gallery can merely allude,
suggest, demand further inquiry from the human audiences traveling through the space. We have
merely reached an impasse with narrative, touched into the unknowing that is other modes of
being and knowing together-with.
This crisis in narrative and realizing the human subject fully is, as my earlier assessment
of The Real Death Valley illustrated, a generative impasse. Rather than seek to foreclose this
crisis by seaming together some story of migrants’ claiming to liberal humanist humanity, I want
to dwell in the uncertainty and the open-endedness of the nonhuman object, of the object imbued
with racialized materiality and the analytic networks it opens up. The experience of the gallery
space, and the many objects contained within it which tell no one story, if any story at all,
activates a critical practice of wandering. There is lingering, wondering, contemplating, and
staying a bit longer over what these objects are doing, of the nonlinear and dynamic trajectories
for thought they predicate. Sarah Jane Cervenak, on her study on philosophical wandering for
black freedom, asks, “what would it mean to leave alone that which cannot be read or that which
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resists the epistemological urgencies at the heart of such readability and knowability?”29 The
mode of the exhibition in the gallery space and the proliferative objects within that space, I
propose, engenders an unsteady relation to readability and knowability. Its configuration as it is
serves to open up, to lead astray, to invite wandering, rather than delimit, define, and conclude
knowing and being. Distinctions of critical practice and intellectual inquiry such as analysand
and analyzer, passive object and active human, and empiricism and fabulation transmogrify in
this setting, broaching boundaries oft-thought to be mutually exclusive. This chimerical
becoming proposes an analytic practice and hermeneutic method that relishes in the intimacies of
possible becomings, mutualities, and other unfixed and improvisatory avenues for knowledge
production. Resisting the readable and the knowable is central to what I am trying to do with my
wanderings in State of Exception/Estado de Excepción.
At the most fundamental level, the exhibit prompts the question: Are these objects
belonging to migrants on view art, or are they merely pedagogical and evidentiary? More
specifically, what is the relationship we are supposed to be having to the object on display as a
viewer? Objects, which, as the descriptions testify, remind us have belonged to starving and
dehydrated migrants, to migrants who left them to cross deserts and rivers, migrants who might
very well have perished on their journey. These are objects directly linked to human suffering
and hardship, the exhibit makes clear enough. New York Times art critic Holland Cotter, in a
review of the exhibition when it was presented at the New School, poses the concern over what
we are to do and how to interpret the material: “You could debate whether the resulting images
qualify as art or as scientific data. My own definition of art is broad. Is the material in question
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interesting to look at? Has it been made interesting to think about? Is it being shown in an ‘art’
context? If the answers are ‘yes,” then art is what you have. And it can be particularly powerful
when it coincides with red-alert political realities.”30 Cotter here straddles the line for what we
can only presume is a white bourgeois reading audience, an audience which will demand a clear
line between art and politics. But Cotter assuages the tension by the listing of questions related to
aesthetic experience, and the gentle, “If the answers are ‘yes,’ then art is what you have,”
followed by a reminder that art can also be political. His criteria for the constitution of art in
relation to the exhibit is the interesting. If this generates interest, the critic seems to suggest, then
take this seriously.
Invoking the interesting as a criterion for aesthetic appreciation invokes Sianne Ngai’s
work on the interesting. Ngai’s work on aesthetic categories and her attention to how aesthetic
experience inform critical practice is extensive. Her attention on category of the interesting traces
the qualities of the interesting, as that “ascribing value to that which seems to differ, in a yet-tobe-conceptualized way, from a general expectation or norm whose exact concept may itself be
missing at the moment of judgment.” Affectively minimal, lacking in overall intensity, interest is
the stance towards an object which one has yet to define a specific affective attachment to or a
conceptual outcome over. The “lack of conceptual knowledge” which the interesting operates in
“launches us on a search for its own criteria.” The interested subject will do the work of
assessing and defining the constitution of that interest, figuring out what exactly makes the cogs
and gears of the interest work. Ngai locates interest within a diachronic framework. The
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interesting as an aesthetic judgment bound to the past object of interest yet there is an
anticipation of interpretive and aesthetic understanding to come.
Following Ngai, State of Exception/Estado de Excepción elicits interest because of its
vagueness, in the directionlessness of the objects’ on display inability to proffer specific
narratives or stories belonging to humans. Signifiers without the signified. Whereas Ngai situates
interest within a diachronic register, of a past and anticipated concept judgement to arise, the
exhibit, I contend, functions within a spatial register. The interest of the viewer is activated in the
objects in the space of the gallery, in the layout of the various objects and images, and the
subsequent experiencing of that layout. That question of what does interest do, as Ngai raises,
plays out through this spatial register where the aesthetic and interpretive experience unfolds in
the space of the gallery, in the movement between and amongst the nonhuman objects.
Wandering in, lingering between. Our interest intensifies because there is so little information on
all the objects, so little humans in which to speak for and on behalf of them. Who might this
backpack have belonged to? What was the reason this wallet was dropped along the Sonoran
desert? The objects across the room invite speculation, ask for a contemplation which requires
the goer to do more intellectual and critical labor. They can do little else besides invite
speculation.
Interesting’s vagueness, as an aesthetic and affective judgement, coupled with the spatial
dimensions of the exhibit, encapsulates State of Exception/Estado de Excepción’s
directionlessness. The assortment of objects curated in their particular way lead to a demand on
the viewer to inquire further. The objects spark interest but where that interest leads, whether a
more specific aesthetic, hermeneutic, or political outcome, is harder to pinpoint. They leave
routes for wandering, and that is what will be done.
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Object Lesson: Backpacks
State of Exception/Estado de Excepción features an eighty-foot-long wall of backpacks which
has encompassed much of the promotional images for the exhibit.31 Many of the photographs
taken by viewers and posted onto social media sites like Twitter also prioritize the displaying of
the backpacks. The wall of backpacks has allure. You can’t look away. You can’t but take notice
of it.
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Fig. 1 Wall of Backpacks (Photograph by Marcos Gonsalez. In State of Exception/Estado de
Excepción. Curated by Richard Barnes, Amanda Krugliak, and Jason De León. February 3–April
16, 2017. Sheila C. Johnson Design Center, The New School's Parson School of Design. New
York, New York.)
The wall takes up the entire length of the room. The backpacks are all sizes, all colors,
and all designs. They are tightly compacted together with none of the wall behind them visible.
Each one is considerably dirty, and many are blanched by constant exposure to the sun. Many of
them have writing in marker on them, names of people, perhaps the names of those who the
backpack belongs to, or perhaps the name of a friend or traveling companion autographing it.
The backpacks are a multitude, what feels uncountable, and one takes in this multitude standing
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in front of them. The viewer can only get a room-length shot of the entirety of the backpacks if
they stand all the way near the entrance.
What exactly are we looking at? Rather: What are we being made to see or not see? This
is no encounter with the sublime, the awe or shock of that most beautiful we cannot comprehend.
These are backpacks, grimy and scuffed up, weathered and worn by the elements. Their closely
compressed arrangement gives off an impression of breathlessness, claustrophobia, of having no
room in which to move or extend. Trash, really, is placed upon the wall, detritus of human
activity and goings-on left behind to decompose in nature. But there is a stupendousness to the
backpacks on the wall, a rush of unease at the sight of all of them put together. Their congested
and compiled materiality begs us to wonder as to who were the human who owned these
backpacks, what were they journeys they undertook, why did they leave them behind.
But what if we move beyond ownership. That, “Who owned this backpack?” as a critical
concern. What if, instead, we thought of what the backpack does in the gallery space. What if we
thought of the wall of backpacks, as a tight and plentiful arrangement which aggregates,
agglutinizes into a mass of fabric and plastic and velcro. Aggregated as such, we are no longer
looking for a story, or the history of an individual backpack, the individual human life which
once upon a time owned it. We are no longer talking about the I, the ego, the possessive
individualism objects made by capitalism are supposed to entail. Massified materiality signaling
subaltern and racialized lives done in this way allows the viewer to think plurality, thinking on
the many humans carrying these backpacks traveling across the desert, across the Americas,
living, surviving, and dying in them. Scaling up the conceptual framework in such a way
provides an entry-point in which to delink from the possessive individualism and liberal selfautonomy so seamlessly woven into narratives of U.S. exceptionalism. There is no pursuit of the
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better life because there is no human in which to vouch for it, there is no narrative of struggle in
the Global South and overcoming in the United States because there is no human to perpetuate it.
There are just inanimate, speechless backpacks. Backpacks stuffed on a wall which beckon for
another kind of critical and imaginative practice.

Object Lesson: Backpack
I stand in front of the wall of backpacks for some time. I change my vantage point. Move
up-close to a cluster, move as far back as possible to take in all of them. After thirty-minutes or
so taking in the wall, I notice a backpack from the rest. My eye catches on to its difference from
the others. One which, finally, stands out to me, one which finally becomes my punctum. The
backpack is a pink that pops, a plastic-looking pink you see in department stores like Walmart. It
is small, its smallness making it stand out amongst so many larger backpacks, standing out
against the landscape of faded browns and blacks. Plastered on the front of the backpack is the
popular children’s animated character, Dora the Explorer. One can surmise this backpack must
have belonged to a little girl who, for one reason or another, had to abandon her backpack along
the border of the United States and Mexico. Any other details of the circumstances surrounding
the owner of this backpack are unknown.
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Fig. 2 Backpack (Photograph by Marcos Gonsalez. In State of Exception/Estado de Excepción.
Curated by Richard Barnes, Amanda Krugliak, and Jason De León. February 3–April 16, 2017.
Sheila C. Johnson Design Center, The New School's Parson School of Design. New York, New
York.)
Dora the Explorer has been on network television since 2000. Originally aired on the
Nickelodeon channel, the show has won several Emmys, has had a live-action film adaptation,
and has been a staple for bilingual programming. The character of Dora is Latina but the show
does not specify what particular ethnicity or nationality she belongs to. This has allowed the
show to broadcast Dora as anything and everything, producing a commercially profitable
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Latinidad.32 However unspecific the Latinidad surrounding Dora the Explorer is, it proves
instructive for marking the racialized and ethnicized character of the people who are moving
across the border and the Americas. Not to mention how it marks a particular type of racialized
femininity and girlhood.
Unable to move from standing in front of the Dora backpack, I take a picture. I
concentrate on the backpack. All I feel is blankness. I tell myself to think beyond this
nothingness I am feeling right now. Why does this backpack strike me so? Is it the pink vivacity
of it? The way it pops in contrast to the surrounding backpacks? There is a little brown girl,
sweaty and tired, walking in the desert which is imprinted into my mind as I look on at the
backpack, as I look on at the photo years later. I cannot take this little girl out of my mind. I do
everything I can standing in place, as if some sentence from the void will pull through, some
word or clause or syllable will whisper to me, shout at me, tell me what to think, and how to
think clearly and sophisticatedly upon what is in front of me.
The backpack does not open itself up to such immediate interpretation.
The backpack remains where it is, in memory.

Object Lesson: Gravel, Rain, Dirt
In another section of the gallery, there is a video installation, where a footage is being projected
onto two walls. The camera views are in the first-person, making the viewer feel immersed in the
footage’s movements. The first perspective is undoubtedly a moving vehicle driving straight
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ahead. It’s dark out, those awkward minutes when the sun is nearly set but not fully, with light
lingering in engulfing darkness. Clouds like the oncoming clouds of a rainstorm, a rainstorm
fussy and scattered, are on the immediate horizon. The second perspective is of a camera moving
forward recording a sideways view: daytime, a light grey sky, an encroaching dark mass of cloud
breaking through the frame. The footage is an endless loop depicting a red fence with desert
brush and desert mountains beyond it. The impression is of movement, steady and concentrated
progression, but the camera’s angle does not change, the scenery appears no different, as if the
viewer is moving in place, moving nowhere, stuck in movement. Overhead are everyday sounds:
rocks crushed by car tires, wind against metal, light rain on the windshield.
The visitor experiences both of these different footages simultaneously. Weather and
gravel and angles and clouds and fences. No humans, no words, no rhetoric. Fables of migration
and better lives and U.S. exceptionalism and cartels and Latin American backwardness are
nowhere to be found. Narrative, if the viewer’s aim is narrative, then requires further research.
The footage resembles the ordinary—that is, movement across terrains, temperamental weather,
rocks sounding out, the flash of lightning, the headlights of a truck. The ordinary—an
experiment in the extraordinary that is the everyday in these Americas.
There is a crisis here of perspective. Are we car or human? Are we nonhuman animal or
are we camera? Rather than orient the viewer, the first-person here displaces. We do not know
the means of our viewing, what vessel or entity is the perspective being done from. This
perspectival displacement configures a viewing and experiential logic that is about wandering,
wondering, occupying an uncertain positionality which does not give in to oversaturated terms,
narratives, and discourses permeating our understanding of the U.S.-Mexico border. The viewer
might ask, “Is this what it is like to be a migrant traversing the border?” but the video installation
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does not easily offer up this question or answer, one hinging upon seeing oneself in the
oppressed other in order to produce empathy towards their plight. The nonhuman elements of the
video installation—the hum of a car driving, the headlights affording visibility in the darkness,
the sound of the gravel and rock upturning as it does, no human voices or speech or language to
relay—propose a mode of relation that is not determined upon seeing oneself as the Other. We
are not in the realm of the human or depending upon universalist claims to a shared humanity.
The nonhuman in the video installation here proffers contemplation, demands a slowness
from the viewer, a way of being and knowing the desert and the happenings of the desert in a
more slackened, more gradual, temporality. The urgency time of the humanitarian crisis, action
above thought and all else, is one that does not operate within the installation. We can move at a
different pace. There is but the quiet, the stillness, the atmospheric, the slow movement across
desert. We can stay as long as we need, as long as the gallery stays open, as long as we record
the installation onto our phones, as long as our memory wants to keep the impression.

Object Lesson: Sheet of Lined Paper
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Fig. 3 Loose Leaf Paper by John Doe (Photograph by Marcos Gonsalez. In State of
Exception/Estado de Excepción. Curated by Richard Barnes, Amanda Krugliak, and Jason De
León. February 3–April 16, 2017. Sheila C. Johnson Design Center, The New School's Parson
School of Design. New York, New York.)
One sheet of lined paper with writing on it. It is preserved in a plastic bag, and put on display.
The bag contains an item number, and the identifying name of the person who wrote it: “John
Doe.” The sheet appears to have been water damaged, the tint of the page a dark brown as if
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exposed to muddy waters, the edges of it curled as if fried by the sun. A letter? An essay?
Spoken word poetry?
The letters are blocky, as if the writer was pressing down on the pen hard, belabored. The
words are in English. Full sentences cannot be deciphered but the beginnings of some are as
follows: “TheRE GOES my…” “LET THE Good…” “My BRown eye…” One word which
reads as “VASANOVA” has the words “we on the,” above it, as if the writer is amending a
thought, being more precise with their meaning. Given the free use of uppercase and lowercase
letters in these words, I hypothesize the writer is an English language learner, teaching
themselves, though imperiled, though endangered, though risking life, a foreign language on the
border. Beyond this, I cannot make any more educated guesses as to the identity of the author.
Interpretation has its limits.

Object Lesson: Notebook

142

Fig. 4 Warped Notebook (Photograph by Marcos Gonsalez. In State of Exception/Estado de
Excepción. Curated by Richard Barnes, Amanda Krugliak, and Jason De León. February 3–April
16, 2017. Sheila C. Johnson Design Center, The New School's Parson School of Design. New
York, New York.)
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On display: a spiral-bound notebook. The pages are warped by water damage, the effect
producing an accordion-like swerving of its papery body. The paper near the metallic binding
appears to be eaten away, lined with holes and tears. The front cover, made of plastic, looks to be
melted, the colors are a faded swirl of blue, tan, and black—no doubt the result of a ruthless
exposure to sunlight. Though unopened (perhaps even unopenable?), the pages appear blank, no
pencil or pen bleeding out of them. One can only surmise that the waves of a river or the soaking
in a ditch, washed away whatever stories, fragments or ramblings were contained within them.
Or maybe, just maybe, there was nothing yet written down on those pages. Blank pages of
journal entries yet to be, poems in process, theories waiting for the right words to explain
themselves.

Object Lesson: Photograph of Desert, Tire, Human Bodies Clustered
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Fig. 5 Mounted Photograph of Desert (Photograph by Marcos Gonsalez. In State of
Exception/Estado de Excepción. Curated by Richard Barnes, Amanda Krugliak, and Jason De
León. February 3–April 16, 2017. Sheila C. Johnson Design Center, The New School's Parson
School of Design. New York, New York.)
Near the entrance/exit to the gallery space, there are photographs mounted to the wall of the
Arizona desert where many of the objects in the exhibit were acquired. One of the photographs
presents the desert in what appears to be the moments after a storm. Clouds are breaking, and
sunlight streams through in slivers, caressing the foliage down below. In the distance are a range
of mountains. There is no doubt the photograph mounted to the wall is presented to evoke from
the gallery-goer a sense of hope. The picture is perfectly captured in a way to give such an
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impression: the sliver of light, the storm fading, the majesty of the mountains in the background.
This is landscape photography at its best.
When I visit the exhibit in 2017, I turn around from the photographs and am presented
with a different scene. Another kind of hope. There are four women looking at a pile of worn out
tired I had glossed over earlier. The tires were once employed by border agents and the U.S.
border patrol to help clear the desert ground in order to make migrant footprints visible, a tire
utilized to hunt down migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, tires turned museum object. I
didn’t see the women enter the exhibition. They look like my tias and primas: brown skinned
women with long black hair. One appears to be in her late 30’s and the three others look to be no
older than fifteen. The women are huddled around the tire. Bodies poised in attention. Their
brown eyes the eyes of concentration. What do they contemplate there before the tire? How do
they do this combined effort of thought?
Looking back years later at the photograph I took of a photograph, and recalling the
imprinted memory of those women there before the tire, both stage a moment of hope. Yet both
are inextricably different forms of hope. The hope of the photographed image of the desert is a
hopefulness tied to a particular mode of aestheticization: the sunlight breaking through the
darkness of a storm of a photograph carefully mounted to the wall for those entering and leaving.
There’s something about the clichéness of the photographic hope which diminishes the radical
materiality of the other objects circulating across the room which have a relation to the desert.
The tire, and the women gravitating around it, is happenstance, fleeting, and ordinary, though the
scene feels imbued with a generous hope. The hope in the mutuality of thought, of different
kinds of becoming over an everyday object, a tire. The everyday meditating over a tire used to
locate, to track, to surveille, to catch, and, by doing so, disarming the mystified power those who
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use such tires have. This moment in the gallery space with the women and the tire is not
photographable because I respect the privacy of those women. It is not documentable within the
evidentiary procedures we ascribe to mediums like photography because to take a photo of it
would be to destroy the moment of contemplating, to draw them from the psychic and invisible
process of critical inquiry and labor they are doing. I can only describe the scene there, attend to
the details of the space I turn around to on that Spring day in 2017, turning to the everyday
contemplating and staying with that people do. The tire in the gallery space allows for this type
of hope to happen. Not a sentimental hope deriving from overwrought imagery of lightness and
daybreak, nor platitudes of a shared humanity unequally experienced. But the hope of linkage,
the hope of straying thought, the associative and speculative hoping in staying with objects and
matter, the hope of what might yet be if we stay a little longer.

147

Coda

Call it a manual of sorts, a how-to guide on how to do ethnography. Writing
Ethnographic Fieldnotes, is a book dedicated to the art of writing fieldnotes, of the writing styles
an ethnographer can use in those beginning stages of field research, how best to document the
peoples and cultures the ethnographer is studying. Under the subheading “Narrating A Day’s
Entry: Organizational Strategies” is the strategy of writing sketches.
In a sketch, the fieldworker, struck by a vivid sensory impression, describes a
scene primarily through detailed imagery. Much as in a photograph, sequencing
of actions does not dominate. Rather, the writer, as a more distanced observer
looking out on a scene, describes what she senses, pausing for a moment in
recounting the action to create a descriptive snapshot of a character or a setting.1

“While the term ‘sketch’ employs a visual metaphor,” the authors continue, “this form of
organizing writing need not rely only on visual details but can also incorporate auditory or
kinetic details as well.” The sketch “lacks any sense of consequential action (of plot) and any full
characterization of people.” As an organizational strategy, and a style of writing, the sketch is
vivid and sensory, attentive to details, to nuance, non-sequential and non-narrative, a horizontal
relationality between objects in a setting. Sketches there in the ethnographer’s fieldnotes so when
the ethnographer embarks upon an article, a monograph, a more finalized piece, they can
invigorate their memory of what was, evoking what is in the moment of the writing. Sketches are
curious exercises in research, writing, and creativity.

1

Emerson et al, Writing Ethnographic Fieldnotes. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2011), 75.
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Throughout the ethnographic primer, fieldnotes, a provisional genre, a genre that is about
process and becoming, is a genre meant to be devoid of evaluative language and interpretive
calls.2 This comes later in the more finished text, as the authors continually emphasize, in the
article or ethnographic monograph. Objectivity, as best as possible when it comes to fieldnotes,
experience-near in Geertz’s conceptualization, as much as can be within these descriptive
sketches and notes.3 This, as the writers make clear, is a means through which to avoid locating
people and cultures within pre-existing conceptual frameworks, classifying before the people and
cultures have a chance to define themselves within their terms and understandings. Clearly, such
explanatory and classificatory work is unavoidably present, the writers are more than willing to
concede, and it is up to the ethnographer to curb these impulses to play the all-knowing
researcher. Indisputably, evaluative and interpretive language, as the case with Lawrence and
modernist travel writing attest, will find their way into descriptive. My proposal throughout
Descriptive Inhumanism has been that there is no need to keep separate the descriptive, the
evaluative, and the interpretive, if it is even possible, as long as all three are aligned in
highlighting how coloniality structures, how it regulates and suppresses and limits, how we
might gesture towards ways of living, thinking, and becoming distinct from coloniality. What is
generative here in the how-to of the fieldnote genre, and the ethics of ethnographic description
and analysis, is the concern over how writing creates people and worlds, the interest over how to
describe is something that is both related to aesthetics and ethics.

2

For more on ethnographic fieldnotes and the politics of ethnographic study, see Paul Atkinson,
The Ethnographic Imagination: Textual Constructions of Reality (New York: Routledge, 1990);
Roger Sanjek ed., Fieldnotes: The Makings of Anthropology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1990).
3
Clifford Geertz. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York:
Basic Books, 1985.
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Descriptive Inhumanism has sought to operate in many ways like a how-to guide, too, a
way of doing a particular mode of critical practice and analysis, attuned to a way of composing
research as creation, as writing practice, as worldmaking. Paying close attention to ways of
writing, to both creative and scholarly writing, as well as the composition of artistic works, has
demonstrated the need for a continued scholarly attention to sensibility and aesthetics, and how
they shape how we represent minoritized peoples. My intention with thinking of Descriptive
Inhumanism as a how-to guide has not been to suggest it is merely a hermeneutic model one can
or should apply to a set of texts. The goal has been to illustrate how following a set of critical
tenets and principles through various texts can string together an analytic practice. Moreover, the
theoretical framework does not magically precede the texts I have looked at. The texts I have
analyzed throughout have shaped the analytic toolbelt I have been able to use. Both method and
texts emerge simultaneously, conditioning one another, and orienting the scholar and reader
towards a mutuality of thought and inquiry. This mutuality is not about consensus or agreement
but rather proximity, the ability to engage and gather to further the study at hand. I hope scholars,
as well as creative writers and artists, may find this study useful for thinking through aesthetic
practice and the politics of representation.
Doing such a co-constitutive intellectual practice emphasizes the through-line of main
concern in this work which has been the questions: How might aestheticizing the nonhuman, the
inhuman, the transformations of matter, do a different kind of socio-political work on behalf of
minoritized humans? What might the confrontation with aesthetic discomfiture, unease, or
uncertainty over human and nonhuman intimacies, of nonhuman and human slippages of form,
do to enact a critical sensibility and episteme which can represent minoritized humans otherwise
from the strictures of liberal humanist rationality? I needed a way of writing and analyzing which
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could do this work, and Descriptive Inhumanism emerged: incrementally, processually, in
fluctuations of affective and intellectual intensity. What takes form is the sustained engagement
with the investigating of what aestheticizing the nonhuman idiom does, and how it can animate
an emancipatory aesthetic and sensibility that seeks to be of the world, more deeply sensed and
felt across differences for queer, anti-racist, decolonial aesthetic practice. From early 20th century
British writers like D.H. Lawrence and Aldous Huxley, to contemporary Latinx writers like
William Archila and Maya Chinchilla, or documentary film and museum exhibitions about
migrant experiences in the desert, all of these texts have gravitated around the concern over how
to aestheticize, how aestheticizing in a descriptively nonhuman idiom elaborates a way of
representing minoritarian peoples against the grain of liberal humanist settler coloniality.
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